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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
G. E. MOORE.

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN EDITORIAL
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A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

 I.—PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD
LECTURES (II.).

BY C. D. BROAD.

B. MIND.

(a) *Enjoyment.*

With this confession I leave S.-T. and pass to Prof. Alexander's views about mind. There are two points to be considered about this, *viz.*, the ontological position of mind and the epistemological question about its knowledge of objects. The former is closely connected with the theory of a hierarchy of complexes with new secondary qualities, and I will set it aside for the present. We are said to enjoy but not to contemplate ourselves and our states and to contemplate but not enjoy qualified complexes of a lower order than minds. Now I find considerable difficulties about both enjoyment and contemplation. I will begin with the former. I might sum up my difficulties about enjoyment in one question: Is enjoyment by a mind a mode of knowledge or only a mode of being? The word *enjoyment* first appears on I., 12. '... I am accustomed to say that the mind enjoys itself and contemplates its objects. The act of mind is an enjoyment, the object is contemplated.' It seems then clear that to be an enjoyment is just to be a mental act. (I exclude for the moment the analogies to enjoyment at lower stages of the hierarchy of qualities.) The meaning of the verb *to enjoy* is more difficult. I take it that it is not intended originally to be an active verb. We enjoy enjoyments; and on this view 'I enjoy X' just means 'X is one of my mental acts'. But then we also have the phrase constantly used, 'I enjoy myself'. This clearly

cannot mean 'I am one of my mental acts'. It presumably must mean 'I am a complex composed of enjoyments'. This interpretation certainly seems to be borne out by the statement that we experience an act in the sense in which we strike a blow, but experience an object in the sense in which we strike a bell. (*Cf.*, I., 12.) If this be so to enjoy is not to know. 'I enjoy X' simply means that X is one of my acts, and it is thus a statement about the nature of X and the complex to which it belongs. It just classifies X as a mental act and assigns it to that complex of such entities which is me.

Yet Prof. Alexander constantly speaks as if to enjoy were to know, and as if we could enjoy things which are certainly not acts of our minds. Thus on I., 21 we are told that the mind in contemplating a horse 'enjoys its togetherness with the horse'. Now this togetherness is a relation between the horse and the state of my brain due to the horse. Hence I do not see that the statement 'I enjoy my togetherness with the horse' can possibly mean—as it ought to do on the above interpretation—'togetherness with the horse is one of my acts'. In fact I am constantly said to enjoy what can also be contemplated; yet I cannot contemplate my mind or its states. Thus in I., Caps. III. and IV., I am said to enjoy the space and time in which my mental processes go on, and these are said to be identical with the space and time in which my brain and its processes exist. Now the latter can of course be contemplated. Thus to say 'I enjoy such and such a space' cannot mean 'Such and such a space is one of my mental acts'; for, in the first place, the statement is perilously near to nonsense, and, in the second, it must imply that some of my mental acts can be contemplated, which is contrary to the theory. Hence the verb 'to enjoy' must have shifted its meaning. One possibility is that Prof. Alexander does here use 'enjoying' as an active verb, and not merely as a verb with a cognate accusative. He may really mean that enjoying is a form of knowing, although a different form from contemplation. On the other hand he *may* not have committed this inconsistency. The phrase 'I enjoy my mental S.-T.' *may* be elliptical. He may only mean that mental events have in fact spatio-temporal characteristics, that these are in fact the same as those of the corresponding neural processes, and that mental events are enjoyed but not contemplated. If this be so the proposition: 'I enjoy the space and time in which my neural processes go on' will only mean: 'I enjoy mental acts which in fact have the same space and time factors as those which can be contemplated in the events of my brain and nervous system'. If this be the

meaning the word 'to enjoy' is of course used ambiguously, but it is not necessarily used to mean or to imply any form of knowledge.

However this may be, the relation between enjoyment and knowledge on Prof. Alexander's view remains to me very obscure. Prof. Alexander often says, as on I., 12, that 'my awareness and my being aware of it are identical'. Now this is an important and characteristic doctrine; but surely it ought to be proved. It cannot surely be meant that to be aware of a tree, and to be aware that I am aware of a tree *mean* the same, and that it is an analytic proposition that there can be no unconscious or unnoticed awarenesses. Of course there is a sense in which it is analytic. No doubt in one sense of *experience* the statements 'I am aware of a tree' and 'I experience my awareness of a tree' mean the same. For, in this sense, *experience* does not mean knowledge; the statement 'I experience my awareness of a tree' merely means 'This awareness of a tree is one of my mental acts'. No one doubts that the word *experience* can be used in this sense. But in this sense I might be 'aware of' all my awarenesses and yet know nothing whatever about them, nor even know that I had them. The important question of fact is: Granted that I experience all my awarenesses in the perfectly trivial sense that they are all awarenesses of mine, am I ever or always aware of them in the sense of knowing them? Prof. Alexander of course denies that I can be aware of them in the sense of contemplating them. If this be so, then either I do not know my states of mind at all, or there must be a form of knowing different from contemplation, and of course different from 'experiencing' in the sense described above; for that is not a form of knowing my states of mind, but the form of being which states of mind have. It would then be a question of fact whether I 'knew' all or only some of my states of mind, in this sense of knowing which is not contemplating.

Against the view that I can contemplate my states of mind Prof. Alexander produces two arguments, one positive and the other negative. The first is on I., 19: 'If I could make my mind an object as well as the tree, I could not regard my mind, which thus takes its own acts and things in one view, as something which subsists somehow beside the tree'. This argument seems to me quite inconclusive. It is not necessary that I should contemplate my mind, but only a certain act of it, *viz.*, this awareness of the tree. Secondly, my mind for Prof. Alexander is a complex continuum of my acts. Therefore, to talk of 'my mind taking its acts and

things in one view' means no more than to say that a certain continuum contains two different constituents, such that the object of the first is the tree, and the object of the second is the first. I do not say that our minds are continua of this kind, but I do not see why they should not be. Certainly there is no incompatibility between this and the fact that our minds are things 'which subsist somehow beside the tree'. Probably the real objection is that on this view one part of my mind would 'subsist beside' another which itself 'subsists beside' the tree. It is probably felt that because a perception and a tree cannot both belong to a single complex which is a mind, therefore a perception and a perception of a perception cannot do so. But this seems a mere prejudice. If I could contemplate my perception of a tree, my contemplation and the perception would doubtless be 'beside' each other, as the perception and the tree are. Of course it is true that the perception and the tree do not both belong to a mind. But this is presumably because trees are not mental, not because they are 'beside' the perception of them. What has to be proved is that the 'besideness' of contemplation is incompatible with both terms being mental and belonging to the same mind. I find this frequently and vigorously asserted, but it does not seem to me self-evident, and no effort is made to prove it.

The negative argument is that introspection, which seems to make against Prof. Alexander's view, can be explained in terms of it. '... An *-ing* (i.e. a mental act) ... may exist in a blurred or subtly dissected form. When that condition of subtle dissection arises out of scientific interests we are said to practise introspection, and the enjoyment is said to be introspected'. The common view is that in introspection a state of mind becomes the object of a fresh act of attention, just as an external object like a flower may. Consistently with his general view Prof. Alexander has to deny this; he has to hold that when a state of mind becomes introspected a change happens in its mode of *being*, not in the fact that it becomes cognised by a later act. Now it seems to me that being always differs from being known. An originally 'blurred' emotion might change in the course of our mental history into a 'subtly dissected' one, but unless both are in some sense known this will not constitute knowledge about the emotion. For this it would seem needful to know both the blurred and the dissected states, and further to recognise such a connexion between the two as makes it reasonable to call the dissected state a dissection of that particular blurred one. It may be that for intro-

spection it is *necessary* that a blurred state shall develop into a dissected one so connected with the former that it can be called the dissection of *it*, but this process itself is not knowledge of the fact that the one state has developed into the other, for no process is the same as the knowledge that it has happened. If you say; 'But this process and all the stages in it are enjoyed', the answer is irrelevant. It only means that the process and the stages in it are mental; to be mental does not *mean* to be known; and if you say that everything mental is *ipso facto* known, you ought to produce some proof for this very doubtful proposition, and to tell us by what kind of knowledge a mental state is known, since you deny that it is contemplated.

Very closely connected with this point is Prof. Alexander's theory about the memory of past states of mind. His theory of the memory of objects is plain and straightforward. It is just a present awareness with a past object bearing the marks of pastness on it. But clearly past states of mind cannot be remembered in this way, because no state of mind can be contemplated at all. Now the great difficulty about remembering past states of mind on any such theory as Prof. Alexander's is this: Suppose I thought about my dinner yesterday, and that to-day I remember this act of thinking. The act of remembering belongs to to-day, the act of thinking which is remembered belongs to yesterday. On the ordinary view there is no difficulty; remembering would be a relation between to-day's act of remembering and yesterday's act of thinking, and there is of course no reason why a cognitive relation should not thus bridge a gap in time. But on Prof. Alexander's view you cannot contemplate a state of mind, you can only enjoy it. And enjoying is not a relation between one state of mind and another; it is merely the mode of existence peculiar to states of mind. Thus a state of mind and the enjoyment of it are essentially contemporary, for the enjoyment of a state of mind is just the existence of that state. Thus memory of past states could not be described as 'a present enjoyment of a past state,' for this would be sheer nonsense; and, on Prof. Alexander's theory, it equally cannot be described as 'a present contemplation of a past state,' because states of mind—whether present or past—cannot be contemplated. What then is a memory of a past state on Prof. Alexander's theory?

I think we can understand his view best by bearing in mind his doctrine of perspectives. It will be remembered that 'space at a moment *t*' did not consist of the spatial characteristics of event-particles at *t* merely, but consisted of

the spatial characteristics of a certain selected group of event-particles of *all* dates. Similarly, I think he holds that 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day' does not consist simply of enjoyments whose date is 10 o'clock to-day. It consists of a certain selected group of enjoyments of various dates. We have seen the principle on which some event-particles of an assigned date are included in, and others excluded from, the perspective of a given event-particle. What is the corresponding principle that includes some of last week's enjoyments in 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day' and excludes others of the same date? The principle seems to be that these past enjoyments which are remembered by me at 10 o'clock to-day and those future enjoyments that are anticipated by me at 10 o'clock to-day are to be included in the selection which constitutes 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day'. All others are to be excluded. If you now ask Prof. Alexander how he reconciles the presentness of my memory of yesterday's thought with the pastness of the thought and with the denial that the one contemplates the other, his answer will be, I take it: 'The remembered thought is past, for its date is yesterday; but there is a present memory of it, because this past enjoyment is included in that set of enjoyments of various dates which constitutes 'your mind at 10 o'clock to-day'.' I support this interpretation by the following passages, all from I., 127: '... The past enjoyment is the way in which the actual past of the mind is revealed in the present; but it is not revealed *as* present'. '... It is not revealed *in* the mind's present, though it forms one part of the total of which another part is the mind's present.' '... It is imagined to persist with the present; and so it does, but it persists as past.' 'If time is real the mind at any present moment contains its past as past.'

Now, as regards this view there are two remarks to be made: (i) As usual there seems to be a confusion between being enjoyed and being known. It may, for all I know, be a precondition of my present memory of my past state that this past state shall form part of 'my mind at the present moment'. But memory surely is a kind of knowledge, and just as it seems to me that the mere existence of a present state in my mind is not knowledge of that state, so equally the mere existence of a past state in my mind is not knowledge of it and therefore is not memory. Surely Prof. Alexander's sound principle that no object gains its existence or its qualities from the fact of being known ought to be supplemented by the equally sound principle that no existent—not even an enjoyment—gets known from the mere fact of ex-

isting and having such and such qualities. It seems to me that his best plan would be (a) to keep his distinction between enjoyment and contemplation, and then (b) to supplement it by a distinction between enjoyment and knowledge by enjoyment (and also probably by one between contemplation and knowledge by contemplation). Knowledge by enjoyment and knowledge by contemplation would then be two different sorts of knowledge by acquaintance, if the latter phrase be used merely as opposed to inferential and to descriptive knowledge. But, whilst contemplation would be acquaintance, enjoyment would not. The doctrine would then assume the following much more plausible form: We have knowledge by acquaintance, in the sense of non-descriptive and non-inferential knowledge, both of external objects and of our own states of mind. But this knowledge is differently conditioned in the two cases. The mere existence of our state of mind is *ipso facto* accompanied by and forms the foundation of direct judgments about them, which we will call knowledge by enjoyment. The mere existence of external objects does not found immediate judgments about them. These require a certain relation between the mind and them, *viz.*, contemplation or acquaintance. This relation does not subsist between minds and their states, and is not needed. When the relation of contemplation subsists between our minds and external objects it founds judgments of contemplation, which resemble judgments of enjoyment in being non-descriptive and non-inferential, but differ in the respects mentioned above. I do not say that this is true, or that it is what Prof. Alexander means, but I cannot help thinking that it would improve his theory.

(ii) Apart from this standing difficulty there is another that is perhaps worth mentioning. Does the statement 'X is a state remembered at *t*' just mean that X is one of the past states included in 'the mind at *t*'? Or does 'the mind at *t*' just mean the selection of states that are present, or past and remembered, or future and anticipated? On either of these alternatives the statement that a past state is remembered if it forms part of the mind at the moment of remembering is merely trivial and analytical. For, in the one case, memory is just defined by reference to the mind at the moment of remembering; and, in the other, the mind at the moment of remembering is just defined by reference to remembered and anticipated states. Prof. Alexander's doctrine of the remembering of past enjoyments is only substantial if (a) those past states which are remembered have some intrinsic distinction from those that are not, and (b) the mind at a

moment is, not a mere artificial, though legitimate, selection of states of various dates, but something naturally marked out and recognisable. Now, I grant that by 'my present self' I do not mean a mere instantaneous cross-section, also that 'my present self' undoubtedly includes my acts of remembering past and anticipating future enjoyments. But, from what has gone before, it evidently does not follow that it contains these past and future enjoyments themselves. That I can make a selection of past, present, and future enjoyments on these principles is obvious enough. And I can *call* such a selection 'my present self'. But that 'my present self,' in this sense, is anything that I actually recognise as a natural unit, or that it is any less artificial than a momentary cross-section, is by no means obvious.

(b) *Contemplation.*

The details of contemplation are very elaborately worked out in Vol. II., and much that is of great value and interest is said there. But I must confine myself to the general outlines and a few special points. It is of the essence of Prof. Alexander's theory that there is no peculiar relation which can be called the cognitive relation. There is one common relation between all finite parts of S.-T. however high or low they may be in the hierarchy of complexes. This is called *compresence*. A stone is compresent with another that attracts it, just as a man's mind is compresent with a stone that he perceives. But we say that the man cognises the stone, whilst we do not say that the one stone cognises the other. The difference is not in the relation, but in the nature of the referent. When a complex which has mentality is compresent with a stone we call the relation cognitive; when a complex that has only mechanical and secondary qualities is compresent with a stone we do not talk of cognition. Since any bit of S.-T. is compresent with any other, since cognition just is the compresence of a complex which has mentality with some lower complex, and since we are complexes with mentality, it might be thought that we ought to cognise everything in the universe below the level of mind. Prof. Alexander's answer is that pairs of finites may not be compresent to each other with respect to all their characters. Thus, things behind my back are not compresent with my mind if I am not thinking of them; but they are still compresent with my body since they exert attractive forces on it. Such things 'never fail to be compresent with me in

some capacity of me,' though they may not be compresent with me in my capacity of a thinking being. (*Cf.* II, 99-100.)

This solution of the difficulty has implications which Prof. Alexander does not explicitly state, and which it is important to notice. He cannot merely mean that unnoticed things are compresent with the part of my body which only lives and does not think, but not with the part that thinks as well as lives. For, if this were so, there would be a finite bit of S.-T.—*viz.*, this latter part—with which they are not compresent; which is contrary to his view. We must therefore suppose that everything is compresent with the part of my body that thinks, but not with it *quâd* thinking. What does this involve? A certain set of motions has the quality q_n , and, consequently, all the lower qualities $q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} \dots$, etc. If everything be compresent with it everything makes some difference to this—as to any other—set of motions. If some things be not compresent with it *quâd* possessing the quality of q_n but only *quâd* possessing (say) $q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} \dots$, etc., this must mean that a set of motions possessing the qualities $q_n, q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} \dots$ can be modified without any modification of q_n . Thus it is implied that there is not an unique correlation between a set of motions that possesses the quality q_n and the quality q_n itself. Presumably the higher your complex the more modification it can undergo without change of its highest quality.

In sensation some sensum B evokes by causal action a set of motions in the brain of an observer. These motions are enjoyed, and the enjoyment of them is the sensation of B. Any other sensum B' would excite different motions, and the enjoyment of these would be the sensation of B'. But suppose we are aware of an image or of a memory. Here the object that we become aware of is not the cause of that brain-state which, as enjoyed, is the awareness of the object. The cause may be purely internal to the body. But the final result is the same, *viz.*, the production of a set of motions which (a) is complex enough to have the quality of consciousness and (b) is 'appropriate to' the object, so as to be the consciousness of it. Just as every finite object that affects our minds produces the appropriate act, so no act exists without an appropriate non-mental object. And this object may be quite independent of the cause of the act. (We shall have to deal later with the apparent exceptions presented by error and illusion.)

The first point that seems to need further light is the relation between 'compresence' and 'appropriateness'. At stages below life and mind it would seem that compresence

practically comes down to causal influence, and that appropriateness is secured by the assumption that any difference in the cause involves a difference in the effect and conversely. The explanation also applies at the level of mind in the case of sensation. When I am aware of an image the image and the brain-process are compresent, and the latter is appropriate to the former. But the compresence does not here mean causal influence, and thus the appropriateness cannot be secured by any axiom about causation. It would seem that here the appropriateness must be the primary fact, and the compresence derived from it. We call this image compresent with this act of imaging because the latter is appropriate to the former and not to any other object.

Now the question that arises is: What justifies the assertion that every act has an appropriate object in the non-mental world? An act is a certain brain-state with a mental quality. This may be produced by causes which have no connexion with the object to which such an act is appropriate. Surely we might expect such acts to be constantly happening in the absence of any appropriate object. Nor do I see how we could tell in any given case whether there was an appropriate object or not. A certain brain-state is produced by causes internal to our bodies; this brain-state is complex enough to be conscious and we enjoy it; and we define the consciousness of the appropriate object to be this enjoyment. What is to prevent all this going on even if there be no appropriate object in the non-mental world? The object has nothing to do with the causation of the brain-state, so that might happen in its absence. The object has nothing to do with the brain-state being conscious, for that is entirely dependent on the structure and complexity of the brain-state itself. So the brain-state could be conscious in the absence of the appropriate object. But the enjoyment of a brain-state which is conscious just is the awareness of the appropriate object. Thus I cannot see what prevents the awareness of an object from existing although no such object exists, has existed, or will exist. Prof. Alexander's epistemology is of course meant to be thoroughly realistic; but his account of what constitutes consciousness of an object seems to me to involve all the difficulties of extreme subjective idealism. The reason is not far to seek. Compresence at the lower level of existence shows itself as causal influence, and the peculiarity of this relation is that if *a* exists *A* can only influence it causally if *A* also exists. Thus, in this sense of compresence, the existence of *a* is a guarantee of the existence of anything else that is compresent with it. But at

the cognitive level compresence does not always or usually show itself as causal influence; the enjoyed conscious brain-state *a* can be compresent with the object *A* though there is no causal influence between them. If we ask what constitutes compresence in such cases the answer apparently is that compresence here shows itself as appropriateness. Now the appropriateness of *a* to *A* only means that there is a one-one correlation¹ between the two, that a different *a* would be the awareness of a different *A* and conversely. But this relation of appropriateness, unlike the causal relation, does not guarantee the existence of one term given that the other exists. It is a mere correlation of the internal structure of two terms. Thus *a* might exist and be appropriate to *A*, but this would be no guarantee of *A*'s existence. For to say that *a* is appropriate to *A* only means that if there be any object of which *a* is the awareness then that object must have the *A* structure and not (say) the *B* structure. A certain key will only fit a certain lock; but if keys and locks be produced independently the existence of the key is no guarantee of the existence of an appropriate lock. So it seems that the theory tries to make the best of both worlds. It tells us that the relation of act to object is that of compresence; we ask for an illustration of this and are offered instances of causal influence between physical objects. In these instances if one term exists all others compresent with it must exist too. Then we find that acts and objects do not as a rule have this relation, but another, called appropriateness, which does not have the peculiar property that if one of its terms is an existent the other must be so too. But we slur over this difference, because we are told that appropriateness just is compresence, and we remember that the examples of compresence which we have met were such that if one term exists so must the other.

I suppose that Prof. Alexander's answer would be somewhat as follows: Compresence is one and the same relation everywhere, and the feature that we notice in causal influence is common to all instances of compresence. Now every finite is compresent with other finites. A conscious state *a* exists. Our general principle implies that there will be other finites compresent with it. And the nature of compresence is such that these must themselves exist. Among the other existent finites only that one which is appropriate to *a* is compresent with it. But, since *something* must be compresent with it,

¹ Perhaps more strictly a many-one correlation, since presumably different brain-states enjoyed by different people can be awarenesses of the same object.

and since only an *appropriate* finite could be compresent with it, there must exist a finite appropriate to *a*. If this be the right interpretation we have three independent premises: (i) All finites are compresent with some other finite in respect to any assigned quality of them; (ii) What is compresent with an existent finite exists; (iii) Finites that have the quality of consciousness are compresent in respect to this quality only with other finites that are appropriate to them. It follows formally from these premises that every cognitive act has an appropriate object which exists. It is often difficult to distinguish what Prof. Alexander assumes and what he claims to prove, and the above tedious discussion is perhaps justified if it disentangles the premises and the conclusions of his theory of contemplation. It leaves me with a very grave doubt as to whether there is one single relation of compresence, the same at all levels, and differentiated only by the different qualities of the relatum. At the lowest level compresence is just the fact that two finites are both bits of one continuous S.-T. This is easy enough to understand, and it is easy to see that every finite is in this sense compresent with every other. But at the stage of mind compresence has become rigidly selective, there is a one to one relation between cognitive state and appropriate object. It is obvious enough that what is compresent with an existent must itself exist, if compresence merely means coexistence as finite bits of one S.-T. But it is by no means so obvious when this meaning has dropped into the background, as it has done at the level of mind and its objects. Prof. Alexander offers other illustrations of this sense of compresence which is independent of causation. He takes them from the sphere of life. An animal acts appropriately to catch prey which he does not now see. The prey does not cause the action, yet the action is appropriate to the prey. This does not seem to me a very happy illustration. If the animal does not yet perceive its victim (say a mouse) its present action is appropriate only in a general sense; it is one that can equally be continued into the movements needed for catching a mouse or into those needed for catching a bird. On the other hand the act of imagining a future scene is supposed to be not merely appropriate in a general way to the image, but to be uniquely correlated with it. Again, it is asserted that a mental act cannot exist without an appropriate object; and we have objected that on Prof. Alexander's view it is difficult to see why this should be so certain. Now cats often make the appropriate movements for catching mice and then fail to catch them—sometimes because it is not a mouse

but a bit of dead leaf that starts their actions. Thus the illustrative analogy is rather in favour of our objection than of Prof. Alexander's theory.

(c) *Appearance and Illusion.*

This brings us to Prof. Alexander's view about appearance and illusion, a subject which is always the crux of realist theories of perception. He distinguishes between real, mere, and illusory appearances. Real appearances are genuine parts of a perceived thing. From different positions we perceive different parts of the same thing and these are its real appearances. An example is the elliptical visual appearances of a circular object. Mere appearances are real parts of some complex of several things. Thus the bent visual appearance of a stick half out of water is a mere appearance of the stick, because it is not a part of the stick as such but of the more complex thing 'stick-in-different-media'. Lastly, illusory appearances are cases where the observing mind intrudes itself into what is observed. 'An illusory appearance is so only so far as it is supposed—either instinctively . . . or by . . . judgment—to belong to the real thing of which it seems to be an appearance.'

There is an interesting comparison (II., 191-192) between this view and Prof. Stout's, which throws some further light on the above distinctions. For Stout all appearances would be at best *mere*; for in any apprehension by us of external objects our own bodies are concerned, and the appearance apprehended is a function of them as well as of the external object. Prof. Alexander says: 'For us this position is unacceptable, because the action of the sense-organ is part of the process of sensing . . . not its object . . . The distorting or qualifying thing must be either observed or observable in the sensible object.' I do not quite understand whether Prof. Alexander's difference from Stout on this point is substantial or only verbal. Does he accept Stout's view that changes in the sense-organ modify the apprehended appearance as much as changes in the medium between the the body and the external object? If so, the difference is merely verbal. Prof. Alexander just refuses to call variations due to my eye mere appearances because I do not and cannot perceive my eye when I perceive an external object by means of it. But I equally do not and cannot perceive my glasses when I perceive external objects through them; are we to say that distortions and changes of colour due to them are real appearances? If you answer that I can see my glasses

at other times, it is equally true that I can see my eye at other times by making suitable arrangements. If, on the other hand, Prof. Alexander intends to deny the facts alleged by Stout he has a very difficult position to maintain. So far as I can see the eye, with its lense, behaves exactly like any other optical instrument such as a camera or a magnifying glass, and no sharp distinction can be drawn between the bodily and the non-bodily conditions of the variation of appearances.

As regards real appearances of shape and size Prof. Alexander has a very interesting theory. In the first place he holds that spatial characteristics are not perceived by means of any of our sense-organs but by the brain. The use of eyes, ears, etc., is to make us aware of the secondary qualities possessed by complicated motion-complexes. But these motion-complexes *quâ* bits of S.-T. excite areas or volumes in our brains. The enjoyment of these volumes is the awareness of the shapes and sizes (and, I think, distances) of the external object. Since our brains are only affected through our special sense-organs we cannot *intuit* the spatio-temporal attributes of an external thing without at the same time *sensing* some of its secondary qualities. Hence we think that we sense the spatio-temporal attributes; but this is a mistake. Really we intuit the contour of a thing by our brains and sense the secondary qualities which belong to the motion-complexes within that contour by means of our special organs of sense. Now Prof. Alexander points out the important fact that, although a circular disc looks smaller as we move it away from us, and although it looks elliptical as we turn it round, yet the felt and the seen contours continue to coincide. Though we see an ellipse and feel a circle there is at no point a gap between the two. Now what we see at any moment is those event-particles from which light reaches us at that moment. These are not contemporary. If we are looking straight down on the disc the centre is nearer to us than the outside parts, light has therefore further to travel, and so what we see at the centre is earlier than what we see at the outside. The further we are from the disc the less is the difference in time between the central and the peripheral events that we see and this difference apparently is seen as decreased size. Similar remarks apply to the elliptic visual appearances. Thus all can be regarded as parts of the one thing because the thing is something with a history and the visual appearances are selections of events of different dates in that history. Touch, though not perfect, gives us the nearest approximation to the real geometrical properties of things.

The above theory, if I have understood it aright, seems to me to contain a very valuable suggestion for dealing with conflicts between sight and touch. Once we remember that things are not momentary volumes but have a history, and consequently are extended in four dimensions, we see that the phrase '*the shape of a thing*' needs definition, and we see that the object of vision on a realist view cannot be a set of contemporary parts of the thing. And, if space and time be so closely bound up with each other as Prof. Alexander holds, temporal differences in an object might, I suppose, be interpreted as spatial differences. But these valuable hints need considerable working out. In the first place, when Prof. Alexander says that touch gives us the nearest approximation to 'the real geometrical properties of things,' we should like a clear definition of what is meant by *the shape* or *the size* of a thing, taken as a four-dimensional contour. Secondly, the touch that assures us that a disc is circular is *successive* touch; we run our fingers round the edge. Thus the object of touch no more consists of contemporary event-particles than does that of sight. And the more slowly we run our fingers round the edge the greater will be the time differences between the event-particles felt. These differences thus (*a*) depend on our own action, and (*b*) are much greater than any that occur in the object of sight (for the latter are inversely proportional to the velocity of light, and the former to that of our fingers). It seems odd then that the deliveries of touch should be so constant as compared with those of sight, if the variations in those of sight be due to time differences in the different parts of the seen object.

The theory of illusory appearances I find more difficult to follow. The general principles are clear enough. In *all* perception there is ideal supplementation of a sensum by association. If the perception be not illusory this supplement can be verified by sense in the perceived object on further experience. If it be illusory it cannot. 'An angel would see illusory appearances as mere appearances,' because he can contemplate the percipient's mind as well as the perceived thing, and can thus see—what we cannot—that the attribute ascribed to the latter really belongs to the complex thing composed of it and the former (II, 213). The main difficulty is over illusory sensations. Suppose I see a certain patch as green (through contrast) when it is really not green. Then according to Alexander (*a*) the green that I see is actually in the world, (*b*) it is not merely an universal green that I apprehend, and (*c*) the mode of filling a patch with a colour is a real factor in the world. The illusion

consists in seeing the real particular green, in the real relation of 'filling' a contour to which it does not stand in this relation. On II., 214, we are told that 'the actual intuited space of the grey patch is filled with the green quality'. And the cause is that 'the mind squints at things, and one thing is seen with the characteristics of something else' (II., 216). Now I really do not see how all these statements can be reconciled. A certain intuited contour is filled with a grey colour, and this means that motions of a certain kind are going on within it. We see this patch as green. The particular green of the patch really is somewhere else in the world. Where precisely? Let us say in a particular piece of grass. This means that in the contour of the piece of grass motions of another kind are going on. In what way and in what sense can our minds put the particular green of this bit of grass into this grey contour? The statement that 'the actual space of the grey patch is filled with the green quality' suggests that the mind really transfers (in a perfectly literal sense) the green motions of the bit of grass into the grey contour. But if it does this the originally grey contour really is green for the time being, and there is no illusion; whilst presumably the bit of grass must really cease to be green. This cannot be what Prof. Alexander means; but I can offer no suggestion as to his real meaning here.

C. THE HIERARCHY OF QUALITIES.

I regard this doctrine as perhaps the most important thing in Prof. Alexander's book. I believe that something of the kind will prove to be the necessary and sufficient means of settling the embittered controversies between mechanists and vitalists, if only the extremely muddle-headed protagonists on both sides could be got to see what they are really arguing about. And I think that Prof. Alexander is quite right in holding that the question ought to be raised at a much lower level than that of life or mind, certainly at that of chemical action at least. It is needless to enlarge on the doctrine, for the general outlines of it will be clear enough from examples that have occurred earlier in this paper. There are just two points, however, that call for some criticism.

(i) Prof. Alexander holds that if a complex has the quality q_n then it is always a specialised part of it that will possess the quality. This part will indeed also possess all the lower qualities q_{n-1}, q_{n-2}, \dots . But the rest will *only* possess q_{n-1}, q_{n-2}, \dots . I do not see any very good reason for this view. It is of course suggested by the analogy of the brain, which

has consciousness as well as life, etc., and is an integral part of a larger whole which has life, etc., but no consciousness. But I do not see why *e.g.*, a coloured physical object *must* consist of specialised coloured motions dotted about within a contour among others that are merely mechanical. It *may* be so, and it provides Prof. Alexander with a convenient way of dealing with intensity; but that seems to be the only argument in favour of this possibility.

(ii) It is not clear to me that 'quality' is used in the same sense all through the alleged hierarchy. *E.g.*, red seems to me to be a quality of a certain motion-complex in one sense, and life to be a quality of a more elaborate complex in a very different sense. By saying that a body is living I just *mean* that its motions and other changes fit into each other and into the environment in certain characteristic ways. The statement is an analysis of its characteristic modes of change. But by saying that a motion is red I certainly do not *mean* that it is a vibration of such and such frequency. The statement is not an analysis of its characteristic mode of motion, but is the assertion that a property, which is not analysable in terms—such as velocity, frequency, etc., that apply directly to motions as such, occupies the same contour as a certain set of motions. Prof. Alexander holds that organic *sensa* are characteristic of living bodies and are contemplated by us when we have organic sensations. If this be true organic *sensa* are qualities of living bodies in precisely the same sense in which colours are qualities of certain non-living bodies. But the *life* of a living body does not seem to me to be a quality of it in this sense, for the reasons stated above.

We are told that the characteristic behaviour of a living being could be exhibited *without remainder* in physico-chemical terms, provided only that the nature of the physical constellation were known. 'If we could secure the right sort of machine it would be an organism and cease to be a material machine' (II, 66). Yet life is not an epiphenomenon; such and such a constellation *could not* exist without life. Similarly I suppose that such and such a vibration *could not* exist without being red. Now I agree with this; but I believe that the 'could not' has a different meaning in the two cases. If life could be exhibited without residue in physico-chemical terms, it is because life just *means* characteristic modes of change. A machine that moved and changed as a living organism does would be alive by definition.¹ The necessity here is

¹ Though the very important difference remains that such a machine would be an *artificial organism*, *i.e.*, one produced by the deliberate action

analytical. But I do not see that red can in this sense 'be exhibited without residue in physico-chemical terms,' because no part of the *meaning* of 'red' has anything to do with motion and change. I agree that there is a perfectly good sense in saying that the vibrations which in fact are red could not fail to be red. But I understand this to be a synthetic proposition asserting it to be a law of nature that such and such types of vibration are always accompanied by such and such a colour. The statement about life is like saying that a figure all of whose points are equidistant from a fixed point could not fail to be circular; the statement about red is like saying that a ruminant cannot fail to be cloven-footed.

The sense in which it is certain that life can be exhibited without residue in chemical and physical terms is that by calling a body alive we mean no more than that it changes and moves in such and such characteristic ways. (I omit the question of organic sensa.) The sense in which it is nevertheless possible that there is something new in an organised body is that (a) it may be impossible even theoretically to deduce all the behaviour of such a complex from the most exhaustive knowledge of what its parts would do if they were not in such a complex; and (b) even if the parts obey precisely the same *laws* within as without this complex, and if therefore the peculiar behaviour of living bodies comes down to a question of *collocations*, there is still the question whether the laws and collocations of the inorganic world will account for the coming together of these organic collocations. Neither colour nor consciousness can be exhibited without residue in physical and chemical terms in the sense in which life can, since to be coloured or to be conscious does not mean to move in certain peculiar ways. The only sense in which red can be exhibited without residue in physical terms is that, since redness and a certain sort of movement are constantly connected, any proposition which ascribes a predicate to red objects can be replaced by one which ascribes the same predicate to movements of the sort that are red.

D. UNIVERSALS.

Universals on Prof. Alexander's view are patterns which are or may be repeated in S.-T. Individuals are complexes of S.-T. The configuration of an individual is particular, but it follows a plan which may be repeated by other configurations

of mind, whilst an ordinary organism is rather a *natural machine*, produced so far as we know, without any deliberate design. This is the really queer thing about organisms.

at the same time or by this configuration at different times. We might be tempted to hold that it is a plan as such that constitutes an universal, and that it is merely a contingent fact that all plans are plans of configurations of S.-T. This Prof. Alexander would deny; all possibility is rooted in the actual, all that is actual is S.-T., and it is part of the *meaning* of a plan to be a plan of a configuration of S.-T. The essence of universality is that configurations of the same spatio-temporal pattern can exist anywhere in S.-T. This, Prof. Alexander thinks, is only possible because S.-T. has an uniform 'curvature' in Gauss's sense.

The last statement seems to me to be much too sweeping. We must recognise a hierarchy of universals. Let us start with something that is merely geometrical and take the series:—circles of 1" radius, circles, closed conics, conics in general. Now suppose that the curvature of S.-T. were not uniform. Then (a) circles of 1" radius might still be possible at some places and times though not at all; (b) even if there could be nowhere and nowhen circles of 1" radius, circles of smaller radius might be possible at various times and places; (c) even if this were not so conic sections of some kind might be possible always and everywhere, so far as I can see. Thus many variations in the curvature of S.-T. might be imagined which would only cut out universals of the lowest order, *i.e.*, those whose instances are particulars, such as circles of 1" radius, and would leave higher universals, such as conics in general, standing. And, unless it be essential to an universal to be capable of having instances *always* and *everywhere*, many variations of curvature would be compatible with the subsistence even of lowest universals like circles of 1" radius.

When we pass to more concrete universals like cats and dogs, the argument is stronger still. I cannot imagine why the existence of dogs requires complete constancy of curvature. It is admitted that no two dogs are exactly alike in shape, and that any dog changes its shape considerably in the course of its history. Thus the curvature of S.-T. might vary considerably from place to place and from moment to moment without prejudice to the possibility of things built on the pattern of dogs, or even of pug-dogs, existing always and everywhere. Of course if S.-T. were such that a pug in one place was rolled out into the shape of a dachshund by merely chasing a cat from one end of a garden to the other, the universals 'pug' and 'dachshund' could hardly be said to subsist. But S.-T. might vary in curvature without varying so wildly as this; and, even if it were so wild, the universals 'dog' and 'cat' might still subsist unmoved.

E. DEITY.

I do not quite know how seriously Prof. Alexander intends his theology to be taken. I suppose it is a point of honour with Gifford Lecturers to introduce at least the *name* of God somewhere into the two volumes, and we may congratulate Prof. Alexander on the ingenuity which discovered a place in his system for something to which this name might be not too ludicrously applied. Whether the religious consciousness will be satisfied with Prof. Alexander's God I cannot say. He modestly professes to have very little personal experience of religion, and, as I too come very much nearer to 'our countryman Dr. Middleton' than to 'the Cardinal Baronius' on that 'theological barometer' suggested by Gibbon, of which these two theologians were to form 'the opposite and remote extremities,' it would ill become me to say what the religious consciousness does want. Prof. Alexander's candidate for the position of God has the two merits of being necessarily mysterious to us, and being in a definite sense higher than ourselves. The vaulted roof of St. Pancras station seen at midnight has been known to evoke the religious emotion in one eminent mathematician returning to Cambridge from a dinner in town; and what the sight of St. Pancras has done for one man, the thought of the next stage in the hierarchy of qualities may do for others. It might indeed seem difficult to feel much enthusiasm about a God who does not yet exist, and who will cease to be divine as soon as he begins to be actual. Still the merit of faith is commonly held to increase with its difficulty, and the merit of religious adoration may vary according to a similar law.

Frankly it seems to me that the doctrine of what Prof. Alexander calls 'deity' is an integral and important part of his system, but I suspect that it is not what anyone else means by deity, and that it has been somewhat strained to make it fit in verbally with the concepts of religion and theology. If Prof. Alexander really does feel towards his deity as religious persons do towards their God I apologise most humbly for poking fun at it.

The theological reference seems to have warped the discussion in at least two ways. (i) We hear much more of the quality of deity as such than about the beings who would possess it. This is because the former is identified with God, whilst the latter would merely be gods, and polytheism is out of fashion. But all sorts of interesting questions could be raised about gods in Prof. Alexander's sense. There may be gods, with respect to us, existing now. If there be we might

stand in one of two different relations to them. Our brains might be parts of a god. This might be true of some of us and not of others. The 'good old German God' might be more than a myth if it would consent to forego its capital letter. The quality of deity might belong to a material system composed of special parts of the brains of all Germans or of all Hohenzollerns. Taking the latter hypothesis the brains (and consequently the minds) of Hohenzollerns would be connected with the good old German god in a way comparable to that in which the merely living part of our bodies is connected with our brains, which think as well as live. The brains of other Germans would only stand to the German god in a sort of relation in which (say) plants stand to animals. In general, if any gods exist now, parts of the brains of some of us might be parts of a material system which has deity. Others of us might have no share in any god. Or it might be that all men and no animals stand in the more intimate relation to some god. We might expect that if some men stand in a much more intimate relation to deity than others this would show itself in their lives and thoughts. With half the ingenuity that Prof. Alexander has lavished on proving that his God has many of the attributes ascribed by theologians to their God, I would undertake to work some of the most characteristic doctrines of the Christian religion into his system on the basis of the possibilities outlined above.

(ii) I think that the theological implications of Prof. Alexander's phraseology have led him into a quite unjustifiable optimism. He seems to hold (a) that S.-T. will always go on producing higher and higher complexes with new and more wonderful qualities, and (b) that we ought to regard these new qualities with something of the love and reverence which religious persons feel for their God. But these assumptions seem to me quite baseless. (a) What we know of nature, apart from alleged divine revelations, rather tends to suggest that the higher complexes, such as those that carry life and mind, are unstable; that they can only arise and persist under very exceptional conditions; and that these conditions are unlikely to be permanent. (b) What we know of the relations between beings who have only life and those which have both life and mind does not justify a very comforting view of the probable relations between ourselves and gods. Animals have life and mind; plants, I suppose, only life. The main relation of the worshipper to the god in this case is that the latter eats the former when it can. Whilst this presents an interesting variation of the religious

conception of the Sacramental Meal, it may cause the timid worshipper to view the coming of the Kingdom with a certain degree of apprehension.

I must bring this long discussion of Prof. Alexander's book to an end. I have mainly mentioned points where I disagree or feel difficulty. The system is so original, and so many hard questions are dealt with in the book, that it is almost certain that I have misinterpreted Prof. Alexander in many places. It will necessarily take the philosophic world some time to think itself into the new positions, and we are bound to make mistakes in the process. The author himself must give us help on the way; and it is in the hope that he may be moved to do this in the pages of *MIND* that I have 'praised with faint damns,' which, I hope, have not disguised my admiration for a great work of philosophic speculation, nobly conceived and conscientiously carried through.

II.—HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY AND ITS CRITICS. (II.).

BY FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

THE STANDARD OF RIGHT.

ACCORDING to Hume, as we have seen, the term "right," when applied to conduct, means that the person judging believes himself to have abstracted from all relation of the action to his private interests, and from all accidental relations to himself of whatever kind they may be. Right represents the desires of an impartial observer of the situation. Since human beings are constantly supposing themselves impartial in their judgments when in fact they are not, the actual judgments of the race contradict each other to an enormous extent, and varying types persist through generations or centuries. Of all the mass of human judgments those alone may properly be called "correct" or valid which are the expression of a thorough-going, all-sided impartiality, because they alone really are what they give themselves out as being.

This conception of right raises two questions fundamental to ethics: Is there some one standard valid not merely for you or me, but for the race? And if so, what is it? Hume's attitude towards the first question we shall find it convenient to reserve for later consideration, premising only that he believes in the existence of a universal standard. Turning to the second question we are compelled to say that Hume answers it in only very general terms. The conduct approved is that which is useful or agreeable to the agent or others. This is well enough as far as it goes, but it is only half an answer. The really interesting problems are still before us. In life it constantly happens that we are compelled to choose between the good of one person or group and that of another; or again between the harm of one party and that of another. In such cases which interest or set of interests ought to prevail? Hume recognises at one point or another—though he nowhere undertakes a systematic presentation of the subject—that three very different

and sometimes incompatible principles are used by the men in the street in solving problems of this kind: They are: (1) One ought to choose the *greater* good, or, where harm or loss is inevitable, the less harm. (2) Where the actor himself or a member of his family is one of the parties affected, he ought to choose the *nearer* good, even where the result is a net loss for those affected. (3) The good of *those who are worthy of admiration* ought to be preferred to the good of those who are not; and the good of the more admirable ought to be preferred to that of the less admirable. With changed terms, the same principle is applied to the distribution of necessary evils. In so far as the admired are admired for moral qualities (3) becomes the principle that claims are a function of moral desert or merit.

Now, as has been said, Hume sees these facts, but just as he nowhere presents them as a whole so he never subjects them to a serious and systematic examination with a view to solving the problems of validity which they present. Why, we can only guess. Of one thing we may be sure, however, namely that he had a pretty well defined view of his own, for bits of it are dropped here and there. All that we can do to-day is to pick up the crumbs which fell from his table. His contributions to this subject—if this be not too pretentious a name for them—deal with just two items. Both have to do with the claims of the “nearer” good.

Logically the definition of right in terms of impartiality requires a modification of the doctrine that morality has its source exclusively in concern for the good of others. Hume has nowhere discussed this subject in the light of his general conception of right; but he leads his readers to the necessary conclusion by a different route.

Taken literally a view which reduces all morality to benevolence can only lead to Comte's maxim: Live for others, in the sense of, Live solely for others. But Hume has discovered the inner contradiction at the root of such an ideal. In showing that the institution of private property would have no place in a society governed by the spirit of universal benevolence, he writes: “Suppose that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows: it seems evident that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why should I

bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the desired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me? in which case, he knows that, from my innate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent generosity."¹ This is the principle which in the *Essay on Suicide* he states in the words: "I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expense of a great harm to myself."² This is the only conclusion which his definition of right permits. Impartiality works both ways. The moral point of view is the Copernican point of view. It does indeed thrust self from the position it tends to arrogate to itself at the centre of the universe, but it assuredly does not annihilate it. In accordance with this insight we shall have to say that Hume's system involves the view that the desire from which springs the valid moral judgment is the impartial desire for good as such; and Love thy neighbour as thyself, rather than Live solely for others, is the requirement of the moral ideal.

A second problem on which Hume has expressed his opinion concerns the claims of the greater good and the good of one's family and friends when the two conflict as they occasionally do. Hume recognises that public opinion in many instances regards the latter alternative as having the higher claim. He himself denies the validity of this claim, and asserts that the common belief arises from that failure to be impartial which is precisely the source of invalid moral judgments.³ It cannot be said that he has worked out the doctrine of the subject satisfactorily. He has left it with a bare affirmation. And there it stands, a fundamental problem of ethics, of great theoretical if not practical significance, almost completely ignored by moralists till the present day.

The claims of the greater good, as we have seen, sometimes come into conflict with another ideal, that of the treatment of men according, not to the amount of their need or the good that can be conferred upon them, but according to their merit. Hume recognises in one place the existence of the judgments that directly approve preferential treatment

¹ *Enquiry*, sec. iii., pt. i., G. ii., 180; S.-B. 184.

² *Essays*, G. ii., 413.

³ *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 261-262; S.-B. 488-489; pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 341-342; S.-B. 582-583. Other illustrations of failure in impartiality as a cause of invalid moral judgments will be found also in the following passages: *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. i., sec. ii., G. ii., 248, S.-B. 472; pt. iii., sec. i., G. ii., 344; S.-B. 585.

of the meritorious and the inflicting of suffering upon the evil doer as an end in itself, and explains it.¹ But in no place does he even express an opinion upon the validity of such judgments, except, of course, by implication. Of the problems, in particular, which are involved in the recognition of moral judgments based upon the desire of harm for harm's sake there is no genuine recognition in any of his writings.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL VALIDITY.

Nevertheless the problems of retribution are of the greatest theoretical, to say nothing of practical, importance. For they raise in its most acute form the question whether there is one standard valid for the entire race. They represent an ideal of hate face to face with an ideal of love. Since some persons accept the former where others reject it the question arises, which attitude is the proper one. Or must we rather say, as Socrates said to Crito: "Those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ".

My own answer is that there is a solution of this problem of retributive punishment which follows directly from the foundations of Hume's system. To understand it we must distinguish between two features of Hume's definition of right which as yet we have not attempted to separate. The impartiality involved in the nature of the moral judgment means impartiality of attitude towards the goods and evils of life, and, properly speaking, it means nothing more than this. Three such attitudes are possible, that of friendliness to goods, that of indifference, that of enmity. Hume recognises in his formal descriptions of the moral judgment only the first, so that for him morality consists (as we have phrased it) in equal *concern* for equal interests. But, as we have just noted, there exist judgments which have a *prima facie* claim to be called moral which are based upon enmity. And the question we have to face is, Can they justify their claim to validity? This is to ask whether, if we weigh equal interests with equal scales, we can find a place in the moral ideal for the demands of retribution.

To answer this question we must note that the great, indeed the overwhelming, majority of our moral judgments have their source in what (using the terms of the preceding paragraph) we may call friendliness to goods; otherwise

¹ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.: G. ii., 349; S.-B., 591. Cf. *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 213; S.-B. 226.

stated, in the desire that goods may exist. This is not merely true as a fact, it must be true in any human society which we can conceive of as existing on this earth. For the desire for the realisation of the good is constructive, but the desire for the infliction of evil is destructive. Universal destruction of values for destruction's sake would mean the ruin and death of the society in which it prevailed. The approbation of the infliction of harm for harm's sake is thus conceivable only as a sporadic irruption into an alien system of ideals.

It is on the basis of the impartial desire for the preservation and increase of values that we demand that a man shall moderate his ambition, his love of power, of money, and similar springs of action, till he brings them to a point where they are in harmony with the well-being of the whole of which he is a member. On what ground then can we urge an exception to this rule in favour of the desire for vengeance? Either this is a piece of favouritism, a dispensation granted to one desire that is not granted to others, or it is not. If the inclusion of the demand for retribution can be shown to involve no favouritism, then it ceases to appear as a rival standard; it takes its place in the organised system of values that make up the moral ideal as Hume conceives it. It therefore presents no exception to the doctrine of a universally valid moral standard, and is therefore of no farther concern in the treatment of the present topic. On the other hand, if its inclusion in our code of conduct is mere partiality, a determination to stand at all odds for what we happen to like, then we may like it as much as we will, it can nevertheless claim no place among moral judgments. Nor can it be raised to this dignity by the simple expedient of throwing the demands of the desire into the form of a universal judgment: Let all, whether others or me myself, who have committed such deeds, be made to suffer in return. For this formula as it stands is a mere counterfeit of the impartiality required for the moral judgment. It is obtained by picking out one interest of one party and universalising it. Whereas genuine impartiality requires equal concern for *all* interests, those of the victim as well as those of the would-be avenger. The mistake is the same as that made by Mr. Spencer in the use of his formula of freedom: Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. As Mr. Spencer actually interprets this principle—except occasionally when caught in a corner—this means: I am at liberty to play the piano in my apartment all night long provided I am willing to allow the other residents of the same building to do the same thing. Here

obviously there is a failure to weigh all the interests concerned, which is concealed from view by our willingness to share with others the favoured one. The same is true of the demand for retribution. It has its source in a certain desire. Its advocate declares himself willing to universalise this desire. But in supposing that he has thereby transformed a personal desire into a moral ideal he forgets that there are other interests involved in the situation—those of the victim, for instance, which demand their chance to be brought to the scales and to have their part in determining the decision.

The only moral code in which the demand for retribution could find a place for itself would be one built from the ground up on the basis of a consistently impartial hatred for all goods. And such a code, as we have said, never has existed as far as we are aware, does not exist, and as far as we can see never will exist under any conditions concerning which it is worth our while to speculate.

I have introduced this discussion not for its own sake but as a means of approach to the question left unanswered above. Is there one code valid for the race? The approbation of retributive punishment is the most striking and important of the apparent exceptions. If it can be shown that this as well as all the lesser variations from the principle that that conduct is right which aims at the greatest attainable good of those affected—if it can be shown that these variations are all due to a failure to meet the conditions which we suppose ourselves to have met in calling an action right, then our question is answered in the affirmative.

What then is Hume's share in this result? I reply: His definition of right has supplied the instrument by which it was gained. The method employed is that which he himself employs here and there—very incompletely no doubt—to distinguish between valid and invalid judgments. Finally the conclusion reached is that which Hume himself accepts and argues for with a great deal of earnestness.

Since he himself, however, in his official arguments, so to speak, in behalf of universality does not use the method above presented, it may not be superfluous to examine the grounds upon which he does rest his doctrine of universality. He discusses the subject in two places.

In the *Enquiry* he affirms that regard for others ("humanity") is either universal in the race or is universal in all those who have not destroyed it by a career of crime. Ignoring the demands of malevolence and treating, as he usually does, morality as a matter of the service of others, he thence con-

cludes to the existence of a code which is valid either for all or for practically all the members of the race.¹

In the essay entitled "A Dialogue" he reaches substantially the same conclusion in a different manner. Here the diversities of the moral judgment are reduced to two classes, as follows: "Sometimes men differ in their judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action: Sometimes also the peculiar circumstances of things render one moral quality more useful than others, and give it a peculiar preference".² Confining our attention to the first which will supply the principle for dealing with the second, it is easy to show that the whole argument is from Hume's own point of view an *ignoratio elenchi*. The differences in judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action are differences in what Hutcheson, reviving a scholastic distinction, calls material rightness. Some moralists seem to scorn this distinction as a trivial one. It is precisely the reverse. Every voluntary act involves (1) a view of the situation in which one is about to act, and (2) a purpose, or if you prefer, an intention to bring about a certain state of things. Now on Hume's own view an error in (1) is not an error in moral judgment; it is an error of the intellect (whether of the individual or of his time) committed in the attempt to examine the facts of the situation. Most of us would agree, for example, that it is an error to suppose that the negro is on the whole better off, in any reasonable sense of that term, under a white master than as a free man; we shall be equally ready to agree that it is an error to think of eternal salvation as depending upon the acceptance or rejection of this or that theological dogma. From this point of view the holding of slaves and the burning of heretics are materially wrong; *i.e.*, they are things which cannot be done by a man controlled by a moral purpose *who sees the situation as it really is*. Formal rightness, on the other hand, has to do with the purpose as such. The question of formal rightness always is, in essence, the following: Assuming the interest involved in the situation to be such and such, which of the conflicting interests or sets of interests has the superior claim upon the will? According to any system of ethics which regards the moral judgment as a judgment upon purposes it is mistaken answers to this question that alone constitute mistakes in moral judgment. This is precisely Hume's view. Therefore a discussion of variations in judgments of material rightness is entirely irrelevant to the moral problem

¹ Sec. ix., pt. i.; G. ii., 247-248.; S.-B. 271-272.

² *Essays*, G. ii., 299; S.-B. 336.

which he supposes himself to be treating in the Dialogue. The consequences of this singular lapse were most unfortunate. This essay is Hume's one systematic discussion of the nature, extent, and causes of the variations in moral judgments. As a result of getting on the wrong track in this place he never faced these problems in their entirety, and he thus failed to formulate a real solution of them.

Hume's contributions to the problem of universality in ethics, as we now see, were two in number. He asserted the existence of a code which though based upon "the particular structure and fabric of the mind" is in virtue of the fundamental unity of that structure valid for the race. What is far more important he discovered a cause of variations in moral judgments which has a tremendous range; a cause so extensive in its operations that it challenges the moralist to show the necessity of introducing any others; a cause which if it turns out to be the sole cause of the failure to attain unity of moral ideals will enable us to assert the possibility of formulating a single code valid in its principles for all mankind.

THE ELEMENT OF TRUTH IN THE DOCTRINE OF OBJECTIVITY.

We are now in a position to estimate the force of what may perhaps be regarded as the central objection which rationalistic ethics has urged against Hume and the entire school of which he is a member.

Reid in his work, *On the Active Powers*, writes as follows: "Suppose that, in a case well known to both, my friend says—Such a man did well and worthily, his conduct is highly approvable. This speech, according to all rules of interpretation, expresses my friend's judgment of the man's conduct. This judgment may be true or false, and I may agree in opinion with him, or I may dissent from him without offence, as we may differ in other matters of judgment.

"Suppose, again, that, in relation to the same case, my friend says: The man's conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling.

"This speech, if approbation be nothing but an agreeable feeling, must have the very same meaning as the first, and express neither more nor less. But this cannot be, for two reasons:—

"First, Because there is no rule in grammar or rhetoric, nor any usage in language, by which these two speeches can be construed so as to have the same meaning. The first

expresses plainly an opinion or judgment of the conduct of the man, but says nothing of the speaker. The second only testifies a fact concerning the speaker—to wit, that he had such a feeling.

“Another reason why these two speeches cannot mean the same thing is that the first may be contradicted without any ground of offence, such contradiction being only a difference of opinion, which, to a reasonable man, gives no offence. But the second speech cannot be contradicted without an affront; for, as every man must know his own feelings, to deny that a man had a feeling which he affirms he had, is to charge him with falsehood.”¹

This contention could have been accepted by Hume as essentially sound. The only objection he need have urged against it is the supposition that it applies as a criticism of his system. Right, he teaches, does represent something more than the chance feelings of the passing moment. It means that the action will give a feeling of satisfaction to one who evaluates impartially all the interests affected. To say this is obviously to make no affirmation whatever about my own feelings as they are in the moment of judging/when they may be dulled by pre-occupation with other affairs, warped by personal prejudices, antagonisms, or emotional stresses, or dimmed by a dull imagination or lack of experience in that particular field of life. However remote from each other the starting points of the two theories may be, and however widely their farther courses may diverge, rationalism can pick no quarrel with a system such as Hume's on this issue. On the contrary Hume could well afford to admit that rationalism has performed a great service to ethical inquiry by insisting, in season and out, upon this central fact of the moral experience.

MORALITY AS FEAR OF PUBLIC OPINION.

Before leaving this part of the subject I must call attention to one more misunderstanding with regard to Hume's theory of the moral judgment. In his Introduction to Hume, Green writes: “The pleasure of moral sentiment, as Hume thinks of it, is essentially a pleasure experienced by a spectator of the act who is other than the doer of it.”² The basis for this supposition will be found in the words which immediately follow those just quoted: “If the doer and spectator were

¹ *Essay* v., ch. vii., Sir William Hamilton's edition (1863), p. 673.

² P. 367. Introduction ii., sec. 61. Cf. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 5 for another statement of the same view.

regarded as one person, there would be no meaning in the rule that the tendency to produce pleasure, which excites the sentiment of approbation, must be a tendency to produce it to the doer himself or others, as distinct from the spectator himself". This argument involves the assumption that a person cannot look at an act or a situation from two points of view. One hardly knows whether to take an argument of this kind seriously. If we must, let us test it by an examination of the following commonplace illustration. A gives money to a worthy person, B, to relieve the latter's necessities. According to Hume, A's fundamental motive must have been—if the act is to be counted a thoroughly moral one—a desire to give pleasure to B (or to relieve him from pain). The pleasure which he here desires to produce in B is obviously a pleasure distinct from that produced in the spectator of the deed. The latter, looking impartially at once at A's resources and B's needs, feels the satisfaction of a benevolent man in the act. What is there to prevent A from reacting in the same way? Can he not feel a generous satisfaction at his conduct when viewed from this standpoint, a satisfaction the same in kind and source as that of the spectator? If he does he is playing the role of agent and spectator at the same time. Is there anything in the logic of Hume's theory to make this impossible? Nothing whatever. Is there anything in his language to show that he regarded it as impossible? Far from it: Hume constantly assumes that the agent may play the spectator. The fundamentals of his system are not merely not incompatible with this position, they demand it.

Suppose we occupy ourselves for a moment by combining Green's statement above with his other statement about the incompatibility of altruism with a sensationalistic psychology. This would mean, translating it into the terms of the just used illustration: A could not merely feel no approbation of himself for helping B, he could not even form the idea of B's needs as something demanding his assistance. What then is left to serve as motive for the action? Green's answer is: Nothing but the desire to stand well with the spectator. "Understood as [Hume] himself understood his doctrine it is only 'respectability'—the temper of the man who 'naturally,' *i.e.*, without definite expectation of ulterior gain, seeks to stand well with his neighbours—that it will explain."¹ Our reply to this assertion is that the sensationalistic psychology of Hume will explain nothing whatever beyond the range of

¹ *Essay* v., ch. vii., p. 370; sec. 64.

motive possible to Principal Lloyd Morgan's chicks; and that they are as incapable of the aspiration for respectability as they are of the enthusiasm of humanity. If we consider what results would flow from the application of Green's principles of exegesis to the interpretation of Hume's *History of England*, or let us say, to Mill *On the Subjection of Women*, we shall see just how much they are worth. Their worth being precisely zero we are free to consult Hume himself. What does he say? "Our regard to a character with others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgment on the correspondent approbation of mankind."¹ This statement is made not merely once, but over and over again. It may seem somewhat exaggerated to some of us, as if Hume, in the endeavour to walk straight, were leaning backwards. Let that be as it will. What alone concerns us here is the fact that starting with those premises of Hume's ethical theory which it is alone profitable to consider, there is nothing in them or any legitimate deduction from them which can properly be urged in criticism of the view that the desire to stand well with one's neighbour is a mere derivative from the desire to stand well with one's self. The attempt therefore to manœuvre Hume into a position where he can find room in his ethical system only for the fear of public opinion must be adjudged a failure.

REASON IN THE MORAL JUDGMENT.

Having completed our account of Hume's theory of the moral judgment we are prepared to inquire what role is assigned to reason in the formation of the moral judgment.² The word reason has a considerable number of meanings which it is necessary to distinguish:—

(1) By reason may be meant the power of intuiting necessary truths. If these truths are thought of as a special set of judgements, applicable to a definite field, as the axioms of geometry are held to apply to space, then, as we know, Hume denies the existence of such axioms.

(2) If, on the other hand, reason be defined as the power of apprehending those necessary truths upon which thought of every kind depends, specifically the law of contradiction, then it can be shown that although Hume himself does not specifically mention the fact in so many words, the logic of

¹ *Enquiry*, sec. ix., pt. i.; G. ii., 251; S.-B. 276.

² Certain aspects of this subject are discussed in *MIND*, N.S., vol. xiv., by Norman Smith in a paper entitled *The Naturalism of Hume*.

his theory makes it necessary to assign to this law an important part in the determination of the structure of the moral standard. The principle of contradiction can of course play no such rôle in Hume's system as in Kant's. It can appear only in the form of the principle of consistency. Some modern rationalists who try to lean on Kant as far as possible do not appear to see the difference, but it is in reality clear and important. To accept contradictions is to believe differently about the same, while to judge or to act inconsistently is to feel or to act differently about the same. Consistency, in other words, is nothing more or less than persistency—persistency in the use of a principle of approbation or of action.¹ Consistency in judgment is requisite wherever there is a principle at the foundation of the judgment. The principle upon which the moral judgment is based in Hume's system may be formulated as that of equal concern for equal interests. To say that this must be employed consistently is to say that this feature of the moral judgment is of its essence, so that failure to conform marks the judgment as invalid.

(3) Again, if reason be defined as the power of conceptual thought, then most emphatically Hume regards it as playing a large rôle in the moral judgment. Not merely, as he asserts in a formal statement, does reason in this sense apprise us of the existence of the actions which arouse approbation and disapprobation; it lies in the very nature of the moral emotions—conceived of as satisfaction and dissatisfaction at conduct or character—that they should be aroused by ideas. We may assert with confidence that no moralist has ever thought of denying this fact. Everybody knows that, in normal adult life, emotions are aroused only by ideas—or rather by judgments (in the logical sense of the term). It is thus clear that the formation of a moral judgment is something very different from the operation of a "sense," whether it be called internal or anything else. The name "moral sense" is most misleading as a representation of anything that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or Hume ever thought of teaching. The members of this school—whether they used the term little or much—were perfectly clear about the facts. It is only their critics that have allowed themselves to get muddled. Perhaps one reason for their mistakes may be found in some words of Viscount Bryce: "There are

¹ Obviously this latter principle must be something else than the principle of consistency. In view of their failure to see this fact it is not surprising that the Kantians of every tribe have been reduced to pitiable straits in the attempt to find a content for the moral ideal.

always people ready to assume that things are what they are called, because it is much easier to deal with names than to examine facts".

(4) The rationalism that finds its clearest Eighteenth Century expression in the writings of Price asserts that reason (or the understanding, as Price calls it) contributes a new conception to ethics, the unanalysable, *a priori*, idea of right. It need hardly be said that Hume does not share this view; but it may not be superfluous to point out that his own position is based not upon an appeal to sensationalistic first principles, but upon the possibility of analysing the term. If we can define right conduct as that which has a tendency to arouse in an impartial observer a feeling of satisfaction, we can see that, as the conception arises in the course of individual or racial development, its appearance in the arena of life means not the emergence of a specifically new conception dropping in upon the mind from a world outside of experience, but rather a new organisation of pre-existing conceptions, each of which has its roots in experience.

Because Hume took this position he was at liberty to repudiate another favourite, if not necessary, feature of all theories of ethical rationalism. This is the view according to which certain ideas, solely by their own power, so to speak, are capable of arousing feeling, so that you could predict *a priori* of any rational being that having the idea he must have the emotion or desire. Hume denies this in the words: "Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will".¹ The rationalistic doctrine, as is well known, caused Kant a great deal of worry. Its clearest statement and the best argument in its favour is found, however—as in many other instances—not in Kant, but in Price.²

Price having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that right is an unanalysable idea having its source purely in the understanding, and that the insight that right, as predicate, belongs to a certain action or class of actions is due to the workings of this same faculty, faces the question: What if there be beings who know what is right, but, in its presence, are as indifferent as are the stones at our feet? Price meets every difficulty of this kind by boldly asserting that "excitement belongs to the very ideas of moral right and wrong, and is essentially inseparable from the apprehension of them. . . . When we are conscious that the action is fit to be done or

¹ *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii.,; G. ii., 193; S.-B. 413.

² Price's *Review* was published some years after Hume had written the *Enquiry*. Nevertheless, it supplies the best possible foil for the anti-theoretical position of Hume.

ought to be done it is not conceivable that we can remain uninfluenced or want a motive to action."¹ The same assertion is made with regard to the idea of the good of self, of the good of others, and of truth. According to Hume, on the other hand, the power of responding to ideas by motives has its source in the "particular structure and fabric of the mind," which might conceivably have been different. "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin; to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me."² In maintaining that "'tis not contrary to reason" he means to assert, among other things, that the idea, though it is the stimulus of the dynamic element in the desire, lies outside of this element, as the match lies outside of the gunpowder; so that it is possible in the abstract to have the idea without a trace of the corresponding emotional or volitional reaction. That Hume's analysis of the moral experience does not commit him to any such bold assertions as his opponents have been forced into making in connexion with this subject is certainly one of his titles to the attention of judicious minds.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT.

When men talk about the place of reason in morality they are often in reality thinking about its "reasonableness". But no one can discuss this question without having in mind the claims of possible competitors. Of these the most clamorous is the welfare of the ego. Its claims to the last word were championed by the moralists not merely of the dark ages when egoistic hedonism was a power in the land, but of the enlightenment of the latter part of the Nineteenth Century under the sway of what for want of a better name we may call the Green-Caird school. We have already seen³ how Hume would handle the pretensions of egoism to be the judge of last resort in matters of reasonableness. We need give no more attention, therefore, to this aspect of the case.

The inquiry into the reasonableness of morality, however, sometimes has a different meaning from the question: What is there in it for me? The inquirer may have in mind its ability to stand the test of reflective criticism from any point

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 310; cf. p. 89 ff.

² *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii.; G. ii., 195; S.-B. 416.

³ *MIND*, N.S., vol. xxx.,

of view whatever.¹ Turning away, then, from the insistencies of egoism the problem for a theory such as Hume's can only be formulated as follows: "Is there anything in moral action which appeals to the desires which I find possess the deepest significance when I sit down and scrutinise them in a cool hour?"

The experiences that force this question upon us are far from infrequent. Who of us has not many times allowed himself to be determined in his actions by feelings which, for one reason or another, he has reprobated even in the moment of obeying? When Paul du Chaillu was exploring in West Africa his party ran out of provisions and were without food for several days. When they were reduced almost to the extremity his men killed a huge snake and devoured it with great relish. But du Chaillu was unable to bring himself to touch it though he cursed himself all the time for his squeamishness. This is a fair illustration of the distinction which Butler designates as the distinction between power and authority, even if it is not of the sort that he had specifically in mind.

Butler's solution of the problem is well known. It consists in asserting that the moral judgment carries within itself an element or factor which is directly apprehended as authoritative. Hume's solution is nowhere stated in so many words in his published works. The one specific reference to it which is preserved to us is found in a letter to Hutcheson relating to the latter's *Compendium*: "You seem here to embrace Doctor Butler's opinion in his *Sermons on Human Nature* that our moral sense has an authority distinct from its force and durableness; and that because we always think it ought to prevail. But this is nothing but an instinct or

¹ In the common use of the term, "reasonable" means "capable of standing the test of reflective examination," or, "approved when all relevant facts have been brought into consideration"; where "relevant facts" mean those which are capable of influencing in any way the decision. The English and French habit of employing this particular term to represent this meaning may have lured some students of ethics into the rationalistic fold; but it can have been only those who could not distinguish a pun from an argument. This will be evident if we examine a typical statement like that of Sidgwick (*History of Ethics*, p. 215.): "It is only another way of putting Hume's doctrine that reason is not concerned with the ends of action to say that the mere existence of a moral sentiment is in itself no reason for obeying it". This sounds rather plausible till it is translated into German, where reason as first used would become "Vernunft," and at the end of the sentence would become "Grund". Thereupon the reader awakes to the fact that he was being treated to a piece of linguistic legerdemain.

principle which approves of itself upon reflexion and that is common to all of them."¹

This solution of the problem of authority is patently incomplete and in so far unsatisfactory. It is possible to work out something better, however, with materials supplied by Hume, and on the basis of the fundamental principle of his system, the principle, namely, that morality is a matter of values and that value has its source in the affective side of our nature. We distinguish between the relative value of different desires and feelings, according to Hume, in proportion to their force, durability, and number. Where choice is necessary, cool, *i.e.*, impartial reflexion always desires the greater value. When such a feeling as the antipathy to snake meat appears we may obey it because it is at the moment a more powerful impulse than that which can be aroused by a calm estimate of values. Nevertheless, even at the time we may know we are sacrificing the greater value for the less, and wish we could, by a word of command, annihilate the recalcitrant feeling. An impulse obeyed, but in the very act of obedience wished out of existence, is precisely one that may be said to have power but not authority. And the distinction is accordingly perfectly explainable from Hume's premises, and by a method which he adumbrates. Authority is thus the voice of our permanent self (which in no normal human being is the equivalent of the merely egoistic self) as against the temporary self, a voice which we may refuse to obey at the moment, but which in that very moment we know we shall ever afterwards wish we had obeyed, and which, therefore, in the act of disobedience we wish we could either destroy or control.

THE USEFUL CHARACTER AND THE USEFUL BUILDING.

Hitherto we have been dealing with the valuation of character as a means to an end, its utilitarian or extrinsic value. But an ethical system which recognised no other element of worth in character than this would be open to the objection first urged by Adam Smith in the following words: "It seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building; or that we

¹ Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, vol. i., p. 149. Cf. Adam Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. iii., ch. iv. (Bohn edition, p. 222). "The passions . . . as Father Malebranche says, all justify themselves, and seem reasonable and proportioned to their objects as long as we continue to feel them."

should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers".¹ Hume himself raised this objection, but answered it in a very vague and inconclusive manner. In the *Treatise* he pronounces these variations in our feelings "very inexplicable";² in the *Enquiry* he says: "There are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only proper object: And though the very same qualities be transferred to an insensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments".³ This is much the same as the statement of the *Treatise*, only in more words. As a matter of fact, all this time Hume was holding in his hands precisely the cards he needed, but, curiously enough, he failed to play them. However, he has laid them out for us, and if we do not use them the fault is our own.

The direction in which a solution is to be sought seems sufficiently clear. It is not to turn our back upon all that has been already accomplished. It is rather to find additional modes of value in character which do not apply to material objects, and which, therefore, will account for the differences under consideration.

Such a mode of valuation may at first sight seem to be given in Hume's frequent references to beauty of character. The immediate source of this language is doubtless Shaftesbury, who, in turn, borrows it from the Greeks. For Shaftesbury, moral beauty is due to "harmony" between the egoistic and altruistic elements of our nature. But Hume attempts to explain the æsthetic element in character in a very different way. To say that an inanimate object, as a skilfully designed machine or a well cultivated field, appears beautiful is, according to him, to say that the view of it affords the spectator a sympathetic delight in the promise which it holds out of happiness in the form of work done or food supplied. Beauty of character has its source in the same kind of qualities, and touches the same springs in human nature.⁴ Obviously, then, it cannot be regarded as a new element over and above utility; it is rather another name for the same thing. Accordingly, whatever may be thought

¹ *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. iv., ch. ii.; Bohn edition, p. 271.

² Bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. v.; G. ii., 371; S.-B. 617.

³ Sec. v., pt. i., first note: G. ii., 202; S.-B. 213.

⁴ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 336; S.-B. 576. *Enquiry*, sec. v., first paragraph, and in many other parts of the essay. It may be worth noting that this theory of beauty was suggested by Shaftesbury. See *Characteristics*, vol. iii., p. 180 (5th edition). It does not represent, however, his dominant view.

of Shaftesbury's contributions to the æsthetics of morals, Hume evidently can be of no help to us in this direction.

The desired new element however is found in another feature of the good character. All the greater manifestations of will power arouse, or tend to arouse, an emotion which is akin to or identical with that of the sublime. Hume recognises this aspect of character, calling it the heroic. Unfortunately however his account of it is so manifestly artificial as to obscure and almost destroy the effects of the recognition. In the *Treatise* he writes: "Whatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of goodness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well establish'd pride and self esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. . . . The merit [moral value] of pride or self esteem is deriv'd from two circumstances, *viz.*, its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves [he means, the possessor]; by which it capacitates us for business, and, at the same time, gives us an immediate satisfaction."¹

The inadequacy of this account is only too obvious. Pride has its source in the consciousness of the possession of that which is capable of evoking admiration. Accordingly there must be such a thing as a capacity for admiration before there can be pride in possession. Admiration for the heroic, accordingly, cannot be reduced to the satisfaction of knowing that I possess qualities which, if I had the capacity for admiring them, I should rejoice to possess. Hume would have done better to treat the emotion of the sublime as an ultimate constituent of the mind. He was of course endeavouring to simplify. But there is nothing in his system requiring him to simplify this emotion out of existence, any more than the emotion of anger, fear, love, or hate. In rewriting the above-quoted passage for the *Enquiry* he seems to have been struck by its artificiality. But in his lengthier and far better treatment of the subject he has not entirely freed himself from the trammels of the earlier presentation. However, the fact remains that Hume has specifically noted the direct admiration which goes out to power of will as such, an admiration which, while it is somewhat akin to that which is evoked by a few material objects, such as a mountain peak, or a majestic cathedral, separates as by a great gulf our feelings for the overwhelming majority of inanimate objects from our enthusiasm for moral heroism.

There is still another respect in which our attitude towards

¹ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 356; S.-B. 599-600. The corresponding passage in the *Enquiry* is in sec. vii. See G. ii., 232 ff.; S.-B. 252 ff.

a good man differs from that towards a well-contrived house. A man may arouse emotions of gratitude and resentment both by what he does in relation to us personally and by his treatment of others; broadly speaking—with exceptions which from the point of view of theory are of undoubted importance—for an adult civilised person, a house does not. Unfortunately Hume has not dealt with the subject of resentment and gratitude or thankfulness except in a very unsystematic and confused way. He recognises their existence of course, and the fact that they play a rôle in the moral judgment. Indeed at times he actually identifies the feelings at the basis of the moral judgment with resentment and gratitude, thus making the same mistake as Westermarck to-day, who begins his description of the moral judgment with the second story.¹ But confused and perhaps even conflicting as some of Hume's statements are on this point, the requirements of his system are unmistakable. Starting, as he does, from the position that the original source of the moral judgment is feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction having their source in the desire for good, he is bound to recognise "thankfulness" and resentment as consequences of these feelings.

"Resentment," says Westermarck, "is an aggressive attitude of mind towards a cause of pain." Originally it tends to arise indifferently towards material objects and conscious beings, and in the latter towards intellectual, temperamental, and moral imperfections alike. What it really craves, as Adam Smith clearly shows, is to make the source of pain sorry for his action. Hence when an adult jerks or swears at a tangled fishline he is apt to be ashamed of his folly because he is attempting to satisfy a desire which he knows to be incapable of realisation. Hence the ordinary man learns to control himself on such occasions—more or less completely—and in proportion as he refuses the emotion its expression, it tends to die out. In the case of intellectual and temperamental defects the impulse can of course reach its goal. But when, for example, we who are teachers have let ourselves loose at the stupidity of a thoroughly well intentioned pupil we have, when we have later come to ourselves, felt regret at pain caused which could not be compensated by resultant good. Our victim was helpless and could only suffer. There is one case and only one in which the impulse to express our resentment can be justified in the eyes of a

¹ *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii. ; G. ii., 207 (also 208, 209, in spots) ; S.-B. from 219. *Treatise*, B. iii., pt. iii., sec. v. ; G. ii., 368 ; S.-B. 614.

humane man, namely where the occasion is a moral delinquency. For there the expression of our feelings is capable of producing a change in the outer action and oftentimes in the inner spirit. Here again the law of atrophy holds, and the more clear headed and more sympathetic ultimately come to feel little or no resentment except as a reaction to wrongs committed.

What is true of resentment is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of gratitude or thankfulness. It seeks to make the benefactor rejoice because of his benefaction. In half a dozen ways which anyone sufficiently interested can easily work out for himself, it arouses impulses which can only be satisfied by the response of mind to mind, and for reasons readily conceived it concentrates itself largely—never completely—on traits of character. Admiration of beauty (in Shaftesbury's meaning and other allied senses) and of strength, fused with thankfulness for moral and extra-moral traits of mind, are either love or the most important ingredient of love. Thus we see how, without going beyond the confines of Hume's general theory of morals, we can account for the love and the hatred of the good or bad character respectively as a phenomenon which has no real parallel in our attitude towards useful material objects.

Thus far we have defended Hume by means of his own ideas. But there is another factor which he himself does not mention and which is not referred to by any of his predecessors, but which may be worth a moment's attention in the interest of a complete view of our problem.

There is a service which an unselfish spirit can perform for us which no material object of any kind can possibly supply—that of taking an interest in our welfare, of entering into our life. We crave this for its own sake, entirely apart from any ulterior advantages which we may calculate to obtain from it. It is for this reason that we value the expressions of kindness and gratitude in those persons whose gifts or services are only a source of embarrassment because we can neither use nor refuse them. So strongly do we feel in this matter that when a total stranger in a crowded street car accidentally treads on our toes we wish him to express his regret, though we never expect to see him again. This valuation of the unselfish character is not, strictly speaking, a moral valuation, because it has its source in a personal rather than an impersonal point of view. But it is a valuation of morality just in so far as morality involves unselfishness.

Our feelings of warmth for those who care for a cause in which we are interested represent but another application of

the same principle. The cause in question need have no moral flavour whatever, as the football interests of our university. But it will of course be deep in proportion as the common interests go down to the roots of life. Veterans who have fought in the same war in defence of the same country know well what these feelings are. The good man has something of the same feelings for every other good man who is engaged in the same warfare against the evils which afflict humanity.

The adequate answer to Adam Smith is thus to be found in the recognition of the intrinsic value of character as entitled to a place by the side of the extrinsic or utilitarian value, and in an analysis of the phenomena of "thankfulness" and resentment which shows why they attain their complete development (for the most part) only when their object is human character.

III.—THE ETHICAL AND ÆSTHETIC IMPLICATIONS OF REALISM.

BY W. P. MONTAGUE AND H. H. PARKHURST.

METAPHYSICAL theories are usually defended on the ground that they are true; and even when the advocates of a theory expatiate upon its ethical or æsthetic value, they do so because they think thereby to establish its validity. This indirect method of procedure is natural to all those who share the comfortable assumption of the pragmatist or the idealist that there is some sort of correlation between the good and the real—though even for such philosophers the validity of their method presupposes the validity of the theory which it is intended to establish. To the realist, however, it seems neither natural nor justifiable to appeal to the nobility of realism as evidence of its truth. For him, things are what they are, regardless of their power to edify. This may perhaps be one explanation of the fact that the multitudes of efforts made by realists in recent years to explain and defend their theory have included little concerning the ethical and æsthetic implications of realism. It is the question of these emotional implications of realism, considered on their own account and not as an indirect substantiation of the doctrine, which is the subject of the present paper.

By realism we mean the epistemological doctrine that nothing, whether abstract or concrete, whether real or unreal, about which it is possible to discourse, depends for its character or its status upon the mere fact that it is known. In other words, that cognition is always selective and never creative of its objects. The older forms of the realistic doctrine, such as the dualistic realism of Descartes, and the common-sense realism of the Scottish school, were contented to insist upon an objective status, independent of being known, for the concrete world of existence, and tacitly regarded the realm of abstract forms and universals as a creation of the mind. The realist of the present day assimilates to the common-sense existential realism of modern philosophy the profound subsistential realism of Plato. He would emancipate from their supposed depen-

dence upon cognition not only the things of earth and heaven but the totality of laws and forms—all qualities and all relations. More than this. The new realist has discovered that it is impossible to confer independence upon the real and the true without at the same time emancipating the shadow correlates of these—the false and the unreal. For every true proposition has a contradictory which is false; and if the truth of the true proposition depends upon its subject-matter rather than upon the thinking of it, then, by the same token, the falsity of the false proposition depends equally upon its subject-matter rather than upon the attitudes of belief or disbelief which a spectator may entertain towards it. Round squares and mermaids are not unreal because sane people disbelieve in them; they are sanely disbelieved in because they are unreal.¹

It should be noted that realism as thus defined is a purely epistemological doctrine, and as such is not committed to any of the various metaphysical theories as to the nature either of objects or of consciousness. The objects may be one or many, material, spiritual, or both. Consciousness may be the property of a soul, of a transcendental ego, or even a mere form of relation between material things. The essential point is that cognition, irrespective of its intrinsic nature, discovers and does not create the universe of which it is a part. Again, it is necessary to bear in mind that the realist, in holding that the function of cognition is discovery, is not thereby condemning consciousness to an otiose and epiphenomenal rôle. It is of the very nature of discovery to bring about profound alterations in the thing discovered. The lantern that a man carries does not create the obstacles in his path. It reveals them, but in revealing them as they are it enables the man to remove them, and to create new things in their place. The pragmatist has no monopoly of the doctrine that intelligence is practically efficient. Realists are quite in agreement with him, but they hold that the only direct effects of consciousness are upon the organism. Without itself altering the objects known, consciousness enables its possessor to alter them. If objects were changed by the very act of knowing them they could hardly be so effectively changed by action based upon that knowledge. Indeed, under such circumstances, action itself, as distinguished from cognition, would be altogether superfluous.

¹ Thus in a sense the term realism is somewhat inadequate for the theory which it denotes. There is need for a more appropriate name, such as objectivism, for the doctrine that the status of the unreal and the false, no less than that of the real and the true, is independent of whether or not they are apprehended.

Now, while this is true of all action, we propose to confine our discussion to the realistic implications of the types of action involved in the pursuit of the ethical and æsthetic ideals.

I.

From the standpoint of one who seeks to create beauty in the world of things or goodness in the realm of conduct, the primary condition of effective action is an unflinching recognition of the realities of the situation in which this creation is to be accomplished. If the sculptor intends to change a block of marble into a statue of a god, he must recognise the independent objectivity of the marble and of the laws by which he is to chisel it. Similarly, the moral reformer who would change a community that is impoverished into one that is prosperous must recognise the independent objectivity of the poverty which he is to change, and of the economic laws by which he is to make the change. As a matter of fact, the creative artist and the constructive reformer are found to possess a more than ordinary degree of appreciation of the independent reality of the physical world with its blended worth and imperfection. The entire procedure of the artist bears witness to his deeply-grounded belief that ugliness and beauty alike are external to himself and to all beholders. In his own view his significant task is that of discovery. In combating ugliness he feels himself to be combating no mere psychic state either of his own or of another consciousness. In the same way when pursuing beauty he has the sense of recognising something independent both of himself and of his entire audience. As faithfully as the scientist he scrutinises nature and man to determine their inmost essence; and though a dreamer and a harbinger of ceaseless fancies, it is not as a dream or a fancy that he regards the cosmos. Of the objective reality of that cosmos which is his study he is incorrigibly persuaded.

And similarly of the moral reformer. His two most insidious foes are the sentimentalists who see the world as they would have it rather than as it is, and the complacent conservatives whose habituation to the evil in their environment prevents them from recognising its existence. Buddha and Christ, Luther and Lincoln were actuated by a flamingly vivid perception of the evil about them. Familiarity served not to dull but to enhance this perception, and the vision of what they wished to accomplish was never for a moment confused with the ugly reality confronting them. They were

neither sentimentalists nor optimists, but realists, imbued with a grim and poignant appreciation of actualities.

In those other cases in which the religious spirit has been opposed to militant morality, the opposition has been due to the religionist permitting his faith in the ultimate goodness of the universe to blur his appreciation of the actual badness of the world in which he is called upon to act. If God is good, and if God creates all, then all must be somehow good. And if, despite this, things still seem evil, it is not for us to protest, but rather to rest secure in our faith that evil is not real but only good in disguise. This anti-moral passivism to which religious people are sometimes subject receives formulation in technical philosophy in the theory of absolute idealism according to which the realm of finite life, its sins and tragedies, is labelled the world of Appearance—a fragmentary and distorted expression of an absolute Reality to whose internal perfection the misery and discord in our experience actually contribute in much the same way as the discords of a Wagnerian opera contribute to the higher harmony of the whole. The religious attempt to justify the ways of God to man is in essence the same as the idealistic philosopher's tendency to minimise actual evil by relegating it to the realm of "Appearance". In both cases there is an anti-realistic denial of the actuality of evil, and in both cases the intellectual denial of evil engenders a practical indifference to its presence and to the means proposed for removing it. In short, it is only against real evil that it is worth while to contend. And, conversely, all who have contended fruitfully against evil have had a lively sense of its reality. Hence, while realism does not bar the conception of a God or an Absolute, it does bar all forms of those conceptions which involve excuses or denials of the evil which our world contains.

Associated with the recognition of the reality of evil in nature goes a wholesome interest in the laws of nature. It is only by the use of natural law that nature's evils can be ameliorated. And it is interesting to note that the great moral heroes who have preached the reality of evil have also preached very definite methods for its removal; while, conversely, those anti-realists by whom evil is regarded as good in disguise have usually been indifferent and incurious as to the laws of the material world. Magic and thaumaturgy, prayers and incantations, are good enough devices to cope with an evil which has but a shadow existence: and they seem not inadequate to those for whom the laws of nature are only laws of mind. The responsibilities of natural

science need be assumed only by those for whom evil is one of nature's realities.

So far we have been considering the necessity for a recognition, by the artist and the reformer, of the *existential* reality of the material world in which values are to be embodied, and of the laws and conditions of that embodiment. But there is an equal necessity for all creators to recognise the *subsistential* reality of the ideals themselves of goodness and beauty. For, irrespective of the definition of the æsthetic and ethical, and irrespective also of the nature of the specific ideal which is to be made real, the one who is striving for its realisation must recognise that the validity of that for which he strives is objective and in nowise dependent upon his discovery of it. Even for a reformer who accepted hedonism as true the essential objectivity of the realm of values would be in nowise diminished. For if the happiness of my neighbour is a good, it will be a good irrespective of whether or not I recognise it as such. The realist conception of value implicit in the attitude of anyone who seeks to create value, be he artist or moralist, is not necessarily of something dissociated from conscious experience, but of something whose essence and nature is independent of the would-be creator's awareness of it. The socialist who believes in the desirability of the collectivist state may be mistaken in that belief, but in order that it should inspire him to action he must regard its worth as something intrinsic and independent. From the individual standpoint, belief in the value of a thing is exactly like belief in its truth. In either case the belief may be mistaken, but the assumption of its independent validity is a prerequisite of all action. The sculptor, the architect, the painter, the musician, when they seek to embody in material form the as yet non-existent objects of their imagination, are inspired to their efforts by their belief in the more than imaginary beauty of those objects. If they supposed for a moment that the worth of what they were to create was merely subjective, and dependent upon or derived from their own attitudes of approval, their motive for creation would cease to be æsthetic and become merely hedonic and selfish. In short, even from the hedonistic standpoint, beauty and goodness are the permanent possibilities of enjoyment as truth is the permanent possibility of apprehension. And as permanent possibilities of apprehension have a nature and structure that is quite independent of whether or not they are actually perceived, so equally the permanent possibilities of enjoyment have a nature and structure that is quite independent of whether they are realised. In neither case

does the status of possibility exhaust the nature of the essence to which it pertains.¹

II.

And now that we have seen the extent to which the realistic standpoint is presupposed by artist and moralist with regard both to the world of existence and to that of subsistent ideals, we proceed to discuss how the realist's interpretation of the universe enhances its beauty and moral dignity. In short, we wish now to show that realism, in addition to being a prerequisite for the creation of values, is also a prerequisite for their appreciation; that it is itself a source of new values, both ethical and æsthetic.

Science reveals to us a universe in which there are no evidences of beginning or end or spatial limit. The span of each human life, though all too brief for the accomplishment of chosen tasks, appears to him who lives it a not inconsiderable duration. It is long enough to permit weary waitings and final defeat of cherished hopes and the passage of hours that seem distended and slow beyond all power to estimate. And yet the extent of even the most prolonged individual existence is to the span of recorded history an almost negligible quantity. In the eyes of man himself the magnitude of that vastly greater temporal period of human history causes his own little biography to shrivel to a point by comparison. But we know that, measured by the incalculable standard of the entire racial history, the time comprehended within the limits of recorded annals is but a moment in an extended day. We are persuaded, though bereft of images to convey the persuasion, that to measure, in turn, the entire duration of human experience, incredibly prolonged though

¹ Considered as permanent possibilities of enjoyment ethical and æsthetic values differ in two respects.

(1) An æsthetic value is a possibility of immediate enjoyment, whereas an ethical value is a possibility of mediate enjoyment. Rhythm and symmetry are æsthetic values because the direct experience of them is pleasant. Courage and kindness are ethical values, not because to contemplate them as such gives direct enjoyment, but because to practice them produces results from which enjoyment is derived. Any enjoyment of ethical ideals as such is not ethical but rather æsthetic.

(2) As the two types of value differ in the manner in which they produce enjoyment, so also do they differ in the kind of subject-matter in which respectively they are embodied. Æsthetic values are embodied in sensory material, such as tone, colour, form, and as such are directly perceptible, whereas ethical values are embodied in rules of conduct and attitudes of will which are to be apprehended only conceptually.

Due allowance being made for these differences, one might be justified in saying that virtue is beauty of spirit, while beauty is virtue of matter.

it be, against the larger dimensions of the tale of life from its beginnings upon our planet, is to render the lesser unit once again almost pitifully diminutive. But consider the incommensurability between the period of moderate temperature, adapted to life, upon earth, and the total duration of that body as a physically distinct satellite of the sun. And according to all evidences we are compelled to regard even that last temporal immensity as but a passing interval against a background of even more unimaginable phases. Compared with the ampler chapters of cosmic evolution, the gestation, birth and adolescence of our mighty solar system is but a syllable—a single pulse in a symphony for which temporal limits may not be predicated.

If, as regards duration, the universe which constitutes the subject-matter of science is thus staggering, its spatial extensity is no less so. There again we encounter a series of magnitudes which may be arranged in a hierarchy. Beginning once more with man, we find that his body is of dimensions which, by comparison with certain orders of existence at least, seem to himself of considerable dignity. But if, by contrast with the microscopic, the cubic contents of a human body bulk somewhat large, in what terms are we to describe the magnitude of our earthly globe, measured by the same standard? But even the earth itself proves of little account with regard to the space it occupies, when compared with the proportions of the solar system. When the magnitude to be envisaged transcends the limits of that already unimaginable immensity of the sun with its attendant satellites, imagination is completely paralysed, and the mind is compelled to resort to indirect means of naming and mapping those extra-solar distances. Of the proportions of the milky way and the yawning abyss of space beyond the uttermost stellar system we can make no approach to comprehension. And yet of such inhuman vastnesses does science tell; of such kind is the universe with which the intelligence of mortals grapples.

But the anti-realist, be he pragmatist or absolute idealist, is set upon belittling this cosmos which he is privileged to inhabit. He would take advantage of the intricacies of the epistemological problem to reverse that process of increasing scientific knowledge by which man has emancipated himself from the thrall of his own vanity. Belief that the world and all therein was made for man's behoof and that its events are to be explained by their bearing upon his weal and woe, that the sun and the stars are set in the sky as lanterns to light his path—that man, in short, is the centre about which all things revolve—all such belief serves indeed to feed the

vanity and soothe the fears of the race in its infancy. But chastened by the austerities of physical science, we have made some approach to a decent humility; and the glories of anthropocentricism are no longer more than the bells and paper crown with which the fool was wont to play at royalty. But no sooner has the plain man abdicated from the throne constructed by his own vaingloriousness than philosophers approach and tempt him in new and intricate speech to resume his rôle of legislator for nature. We can learn of things only through their often distorted impressions upon our senses; we can conceive the world only under conditions by which it is related to our minds; and the newer anthropocentricism bids us interpret the relativity and egocentric limitations of our experience as a relativity and egocentric dependence of the world which we experience. In the older view man recognised that the world at least existed independently of his knowledge, even though the origin of its existence and the character of its laws were motivated by his needs. But the anthropocentric philosopher surpasses in arrogance the old-time theologian; for with his slogan, no object without a subject, and his claim that the meaning and existence of things are inseparable from the experience of them, he reduces a whole vast cosmos to the status of a mental construct. Our own experiences are, to be sure, the world's *ratio cognoscendi*. The idealist would conclude that they are therefore its *ratio essendi*. Whether, as pragmatist, he teaches that reality changes with the changes of human opinion, that there is no objective truth, but only as many truths as there are beliefs, or whether, as absolute idealist, he invents a transcendental or universal Self which functions through each of our finite centres and thus sustains the world—in either case the anti-realist belittles the things of nature by relegating them to a false and unnecessary dependence upon experience, and denying them their ancient privilege of existing in their own right irrespective of their status as objects of any experience, finite or absolute.

If common-sense realism is outraged by the reduction of the visible and existent universe in all its vast extent to mere mental content, with a consequent belittlement in power and magnitude, the new or Platonic realism of the present day is still more outraged by the idealist's relegation to the status of subjective dependence upon consciousness of the even vaster realm of abstract subsistence. For the invisible region of the subsistent comprehends the infinite totality of essences and values—of truth, beauty and goodness—and the laws of its structure possess a kind and degree of validity which, to the

realist, far transcends the validity of the transitory and contingent sequences and coexistences which obtain in the world of the concretely existent. Plato, who was perhaps the first clearly to proclaim the objective reality of abstract forms and relations, was strongly influenced by Pythagoreanism, and it is natural that the clearest illustrations of the nature of the subsistent should be afforded by the subject-matter of mathematics. Consider the kind of reality to be attributed to the properties and relations of numbers if those relations and properties are regarded as in no way dependent either upon the concrete objects by which they may be exemplified or upon the consciousness of the mathematicians who discovered them. To the realist it is clear that the truth that 7 and 5 are prime numbers and that their sum equals 12 would be totally unaffected by the annihilation of all existing objects and all existing consciousness.

This realist faith that universal truths are independent of the particular subject-matter in which they are exemplified by no means conflicts with the realisation that we attain to a conceptual knowledge of the universal through a perceptual knowledge of the particular. In the teaching of arithmetic or geometry it is pedagogically necessary to use concrete diagrams of particular shape and size which are experienced at particular times and places. It is by attending to the generic aspects of such diagrams that one comes to appreciate the abstract and universal relations of number and space. This initial psychological dependence of the universal upon the particular prevents many from arriving at a clear conception of the logical and ontological independence of universals. In other words, the fact that the particular is the *ratio cognoscendi* of the universal produces upon the immature or philosophically confused the illusion that it is also the *ratio essendi*. Just as the mind of the child in its early development depends for its knowledge of universals upon their concrete embodiment so do the minds of men in the early stages of culture. In both cases alike we find the same anti-realistic identification of the abstract and universal with its particular manifestation. To one who is emancipated from this confusion the realm of number and geometric form appears in its abstract purity, freed from all limitations of matter and place and from every vicissitude of temporal change. It is because of this freedom from the bonds of locus and date that not only numbers but the entire realm of essences possess a richness and an immensity in comparison with which even the infinities of the existent world are dwarfed to insignificance. For our actual universe is but

one from the limitless store of spatio-temporal systems; any given existent world is but a cross section of this absolute or subsistent totality. For the Pythagorean, the domain of the subsistent appears to have been restricted to number and geometric form; while in Plato's philosophy it received the somewhat different limitations of high logical generality and ethical and æsthetic value. Neo-Platonism was more consistent in that it recognised that any individual, such as Socrates or Cæsar, possessed an eternal archetype. It is perhaps only in the neo-realistic philosophy of to-day that the domain of the subsistent has been seen to include every character whatsoever, quantitative no less than qualitative, specific no less than generic, valueless no less than valuable, fragmentary no less than integrated. From this standpoint we might be tempted to define the world of subsistence after the manner of Leibnitz as the totality of possible or thinkable objects. There would, however, be two drawbacks to this seemingly simple definition. First, the term possibility would have to be paradoxically broadened to include its negative, the impossible, for the subsistent must include not only such empirically impossible objects as centaurs and mermaids, but also such logically or intrinsically impossible objects as round squares. While, secondly, though any subsistent may be termed thinkable or conceivable, yet it is at least uncertain whether this relation to thought is intrinsic to the nature of the subsistent.

What are the ethical and æsthetic implications of the transcendental universe of subsistence as thus realistically conceived? At first sight it might seem that we had upon our hands a vast incoherent heterogeneity of miscellaneous essences promiscuously related. And the fact that this wild totality was regarded realistically as independent of consciousness might seem quite insufficient to confer upon it value of any kind. But to condemn the subsistent in this way would be to overlook the most significant of its characters. For the realm of the subsistent is not merely an aggregate of terms. It is also a system of propositions, that is, identity relations between these terms. These propositional relations do, to be sure, include the false no less than the true. It is, however, from the true propositions that the universe of subsistence derives not only its unity and structure but the ethical and æsthetic values with which this paper is concerned. While the round square fills honourably its humble rôle of illustrating the meaning of impossibility, it is the obverse aspect of this impossibility, namely, the proposition that squareness and roundness are reciprocally incompatible, that

is really significant. Here is an eternal truth whose status is independent of its recognition by any mind, divine or human. Moreover, while such eternal truths are also independent of the world of concrete existence, the world of concrete existence is by no means independent of them. Whatever thing would exist as square must forego the joys of roundness. An eternal truth is indeed an identity relation based solely upon the abstract natures or essences of the terms related, and however varied the temporal and spatial collocations of an existent system they can never be such as to violate the relations that obtain between essences. A square thing may be red or blue, but it cannot be round; an event can be past or future in reference to some given event, but it cannot be both; a thing may be black or non-black, but it cannot be a black that is not the opposite of white; seven electrons may or may not combine, but their number can never be evenly divisible by two.

While there is significance in this capacity of the eternal truths of essences to exercise a selective veto upon the world of existence, the ethical and æsthetic significance of the realm of the subsistent follows even more directly from those intrinsic characters of eternity and immensity of which we have spoken. In the present day, particularly, when the omnipresence of change and the stirring implications of creative evolution are for the first time accorded the recognition that is their due, it is something of a relief to realise that, though Heraclitus was right in his belief that all things changed, he was no less right in his vision of the changeless *logos*, a system of invariant forms and laws by which the flux of existence is measured and defined. However invigorating and splendid the experience of the flowing aspect of reality may be, there is after all a universal craving for the permanent. To participate vicariously through contemplation in the eternal order that transcends existence brings quiet to the mind and permits the conscious ego to transcend its own limits and to rise to a kind of Nirvana—a Nirvana which is, however, attained through expansion of consciousness rather than through its suppression.

That one of Plato's insights which was most important for ethics was also the one most neglected by his disciples, particularly by Aristotle. We refer to his conception of the superiority of ideal good to any existential power, even that of the divine creator. Ideals of right and justice, according to Plato, do not derive their validity from God. On the contrary, it is God who must derive his worth from them. In short, right is above might and independent of it in the

Platonic universe. Which means that religion depends upon ethics, not ethics upon religion. The whole history of religious ethics has been corrupted by failure to realise Plato's discovery of this supremacy of the ideal. The barbarous notion that moral values derive their significance from the will of a heavenly being, that living nobly means nothing more than conforming one's action to the commands of such a being—in short, the doctrine that obedience is the cardinal virtue, and disobedience the cardinal vice, these are the notions, as false as they are degrading, which characterise the ethical traditions of those who reject Platonic realism. For the realist, ethics is an affair of ideals, not of commands, and it is rooted not in the contingencies of existence, but in the necessities of subsistence. If courage and mercy are excellences of character, they do not become more excellent if there happens to exist a power which wills them, nor less excellent if there be no such power. The ethics of realism, because it is based upon eternally subsistent ideas, cannot be corrupted, or shaken by anything that may happen to beliefs about the merely supernatural.

The conception of a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness has undergone many changes in the past, and will probably undergo as many in the future. Belief in the existence of such a power has its consolations and its dangers. We may regard it as supported by the facts of science or as refuted by them, but in no event should the primary sanctity of the sense of duty—reverence for values as such—be put at the mercy of anything so precarious and irrelevant as existential supernaturalism. Ethics—the science of what is noble and beautiful in the way of living—should be freed from all vestiges of authoritarianism. The evil notion that one needs to apologize for the good or to justify the claim of the ideal upon the heart by translating it into the mandates of political or theological authority should be for ever repudiated. This does not at all mean that the realist should forgo the use of any empirical method in his attempt to discover the specific ideal which is applicable to a given situation. The truths of essence are as difficult to discover as the truths of existence, and the realist's assurance of the absoluteness of duty is in no way incompatible with a dubiousness as to what is his specific duty in a given situation. Nor should we fail to realise that the content of duty may change and evolve—that rules of conduct were suitable for yesterday which may not be suitable to-day, and that a change in the situation of an individual will call for a corresponding change of the means used to attain the ideal.

Modern realism is cosmocentric in its outlook rather than anthropocentric or egocentric, with regard to the Platonic world of subsistence no less than with regard to the existential world of common sense and science. It would deny to the individual the pseudo-creativity attributed to him by the philosophy of idealism and pragmatism. It would accord to him no transcendent powers of legislating for nature, or of supporting by his consciousness the infinities of space and time. But in depriving the individual of these illusory powers to constitute reality by his thought, realism gives back to him the increased responsibility of membership in the independent and self-existent order of nature. To be alive in a world that is not of our own making is after all a noble adventure. And to have the privilege of contemplating existent nature in all its vastness, to feel that each new scientific law is not a mere résumé of our impressions but a veritable conquest of the objective universe, gives to the realistically emancipated a high and serious elation which is quite beyond the reach of those who would subject nature to a status of dependence upon mind. And when to the tumultuous and inexhaustible welter of things existent, realism adds the quiet and infinitely greater immensities of the realm of subsistence, the mind gains access to new and imperishable sources of joy and peace. The comprehension that the whole universe of essence and existence, though not created by us or dependent upon us, may nevertheless be mastered through contemplation, induces an emotion of pride freed from the petty arrogance of subjectivism. It is this pride in a universe that is independent yet controllable, and external yet progressively knowable, which is the ground for all sound appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime.

IV.—DISCUSSIONS.

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'.

It is probable that the Symposium on Meaning which was held at the Oxford Philosophic Congress, and was published in the October issue of *MIND*, will have presented to a casual reader the usual features of a philosophic discussion. That is to say, it reads like a triangular duel, in which each participant aims at something different, and, according to the other, misses it, and hits a phantom. I had aimed at what seemed to me the really vital point about Meaning, which I regard as one of the great untouched problems in logic and psychology, but both Mr. Russell and Prof. Joachim, the latter 'resolutely' (p. 404), appear to avoid it. Mr. Russell regards what I aimed at as quite an unimportant part of his paper, though I tried to expound a theory diametrically opposed to his, which seemed to me directly to negative his solution of '*How Propositions mean*'. He wanted me, it seems, to discuss the very peculiar, very interesting, but somewhat unnatural hybrid between Humian sensationalism and behaviourism with which he is now experimenting. Prof. Joachim, lastly, attempts no positive contribution to the question, and labours only to show that Mr. Russell "asserts what no one can possibly *think*" (p. 405). His friends will infer, that, if so, Mr. Russell also does not think it, and that possibly Prof. Joachim has not understood what he meant. I cannot but agree with Prof. Joachim that Mr. Russell has chosen to express himself in difficult and apparently contradictory terms, as philosophers so often do, though the 'contradictions' which strike me most are not identical with those selected by Prof. Joachim. Yet I dare not suppose that they are more than verbal, and think it possible that I have failed to understand Mr. Russell.

After which candid confession I feel entitled to say that he has not understood me in some important points.

(1) I feel sure that he has not understood the two, to me, essential points he says he agrees with, *viz.*, that meaning is *not* a property of 'objects' and that it is essentially personal. For not only does he fail to explain how he can adopt conclusions which are in him devoid of any visible support in the way of premisses, but the whole of his paper seems to negative any such agreement. How, *e.g.*, can meaning be "an observable property of observable entities," if he 'agrees' that it is attached to them by our personal attitudes, whereby they are '*taken to mean*'? Or how can the

meaning of words prevail over that of those who use them, if he 'agrees' that meaning is ultimately personal?

(2) On the other hand he misunderstands both me and the character of my objections to his theory, when he supposes my method to be 'philosophic' rather than scientific: that the method of knowing is *one* and that there is *no* specific philosophic method, is both a corollary of Pragmatism, and, I believe, a very real and important point of agreement between us.

(3) He has entirely misunderstood my alternative to (what I call) the 'intellectualist' method of observation or contemplation. Or rather, he refuses to look at it, and insists on applying to it categories against which it is a systematic protest. When he declares, *e.g.*, that "all the words in which Dr. Schiller endeavours to describe his unobservable entities *imply* that after all he can observe them" (p. 401) and that "his very words turn them into objects of contemplation"¹ (*ibid.*), I can only gasp, and retort that my theory does not concede any such power to words. To dispose of it thus would seem to be a typical case of the over-riding of actual meaning by verbal, which could hardly be surpassed from the writings of Mr. Bradley² or by the most literal pedantries of formal logic. Because the words '*imply*' a meaning I disclaim, am I to be debarred from using them so as to confute superstitions based on verbal meaning? Because I call certain processes 'unobservable,' have I called them 'unknowable'? Because I contend that many of our most vivid and vital experiences are not properly to be described as 'observable objects,' must a *tabu* be put upon the word 'experience,' and must I be tied down to the very words I reject as inadequate, 'observe' and 'object'? All this because Mr. Russell thinks he cannot understand "how anything can be experienced without being an object" (p. 402). Is there then no 'subject' at all, no one that experiences and acts? If so, why do we all habitually talk about it?

I suspect, however, that when Mr. Russell says '*can't*,' he means '*won't*'. But even language, that supreme court of appeal for so much philosophy, refuses to bear him out. It has words for *actions* as well as for 'objects' and 'relations,' it recognises *verbs* as well as *nouns*, and summons philosophers to recognise them too! Now actions, processes, attitudes, are never properly 'objects,' though they can (verbally) be hypostasized by a *fiction* which ignores their dynamic quality and the selective construction of the '*objects*' of our interest. Neither are *agents* 'objects' to themselves; especially not the Self, which has been such an insoluble crux for intellectualist analysis. It has successfully defied transformation into an object, and the distinction of the 'I' and the 'Me' has merely disrupted the unity of the personality which common-sense postulates, and psychic functioning attests.

¹ Italics mine.

² See MIND, No. 72, p. 500, for the doctrine that we are condemned to mean what we say, and cf. No. 73, p. 41-42.

Mr. Russell has obviously got deeply involved in this ancient difficulty. Having insisted that there are to be nothing but observable objects in experience, he has had to dissolve away the Self, after the manner of Hume. Yet he cannot afford to do this, because his theory of Meaning involves an appeal to 'mnemonic causation,' which is, on Humian principles, a double contradiction, because memory demands psychic continuity, and causation, agency.¹ When invited to recognise activities and continuous agents, he has no right to refuse and to require them to be transmuted into 'objects'. For the contention he has to meet is that *they* are the primary reals, and that 'objects' are secondary, and constituted by the operation and selection of 'agents'. Moreover, even if the demand for 'objects' were as legitimate as he thinks it, it could not possibly be satisfied by an analysis which does not provide for the continuity of any object at all.

And when this analysis inquires into '*what swirls in the tide of life,*' it may be invited to contemplate the answer which a still more scientific analysis gives to the question—what *moves* in the world of physics? Physics now analyses all material phenomena into the motions of 'electrons'; but it does not profess to know what the 'substance' of an electron may be, and hardly even attempts to guess what 'electricity' may be *per se*. The simple truth is that, alike in physics and in psychology, activities are far more certain, and better known, than the 'substances' ('objects') in which they are feigned to inhere. And no wonder: for are not activity and life the primary realities, and the sources by which all our notions of 'substances' and 'objects' are deposited?

The 'behaviourist' method of explanation, moreover, which so fascinates Mr. Russell, is far more in sympathy with this attitude of physics than with the old static conception of a world built up of solid substances bound together in stable relations. For even at the lowest it is surely far more certain that the *amoeba* nourishes itself by putting forth *pseudopodia*, than that it recognises staple articles of food standing in a nutritive relation to its internal economy. Behaviourism is *dynamic*, as modern explanations tend to be; but the non-behaviouristic stratum in Mr. Russell's beliefs seems to be incongruously and dangerously *static*.

(4) Passing next to Mr. Russell's reply to my criticisms of the theory that 'images' are the original vehicles of meaning, I find that I must question its adequacy and relevance, perhaps because it is put too elliptically for my comprehension.

(a) His reply to the objection that images cannot be essential to meaning, because there are excellent thinkers addicted to imageless thought, is that this "ignores the history of the individual. The essence of meaning lies in the causal efficacy of that which has meaning," and this is "a result of habit. A word, through association,

¹ Mr. Russell here seems to use the notion of causal agency in a way hardly compatible with his own formal analysis of the notion in his Aristotelian Society address (vol. xiii.).

acquires the same causal efficacy as an image having the same meaning; habit causes it to have this efficacy directly, without the intermediary of the image. But that does not prove that the image could have been dispensed with originally" (p. 398).

This means, I suppose, that though the imageless thinker *now* dispenses with the use of images, he was once less independent. The psychology seems somewhat conjectural. Also is it not a trifle dogmatic to assume that objects have meaning and causal efficacy, and that in these allegations lies the essence of meaning? This is just the question at issue. And in any case how is the answer relevant to the objection? How can the fact that in a mind that has imagery, and uses it, the meaning originally attached to the images may be transferred to the words it uses later, prove anything about a mind that does not have or use images, and yet contrives to mean?

(b) To the objection that meaning and imagery do not in fact vary concomitantly as they should do on his theory, Mr Russell has no reply except the *argumentum ad hominem* that he would not have expected from me so much insistence on 'verbal precision'. Now it may be that I have erred in demanding, vainly, 'vitality and concreteness' from philosophic formulas that are fog-producers; but I do not see how this is relevant to the question whether meaning and imagery do, observably and in fact, behave as if they belonged together. Nor again can I see relevance in the very true remark, with which I cordially agree, that "precision in the meaning of words is a social product," or, as I should prefer to say, a consequence of 'intersubjective intercourse'. But I may point out to Mr. Russell, who is, I take it, committed to the laudable ideal of defining precisely all the words he uses, that this ideal is unattainable in principle, because every word he defines is defined by others which are undefined and ambiguous; so that, until he has defined everything he has not really got precision anywhere. The inference, to me, from this situation, is not that nothing need be defined, but that definitions, explanations, paraphrases, etc., should be used, as best one can, until the personal meaning to be conveyed has actually been conveyed, and is understood.

(c) To my third argument for the independence of meaning Mr. Russell has, so far as I can see, no objection. He merely agrees that, when "the associations of the image are different," the meaning will be different, but has nothing to say on the question how in that case the meaning will be communicable. If meaning depends on images, and the images mean differently, because they have different associations, then images *fail* as vehicles of meaning. Whence I should infer that it might be better to drop the images and to *start* from Meaning as the primary process in understanding.

(5) It seems to me to be a serious misunderstanding to suppose that in my mouth 'intellectualism' is a term of abuse and means merely 'bad' (p. 398).

This charge rests, I suspect, on a confusion between 'intellectual' and 'intellectualist'. I have not the faintest desire to interfere with the exercises of Mr. Russell's intellect, and yield to no man in my admiration for them. I consider him perhaps our finest 'intellectual,' and a leader of our '*intelligentsia*'. I also hold that he inclines, as a rule, to 'intellectualist' views of philosophic questions—as is natural enough in so distinguished an intellectual. But I am quite ready to discuss how far his intellectualism goes, and I recognise that, unlike most intellectuals, he has had the courage to vivisection himself and to analyse his intellectualist bias, magnificently, in the *Journal of Philosophy*, xvi., 2.

Moreover, I by no means use 'intellectualist' as a term of abuse. It is as purely and coldly a descriptive term as 'voluntarist' or 'sensationalist'. It merely means one who tends to explain human behaviour in terms of intellection. Nor can I conceive why an intellectualist should object to being described as such. If I were an intellectualist (as I am an 'intellectual') I should be *proud* to be called one. For it would mean that I believed I had succeeded in explaining the real in terms of man's highest and most specific function, his intellect. When, therefore, I object to 'intellectualism,' I do not mean that it is 'bad' to explain in terms of intellect, but that it is *wrong*—intellectually. It is wrong intellectually, because it tries to account for our cognitions by the unworkable fictions and blind abstractions of a 'pure thought'. Now I hold that this explanation is not adequate. The intellectualist accounts, even of the human intellect, fail to describe its nature and functions. The intellectualist attitude in philosophy is moreover false and futile, because it is covertly inspired by hidden forces or 'complexes' which are neither intellectual nor admirable. But, unfortunately, intellectualists do not understand how they are tricked by their instincts and prejudices. However, it is clear that these contentions are the result not of any *a priori* animosity to intellectualism (and still less to intellect), but of willingness to face the facts. They presuppose an unflinching use of the intellect, even upon itself, and so a goodly dose of intellectualistic affinity. For only one who is capable of severely controlling his desires will confess, even to himself, that the perfect sage is an unattainable ideal; the ordinary man, whose beliefs are dictated by his emotions, could hardly reach conclusions so repugnant to human vanity.

It is, therefore, something quite definite that is meant by the charge of 'intellectualism'. In Mr. Russell's case and in the article under discussion, it means that Mr. Russell wrongly and needlessly *insists* on assuming the attitude of the spectator or contemplator, and will not look at, or for, anything but 'objects'. Now, as the active side of cognition is there, and *is* all-pervasive, it follows that, if you ignore it, you cannot describe correctly. Historically this attitude is explicable enough; it was determined

by the use of the senses, but as the intellect was largely developed by the functions of perceiving and interpreting their data, intellectualism and sensationalism often co-operate and fuse for the purposes of my criticism. Theories of knowledge based on them all suffer from the same incurable defect, that of overlooking that the active side in our nature pervades also our 'cognitions'.

It is *not* true that this side is unintelligible or inexpressible. In every language there exists a vocabulary for it—though it is very defective in Greek, from which our philosophic tradition is derived. Only, of course, the words of the actor are different from those of the onlooker. They are often inadequate, and can always be misunderstood; we should not try to haggle over them, but penetrate to the meaning it is sought to convey. However, 'objects of contemplation' and 'unobservable entities' are not terms it is natural to select in endeavouring to describe activity as it is immediately felt by the agent. As I said, the verbal stronghold of such descriptions is in the verb; but its inexpugnable and insuperable attestation is in the personal pronoun, 'I'. Whoever sets himself over against his experience—even to contemplate it—as Mr. Russell repeatedly does,¹ confesses thereby that it cannot be completely analysed into observable objects, and so admits the failure of his 'intellectualism'.

I tried to show, therefore, that these difficulties of our intellectualistic psychology were factitious and gratuitous. There is an alternative way, and it is wrong to neglect to explore it. If, moreover, such neglect is *wilful*, the *choice* of the intellectualist method becomes, clearly, *arbitrary*: it is, moreover, *self-defeating*. For to *refuse* to recognise the voluntarist alternative to intellectualism is itself an *act of will*, and this act proves that intellection is not the *only* process native to the human mind.

¹ *E.g.*, when he recognises 'propositional attitudes' (*How Propositions Mean*, p. 30). 'Attitude' is precisely the word I regard as least inadequate to the expression of the nature of Meaning.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC.

I AM so much interested in Mr. Leonard Russell's point of view (*MIND*, October, 1920), that I will venture, if I may, this once more, to try to meet it as far as I can.

On one matter, indeed, I do not see my way to any agreement. It seems to run right through the discussion. It is the question whether I am bound, on my premisses, to hold that the subject of a hypothetical judgment must exist in fact (*l.c.*, p. 476). The reason is, as I understand, that I hold the ultimate subject of the judgment to be reality.

In my view it is this doctrine which gives me absolute freedom in my account of the immediate subject of judgment. I take it to be the essence of thought to qualify reality as a whole; and the instrument of its operation I take to be always a discrimination, including in this term selection and combination, within the whole content which reality offers as experience. Any discriminated content that will prescribe a special line of connexion within the whole will serve as the immediate subject of a judgment. The name of a real thing suggests a real subject taken as it is given. But the antecedent of a hypothetical judgment, usually an idea introduced by an "if," suggests at once something divergent from given reality. The "if" introduces an ideal subject, of which the consequent predicates something not true of it as it stands, but true in the light thrown on it by its connexion with what is relevant in the whole. The reason why I say that this is fundamental is that I cannot comprehend the notion of a thought which does not operate towards qualifying the whole reality. Thought, I should have said, strictly speaking, is the whole or the reality operating through minds to qualify itself by establishing definite coherences prescribed by discriminated conditions. Thus I can see nothing in the point that knowledge cannot be based on the whole reality, because it is based on discriminated systematic connexions. It is based, I believe, on a systematic connexion at every point of affirmation, but never on any connexion apart from the criterion of the whole content, the appeal to which is its *nisus* and its nature. The whole specified in its parts in the light of the whole—that is what I understand by knowledge as a construction created by thought.

Subject to this difference of opinion, I can agree that we get knowledge by "constructing a world," but this only in a definitely limited sense and degree, which I will recur to, "other than the

real world" (p. 474). The main work of construction is, I believe, ordering and adjusting the world of experience in 'obedience' to the principle of totality which is the law of coherence. Surely Mr. Russell would not say with Gentile that thinking simply creates the world? As I understand, we make it in discovering it, and discover it in making it.

But this factor of agreement, which goes very deep with reference to the active character of thought, is yet modified by a further difference between us, though again, I hope, re-modified towards Mr Russell's position by a further explanation. I am writing as shortly as I possibly can, and beg for a favourable hearing.

The further difference is this. I admit the work of construction, but cannot agree that it comes under the head of supposition or position. Therefore I must deny that "posited systems are at the basis of our whole explicated knowledge of reality" (p. 475).

Supposition, as I see the matter, is not construction, and cannot construct a world. Construction is the complete work of thought, of judgment. Supposition is ideal experiment, and has the limitation of all experiment. The experiment is one thing; the judgment upon it is another. The whole purpose of the experiment is to see how the real world reacts—how the special track we have selected opens up and continues—in consequence of what the experiment does. Why does "reality" make a difference and furnish the test? Because reality is the whole; it does not matter which word you use; and the whole is the criterion of thought. I am not sure whether Mr. Russell means that he formulated his view, that science is necessary to contradict science (p. 474 top), in opposition to mine or because of it; but I say it in so many words (*Logic*,² i., p. 297 n.). Only, supposition does not tell you whether science is for you or against you. It is solely when you have judged, that you have committed yourself to a survey of the whole, which says that there is no superior generalisation against you. I agree that content is what you have to consider; but it seems to me to be only in the judgment, which affirms of reality, that you have the whole content brought to bear. Strictly, you cannot have a posited *system*. For you cannot *posit* the consequences, the unification, of combinations. You can only *judge* them.

But we seem to have such a thing. We seem able to suppose a world, in erecting which we draw consequences and so unify combinations. Here we are misled, I believe, by the feature, apt to pass unnoticed, of conclusion-premisses (cf. *Implication*, pp. 65-66). The moment you glance at posited data, inference begins to grow. Consequences begin to draw themselves long before the main conclusion is drawn. "All men are mortal" is put forward as a premiss. But it is chock-full of conclusions. And so is the structure of any coherent system which, we say, in current language, that we "posit" or "suppose". The moment we look at the factors of our supposition taken together, judgment

and inference, which go beyond it, begin. The criterion of the whole, and the appeal to it, is inherent in our thought, and cannot be barred out.

This was my further difference. I agreed that thought was productive; but I do not agree that its operation as such can be identified with supposition.

But now I have a re-modification to offer which will take me, I hope, some little way at least back towards agreement.

Mr. Russell had in mind (October, 1918, p. 447) the non-Euclidean geometries. Now I have no right to say a word as of myself on this subject. But I find a discussion by Prof. Alexander (in *Space, Time and Deity*, i., pp. 157, 160 ff.) which seems relevant and suggestive. It is instructive in itself that Prof. Alexander discusses them under the section-heading "A Product of Art". He compares the construction of them "with the arbitrary act of imagination by which we construct a chimera". They are "the investigation of certain notions for their own sake when freed from their attachments". They are products of free thought "giving rise to fresh combinations". Yet they retain a kinship with nature such that they give us valuable knowledge, which can perhaps also be said, but certainly in a sense much more remote, of works of art (Alexander, pp. 161-162). Discrimination within the whole has here passed into divergent supposition. Abstraction and combination have led the way to a posited world—other than the real world.

This, I take it, is the sort of case which Mr Russell is determined to have recognised. Here we certainly get knowledge, and we seem to get it by constructive thinking about an assumption or supposition. I fully admit the importance and significance of the topic. I only venture to suggest two remarks: (1) Pure thought, in drawing consequences, seems to me to transcend supposition by asserting, not positing, its own laws; (2) it also seems to me to transcend supposition just because it pursues the suggestion freely and constructively, *i.e.*, it takes, out of a complete survey of reality, any and every consequent which the supposition indicates to be relevant. Thought would contradict its own nature, and would fail to be creative, if it confined itself to dwelling on the content of an assumption. Rather, like art, it works out the possibilities to which a notion, applied to the whole of content without restriction, gives it the clue.

Then, to come to terms with Mr. Russell's ultimatum (p. 477): "The judgment, I should say, is always and inevitably based on such a partial system, though referring to the whole of reality": I should say that I believe I understand what it means, and that I recognise in it, as I have explained, high practical truth in the case of certain freely constructed systems; but strictly and ultimately I cannot but hold it to be a contradiction in terms. A judgment which refers to the whole of reality must, in principle, be modelled by coherence with it. In a given case the demands of the whole

may make no apparent difference to that one out of innumerable partial systems which is more immediately in question. But this cannot be because the whole of content has not to be consulted, but only because, allowing for undeveloped interdependence of systems, its answer is on the whole taken to be favourable.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

DO WE KNOW OTHER MINDS MEDIATELY OR IMMEDIATELY?

In the October number of *MIND* there was an article by Mr. Joshua C. Gregory, criticising my paper on 'Our Knowledge of Other Minds' in the *Aristotelian Proceedings* for 1918-19, and I should like to say something by way of a belated reply to him. Mr. Gregory disputes my contention that we know other minds as directly and immediately as we know physical things, and defends the orthodox view that minds can only know one another indirectly, *via* the material world. The truth of this view seems to him obvious from the consideration of such facts as the following: a person's thoughts, feelings and desires are concealed from public inspection; absence of bodily signs makes it impossible for us to perceive a person's mental states; our knowledge of other minds depends upon our own previous experience and upon their resemblance to ourselves; some mental lives altogether elude our apprehension. Mr. Gregory then concludes that the existence of other minds is inferred and not perceived; but the inference, he insists, is implicit and spontaneous. It is the work of primary, unconsciously acting memory, and is made by us in our infancy, so that in mature experience the recognition of other mental lives appears to be immediate.

It does not seem to me that the facts upon which Mr. Gregory bases his conclusion are all of them equally certain; thus, *e.g.*, I should be prepared to argue that our knowledge of other minds is not limited to mental states similar to those experienced by ourselves. But even granting that all Mr. Gregory says is correct, the facts he refers to in no way conflict with the 'direct acquaintance' theory. It is perfectly true, of course, that other people's thoughts do not lie exposed to our view and that even their emotions may be difficult to discern; but this is not a reason for denying that what little we do perceive of other minds *is* perceived and not inferred. The fragmentary character of our acquaintance with other mental lives could only be regarded as an argument against the view I am defending if by 'immediate' knowledge were meant a knowledge that is exhaustive and infallible. But 'immediacy' in this connexion simply means that when the act of discrimination is directed upon a mind, then what we apprehend is a mind and not something that intervenes between us and it; it does not mean that the discrimination is either perfect or attained without any trouble. Certain conditions such as the similarity of a mind to our own may help us to discriminate it more perfectly, while under other conditions we may completely fail to detect the presence of a

mental life—but this only shows that our knowledge of other minds is subject to the same limitations as our knowledge of anything else. Mr. Gregory thinks that if minds can be directly perceived, we ought to be able to tell at a glance whether an amoeba has consciousness or no. But then he might as well argue that if physical things can be directly perceived the discovery of the bacillus of cholera ought not to have occasioned Koch the slightest difficulty.

I am not concerned to deny Mr. Gregory's contention that our knowledge of the inner lives of others is inseparable from the observation of their bodily behaviour. If minds do not exist apart from bodies this is just what one would expect to find; but my point is that we could have no clue to the interpretation of expressive behaviour unless we *also* perceived the mental state of which it is an expression. And it is because the two have been perceived together that the bodily movement may become the *sign* of the inner state—though this does not mean that immediate apprehension of minds is forthwith “repressed”. Mr. Gregory grants “some plausibility” to my contention that the reason why we do not perceive minds alone is that they are always connected with bodies; but he qualifies this concession by the enigmatic remark that “we do perceive dead bodies alone”. Certainly;—why not? Mr. Gregory apparently thinks that having once got into the habit of perceiving minds together with bodies, we should not be able to perceive bodies without minds. But our slavery to habit is not so bad as all that; and—fully in accordance with the direct acquaintance theory—not even the ‘habitual conjunction of mind and body’ can make us go on perceiving a mind when it is no longer there to be perceived.

In defending the traditional theory against my criticism of it Mr. Gregory accuses me of having misrepresented the nature of the inference upon which our recognition of other minds rests. This inference, he maintains, is as unconscious and spontaneous as walking, etc., and he constantly compares it to the ‘complication’ of perception: just as the child learns to see the hardness of the table, so it learns to see that its mother is pleased when she smiles. Now it seems to me that the two cases are not parallel. The hardness of the table has, in the first instance, been as directly apprehended as its colour; but the mother’s gladness has, according to Mr. Gregory, never been apprehended at all. It is useless to call upon ‘unconscious memory’ to reinstate something that has never been experienced. And however much one may insist that the inference is unconscious, there is no getting away from the fact that the psychological—and not merely the logical—starting-point of such an inference must be the child’s own experience, which is contrary to all we know of the development of a mental life. Thus, *e.g.*, Mr. Gregory says, “the child learns from its own pain, pleasure or anger associated with bodily manifestations to perceive from similar bodily manifestations the possession by other minds of

similar feelings or emotions". But if the child is to learn from its own pain, anger, etc., it must be capable of detecting these states in itself—which presupposes in an infant an astonishing power of self-analysis; and even if this were a likely supposition, it would not be of much avail, because there is no similarity between a baby's experience of its own angry kicks and the sight of its mother's frowning face—so that its correct interpretation of her expressive behaviour would still remain a mystery. To say that we make the connexion between our own movements as we feel them and the movements of others which we see, "as we make all fundamental connexions—unconsciously, spontaneously, and implicitly," is simply to give up all attempt at explanation.

As against this mythical theory of inference I urge, then, that the presence of a mental life is revealed to us along with the shape, colour, and other qualities that characterise the body, and that living beings appear to us from the first as *qualitatively* different from inanimate things, though it may take us a long time to discover in what precisely the difference consists. There is no contradiction in maintaining that we are aware of minds long before we know that they are minds. This view seems to me to afford a satisfactory explanation of the fact of intra-subjective intercourse; and in my paper I tried to show that there is nothing in the nature of knowledge to make direct acquaintance with other minds impossible. Mr. Gregory has several criticisms to make of the general view I take of knowledge, but they seem to me to be based on a misunderstanding of my position. Thus, *e.g.*, he remarks that I 'have been compelled' to criticise the traditional psychological view 'by deductions from neo-realistic principles'. But it was a distinct object of my paper to consider the bearing of realism upon the problem of our knowledge of other minds; nothing 'compelled' me to take the realistic theory as my starting-point except the fact that I happen to believe in its truth.

NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-neuroses. By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Fellow and Prælector in Natural Sciences, St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1920. Pp. viii, 250.

MERELY to enumerate the titles of Dr. Rivers's chapters, or tell over in one's mind the "inhibitions" and "dissociations," the "substitutions" and "phobias" and "complexes" which advertise so many of his pages, is to see at once that his book will attract attention wherever an interest is taken in the newer problems and concepts now knocking for entrance at the gates of psychology. And attention once caught, it is safe to say, will be held. For the reader will not be long in divining that he has more than a mere record of psychological observations before him. He has an effort at a systematisation of the newer facts; and this in short compass, for it is a comparatively short book.

All work on these themes tends to invite comparison with that of Professor Freud. One feature of the present book which will appeal to many readers may be at once recorded. It has all the interest of having been written by a man apparently about as familiarly acquainted with the phenomena of danger as Freud with the phenomena of sex. It is, of course, a war medical book. Compared with Freud it reminds one more than once of the great difference between the rough and ready methods of war and the refinement, patience, and thoroughness which are possible in such an exclusively civil practice as Freud's has been. Yet it seems to succeed in being convincing on one point at least; not intrinsically a supremely important one, but yet interesting. It shows how good a basis there is, after all, for a view of Freud which is often rested only on prejudice; namely, that his theory of psycho-neurosis is one-sided owing to the exclusive stress which it lays upon sexual factors.

The author's preoccupation with danger experiences is not alone responsible for this result. What has mostly contributed to it is rather just the happy accident which has given the study and practice of psycho-therapy into the hands of an anthropologist. The writer is interested in the theory of his subject. His approach is biological. One of his chief aims is to cast a biological light upon these mental-pathological symptoms. From this circum-

stance chiefly has arisen a certain relaxation of the stress upon sexual factors as the generative agents in the various pathological conditions.

This result seems to arise naturally out of the author's work rather than to be anywhere explicitly pushed into the foreground.

Like all his compeers he works with the conception of the unconscious. He recognises a process whereby functions which were conscious become unconscious. Following the general lines of recent theory in these matters, he takes psycho-neurosis to be the disturbing reverberation of these unconscious functions upwards into conscious life. He wishes biology to throw some light on the question how such functions come to exist. Why should a conscious process pass down into the unconscious? What biological necessity is there for there being processes thus held down? The need is not far to seek. Inhibition of early tendencies is a corollary of evolution. Kinds of activity which have been superseded must be kept down out of the way of superseding ones. In pathological conditions the former reappear. We have an outcrop of "something necessary for the welfare of some of the ancestors of man which still comes into action in special circumstances".

A point of genuine theoretic interest thus arises. What instinctive tendencies are they which do crop out, in man, in a pathological way? "Not universally the sex instincts" is what the author would reply. The reason is fairly obvious. The sex instincts are not the only ones, from a biological point of view, which are old and strong in us. Of far more ancient lineage than the control of them is the control of our natural tendency to go demoralised in the face of danger. Self-preservation is our earliest task. Sex control comes to be a task too, but not till far later. There seems to be this much of justification at anyrate for the author's visible tendency to suspect that sex instincts have been made to do duty, in various quarters, in recent theory of neurosis, where danger-instincts would have served better.

But the whole issue as to which set of impulses most taxes our powers of control is rather aside from the focal point of interest of these studies. Whatever may most need control, the machinery of the controlling process is what interests the author. And in this he bears testimony to the fact—we were not out of need of being reminded of it—of the indebtedness of the whole world of psychotherapeutics to Freud for the real clues to this mechanism. Much and violently as Freud's opinions are still opposed upon all matters, the impression which his general view of the mechanism of repression leaves on the candid expert now, as the author testifies, so far from being one of suspicion, is frankly one of wonder that anything so obvious and simple should not have been thought of long ago. This does not prevent but that within the general truth of the view there should be a great deal still to be understood. And in the interests of further understanding the author would appeal to the hypothesis that the mechanism of inhibition has a

biological function. We cannot but say here how much we welcome a mass of stimulating reflections upon a general hypothesis about which, for certain, many had long been waiting for some biologically-trained psycho-therapist to come forward and offer his opinion.

In his effort at systematisation the author appears to have been rather particularly indebted for his impressions to three sources; (a) the experiments of Dr. Henry Head and his colleagues on sensibility, more especially the observed incidents in the process of the return of sensibility to Dr. Head's arm after the experimental severing of the afferent nerve; (b) the facts of "immobility" as a device for meeting danger (whereby, to take a common example, a hare in flight will suddenly "clap" flat to the ground in a suitable spot, and suppress absolutely every movement in its body); and (c) the experiments whereby Keith Lucas and A. D. Adrian brought out the physiological principle which they call the "all-or-none" reaction of a nerve to a stimulus.

In the experiments of Dr. Head the author detects a phenomenon also appearing in those of Lucas and Adrian. The feature of the latter's experiments was the manner in which the response of the excited nerve seemed to refuse to grade itself to the varying strength of the stimulus. When the nerve was stimulated the reaction simply either took place or didn't, according as the stimulus passed a given point of intensity or fell short of it. It was a case of reacting all-or-none, wholly or else not at all. One of the interesting features of the experiment of Dr. Head, on the other hand, was the definiteness with which a stage of "protopathic" sensibility preceded the stage of the full return of normal or "epicritic" sensibility, and the definiteness with which, at the primary stage, feeling, etc., were simply either there or not there, all discrimination being at a minimum. On the strength of these facts, and under a sense, perhaps, of the closeness of the connexion between sensation and action, the author places the protopathic sensibility and the all-or-none reaction of a nerve, under the same heading, and reads them as the same in principle.

These facts seem to have furnished more or less the clue to what is the governing idea of the book, the author's conception of the nature of instinct (chap. vi.). The feature of instinct is taken to be that it is thus all-or-none. Instinctive reaction does not grade or adjust itself. It is the nature of instinct, as an American might say, to go "with a plop". There is no mediation with it. It simply, so to speak, goes off full blast, or else does not go off at all. "An animal or child exposed to danger, which is so recognised as danger that it produces a reaction, tends to give itself to the reaction fully. If it runs away it tends to run with every particle of the energy it is capable of putting forth; if it cries or screams or utters other sound it tends to do so with all the vigour at its command. In these cases there is no discrimination of

the degree of danger" (p. 44). "If the danger be sufficiently great, and if certain lines of behaviour by which it would normally be met be frustrated, even the adult man will fail to discriminate the nature of the danger and to graduate his movements accordingly. He will devote every particle of his energy to flight or other form of primitive or instinctive behaviour" (*ibid.*).

A question of importance now arises, for it concerns the central theme, the mechanism of suppression and its way of operating. We might get the simple force of it by putting it thus. Looking away from the facts of sensibility and of instinctive reaction as matters of interest in themselves and considering only the process whereby the more primitive among these sensibilities and reactivities become displaced to make room for others, what are we to say of the act of putting them out of action? What are we to say of the inhibiting-act itself? Is it of the all-or-none type?

The author takes as more or less typical of this act of repression—or of suppression as he maintains it should be called—the immobility-reaction to danger (chap. viii.). Here, all happens as though, in the appropriate circumstances, some mechanism simply sprang-to, regardless of grading. In the animal which would protect itself by immobility, every movement is at once and indiscriminately suppressed. This seems to favour the view that originally the act of suppressing was an affair of all-or-none; that it is instinctive, therefore; and his taking this standpoint commits the author (*a*) to the peculiarly thought-provoking position that there is an instinctive tendency to suppress instinctive tendencies (we incline to agree with this, and it suggests to us that intelligence may be a species of *release* of this tendency), and (*b*) to the attempt to explain how indiscriminate suppression came to be graded, which involves the question how instinct generally came to be graded.

The act of suppressing has, in fact, come to be graded. There are many evidences of this. Some of the most interesting are found by the author among the facts of hypnotism and hysteria. That these two conditions are conditions of discriminated suppressing is part of the light which, for the author, biological considerations have to throw upon them.

The view taken of hypnotic states is highly noteworthy. The author finds here an outcrop of features useful in adapting a herd to the task of survival. He regards the hypnotic condition as a throw-back to the gregarious instincts. He finds in its anæsthesias, its hyper-æsthesias, its astonishing docilities and all the rest, things gregariously useful. Its heightened sensibility is gregariously useful, so is its insensibility, so is its general suggestibility.

But the central feature of the hypnotic condition is one which links it with hysterical conditions (chap. xiv.). In both we have a reappearance of one general device whose day of primary usefulness is past, namely, the immobility-reaction to danger. In hysteria

and hypnotic states alike, the paralyses and anæsthesias which are found may be regarded as partial manifestations of a process which, if it were complete, would produce paralysis of all movement and insensibility to all stimuli over the whole body (p. 130).

We have here a conception which seems to us determinative of a good deal in the author's views; his conception of suppression as something not originally graded which has become so. In hysterical and hypnotic states we have a process of indiscriminate suppression modified in the carrying out. The problem is how the modification has been made.

The reply given is that the discriminativeness has been induced by suggestion. Much is set down to suggestion in the book. Sleep, in the chapter on sleep, is said to be procured by suggestion. Hypnotism admittedly comes by suggestion and hysterical suppressions of sensibility, etc., are attributed to the same cause. It operates, in fact, on all instincts.

The great source of suggestion (chap. xiii.) is herd life. Indeed, suggestion, for the author, is little else than the herd instinct in operation. Instead of following McDougall in this matter and taking suggestion as one of three parallel manifestations of herd instinct the author takes it as the one central tendency which itself takes three shapes. He names these in a way calculated to remind us of the mutuality (and the unconscious character on both sides) of the relation denoted in each case. There is a "mimesis" in herd life whereby, when one member happens to do a thing, the others find themselves doing it. There is a mutual "sympathy," and there is thirdly a mutual "intuition". With these terms he would replace McDougall's "imitation, sympathy and suggestion". Suggestion operating within the necessities of herd life is the great articulating factor, adjusting primitive instinct to the definite demands of situations.

One feature of these discussions on suggestion and connected themes, which rather militates against clearness, is the manner in which the author seems to move back and forth between the two problems, that of grading in instinct generally and that of grading in the instinct of suppressing in particular. We must at once say, however, that although clearer statement could have been wished for, of what was being done, this free movement between the one problem and the other is the reverse of unjustifiable. They are at bottom the same problem. It is really indifferent whether we ask how the suppression-act has come to be graded or how instinct itself has come to be graded. Every instinctive reaction is an instinctive suppression. Instinct tears down its own channel; but the very act of opening that channel is a shutting of others. In the case of the rabbit on the grass, the very act of scampering away is an abstention from feeding or playing. In asking how instinct learns to grade its actions and not simply go full tilt down its own groove we are literally asking how it learns to grade its suppressions. The whole problem is one of

grading the suppressing-act. Suggestion, for the author, is the universal grading factor so long as we remain on the level of instinct, *i.e.*, on the unconscious plane. The other way in which our instinctive actions may be checked in their career and properly adjusted or graded is through intelligence. This, however, takes us on to the conscious plane. Graded instinct is thus not necessarily intelligence; which seems a difficulty in the theory, since it leaves the difference between the two very hard of specification. To this point we shall have briefly to return.

There is much discussion in the book upon the conception of the unconscious, much also of a practical therapeutic kind which we shall only be able to touch upon incidentally if at all, as we pursue the matter of central theoretic interest. The presupposition which underlies the work is clearly that in dealing with instinct we are dealing with something of the all-or-none order. What is the effect of this presupposition? What is the value of it? What is the necessity for it?

In the first place, even if it should not admit of acceptance as it stands, we do not see that to upset it is to upset the book. We do not see, in other words, that it is indispensable to there being a problem at all. There must, of course, *be* a problem. Anything which would wipe that out, stands self-condemned. The wonders of instinct have evoked men's admiration for too long. But although we happened not to assume instinct to be by nature ungraded, we could still clearly have a problem; namely the problem of accounting for the *extent* to which grading in instinct has gone, of getting at the source of the continuous *further refinements* of it.

Is there, however, any good reason for demur to the all-or-none principle as applied to instinct? Our first impulse is to reply (very naively no doubt) that while there is no very good one there appear to be quite an array of little ones, against this presupposition; a presupposition of which there is certainly a great deal of philosophical prejudice in favour.

For example: (a) in regard to the experiments which gave rise to the terms "protopathic" and "epicritic," the presupposition in question seems to import into our interpretation of the results an abruptness of antithesis—we put it no higher—which sounds artificial.

We have alluded to the motive for launching these two terms as designations of two levels of sensibility, *viz.*, the definiteness with which the process of recovery fell into two stages. Now, while Dr. Rivers will not say that the later-returning over-laying epicritic system, distinct from the other as it is, simply suppresses the underlying protopathic one; he does contend, and he believes it to be borne out by the facts of the experiment—at which he himself was present—that during the healing process certain features of the protopathic system are suppressed and certain others are taken up

into the epicritic and fused therewith. The impression is left as though the all-or-none principle—taken too seriously as the principle of the suppression-act—were here working against true theory. One has the impression of something which does not discriminate *within what it takes*. It goes to like a spring. What it crushes it crushes and what it leaves it leaves.

(b) The all-or-none character also works unconvincingly at times when introduced into a series of biological considerations. Roundly, it is difficult to imagine an original biological function for the all-or-none type of thing, of such nature and importance as to throw light on pathological states. This is not to say we cannot find a biological function for the suppression-act; but "all-or-none" is the *malady* of the suppression-act, and has not any huge, obvious, universal, biological place such as is wanted and required for the author's purposes, though it may well enough have some place.

This fact seems to us to come out particularly clearly when the author would throw a biological light on the phenomena of dissociation (chap. x.). Dissociation—it is one of the author's contributions to terminology—is not the state constituted by the mere suppression of part of the conscious life. We have dissociation proper only where the suppressed part is able to attain to an independent consciousness, one which alternates with the normal. The "fugue" is an instance of dissociation. The individual in this condition carries out a connected series of actions *qua* another person, which he subsequently cannot remember or understand his having done. When the author raises the question, What biologically useful condition is indicated here? his suggestion is that it is connected with some such alternation of environment as we find in the life of an amphibian; and when we recall what an episode in the history of terrestrial life must have been its emergence from the sea, the brilliance of the hint will be appreciated. But inevitably it recalls to our minds the unlikeliness of a biological use for the *malady*. There might be some use for an original condition whereof the *malady* might be regarded as a distortion.

The impression arises somewhat as follows. For an answer to the question Whence dissociation? our attention is drawn to the frog and the newt, and at once it becomes plain and illuminating that of course memories of land life had better be suppressed during water life, and water-experiences had better be at rest whilst one is tackling the environment of the land. But, we incline to ask, were land and water so different at the time the human race was emerging? Is there any evidence that our human line of ancestry leads through anything so close to a literal newt stage?

While no doubt the present amphibian is the summary victim of two alternating fugues, and is no doubt much inconvenienced by that (from the human point of view) *malady*; it is a present form of life, a comparatively not extremely widespread product of the sharpened distinction of land and water, whose characteristic—its clean-cut alternation of lives—seems rather to take its place along

with the human malady of dissociation itself and along with all other similar conditions, as the distortion of something originally much less clean-cut which was the actual primitive and useful thing. All observation seems to point rather to the gradual restraining of older activities and gradual bending of them to slightly new tasks. When a species of creature, adjusted to a certain environment, finds its environment change without its thereupon going "down and out"—when in spite of a change a species survives—what really does become of the creature's old adjustments for its old conditions once the new environment has arrived? They do not go out of existence. Neither do they, surely, go out of action. They operate subduedly, they operate nascently, at new tasks. It is precisely inhibition of this *graded* sort which is the necessary accompaniment of evolution.

Yet all these considerations are not enough to shelve the principle that the nature of instinct is to be "all-or-none". What is wrong seems to us to be, that *this is applied as a description of how instinct looks from without as well as how it feels from within, whereas it is good as the latter only.* It is a description of the inner view applied to both views. This is the source, we fancy, of most of the head-shaking with which the principle meets. To observation it is simply untrue that the startled hare runs its fastest and its farthest every time it runs at all, nor does the child scream his loudest every time he cries. The author may say "he tends to". Yes, but that is the inside view. And the truth seems to be that from this point of view he not only tends to go the whole way; he does so every time.

We figure the matter to ourselves in somewhat the following way. Every real situation is a system of moments or appearances contained within an all-inclusive appearance or moment. The creature reacting instinctively reacts entirely—wholly—every time, to *that selection* of the appearances whereof the real situation is constituted, *which is apprehended.* Take the case of the rabbit on the grass. His ventures and poises, his starts and stops, his whole elaborate game of venturing out for a nibble in the dawn when he can just see and not be seen, is most delicately adjusted at every point. Even his fleeing is adjusted—he won't "clap" anywhere, but only in a nook among the grey grass where he will be invisible and the wind will not stir his hair! Read from without, it is all graded. But from within, what is it? Most likely, a series of literal presents in which even reaction and apprehension are hardly distinguished, but reaction is part of the apprehension—just *This*, and the ears go up; *This*, and the paws are raised; *THIS*, and it bangs away. Each reaction is a total reaction to as many of the component moments of the situation as happen to strike a selection of cords on the many-stringed instrument of the animal's constitution.

By making this distinction we are helped to explain the peculiar

convincingness which the author's conception of instinct has, despite of apparent artificiality; and which must have made him cling to it in spite of much opposition of the kind which it met with, as many will remember, at the philosophical congress of 1919. The undeniable truth which it seems to us to contain is that instinct from within, or as an experience, is whole-hearted.

And we venture to think that with this distinction respected, the conception of instinct round which this book is built may possibly gain not only in verisimilitude, but in working-virtue as a hypothesis as well.

For to recognise this distinction whilst not forgetting the facts of suppression, may quite well lessen the difficulty both (a) of seeing where intelligence begins, and (b) of understanding the rationale of its operation.

(a) We are warranted in saying, judging by what we feel like when we ourselves are most nearly instinctive, that in the *This*, *This*, *This*, of the instinctive series, each picture, while distinct from the others, is internally distinctionless; and that the super-vention of intelligence is where *This* has become *This-not-that*. But all is activity or reactivity. It is *This-activity-not-that*, which constitutes intelligence. The emphatic focus on the less emphatic background, is really the dominant activity releasing the dominated one to a faint place beside it in consciousness. Intelligence thus becomes a species of release. It is the partial release of repressed activity into consciousness, under control. "Could we but find the springs to relax we might release to the animals themselves their buried intelligence."

And (b) to realise that instinct can be articulate from one point of view and "whole" from another (externally articulate, inwardly whole) is a matter of the greatest importance; it is what lends its peculiar interest to the assumption that to control instinct is itself an instinct. We are prepared to find whole-heartedness not incompatible with articulation. We are prepared to find when the articulation, which is at first external only, at length comes within (dawn of intelligence), that the whole-heartedness may remain. Life is not entirely a matter of golden means and compromise. Instinct has to be regulated; but there is always the instinct to achieve through the regulation, whereto we may give ourselves away. A man may kick too hard or bat too hard, but he cannot ever play his game too well. Instinct does not indeed survive unmodified in intelligence. But it does survive. Unmodified it is whole but indiscriminating. But when it becomes discriminating it can still be whole.

And finally, inasmuch as intelligence is by its nature graded, we cannot altogether agree with the author in the violent view, that what restores the balance, in cases of psycho-therapeutic cure, is not an intelligent, *i.e.*, voluntary process. Is not the psycho-analyst always appealing to intelligence and will? The appeal which cures, so far at least as the present writer has ever been able to see,

is always an appeal to release something. It is hardly possible to substantiate this important point without a brief allusion to two of the well-described case histories which the author prints; but they do happen to illustrate the point aptly. He instances two soldiers (we may call them A and B) who have each met with an experience, by the distressful memory of which they are pursued. Upon much repeated advice, each is found to have been, in all the ways he can think of, following the plan of drowning the memory; but in vain. Dr. Rivers hits upon the plan of making them "face up to it," and succeeds in the one case and fails in the other. The reason is that he can help A to face up to his experience, but cannot help B to face up to his. A's has fortunately an aspect which is beautiful, and which the physician can point out and so release that part of it into consciousness. And with that released, A can face up, and suppress what remains, and get well. B's experience, on the other hand, has no redeeming feature. (A Freudian would probably say that the released aspect of A's experience really operated because it released much more; and in the other case would have gone on willy-nilly till he found something sexual in it and released that.) Psycho-analysis from this point of view emerges as an art of releasing. Intelligence is a releasing. And it seems a mistake to say it is anything else than intelligence and will which effects psychical salvation. Indeed it seems no far-fetched thing to equate psycho-analysis and intelligence. Any animal can fear. It takes a man to "take up arms against his own fear".¹ An animal would cease to be an animal the moment you could psycho-analyse it.

We do not close this review of Dr. Rivers's work with any sense of having done justice to the element of brilliance and of what we can only call random suggestiveness about it, which is the result of that close acquaintance with fact which accompanies all its speculative importance and interest. But the perusal of it certainly strengthens the conviction that the greatest work in this great, rich, new field, will only be done by a thinker of synthetic mind who has something like the author's variety of scientific, philosophic, and especially anthropo-psychological equipment.

J. W. SCOTT.

Physics: The Elements. By N. R. CAMPBELL, D.Sc. Cambridge University Press, 1920. Pp. vii., 565.

THIS work is a critical study of the methods and theories underlying Physics. By Physics the author means that experimental science which the ordinary text-books profess to expound—the Mechanics, Heat, Sound, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, and the Properties of Matter, familiar to every schoolboy.

¹ From W. E. Hocking.

Some, of philosophical or mathematical leanings, would say that this sort of Physics was a relic of the nineteenth century, and shortly to be entirely superseded; that, although Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics were all right for use in Secondary Schools, they were beneath the notice of enlightened men. To this we should reply, that Physics is after all not a branch of Mathematics, but an experimental science that depends upon certain things done in the laboratory; physical measurements, in short. These measurements, of sizes and shapes and masses and weights and velocities of bodies, and of electrical potentials and capacities, and a thousand and one other characteristics of the external world, have been gradually accumulated and made more and more precise throughout several centuries, starting with Galileo and his inclined planes, and finishing up as far as we are concerned with such results as are to be found in Kaye and Laby's Tables of Constants. That is Physics. That is the liquor, the rest is only the froth: it is that that drives our trains and lights our houses and navigates our ships and provides our food and clothing and, when necessary, kills our enemies. If any mathematician or other person wishes to criticise the results, he can do so only by showing that there are mistakes in certain of our measurements, or in our deductions from them. To do this he must assume some to be correct. Moreover, we know already that the measurements are only correct within definite limits, not absolutely. If there is anything certain in this uncertain world, it is that no theoretical criticism can seriously disturb these results: it can supply a commentary on the text and explain obscurities and doubtful points and make minor emendations, but that is all. Or, to change the metaphor, the pruning the theorist can do is only to preserve the shape of the tree and increase its yield of fruit. The only thing that could cause a real revolution would be some new and unforeseen experimental facts. Dr. Campbell, therefore, is concerned with the criticism of the methods by which the results are obtained, not of the results themselves.

The practical person, on the other hand, may object, "if the results are so satisfactory to all concerned, why bother? Why shun delights and live laborious days criticising something you know is all right: for if the results are right, the method must be sound?" This is easily answered. In the first place, it is quite possible to obtain right results by wrong means; in fact, it often happens. It is always well to know as much as possible about one's tools, so as to be able to use them to the best advantage, and to know how to avoid mistakes. Finally, we can say, and this is the only defence Dr. Campbell deigns to make, we are inquisitive about these matters.

In discussing what is undoubtedly an important book on an important subject, the critic may be forgiven if he deals chiefly with what he considers are blemishes, for the author shows a curious perversity of doctrine, which naturally provokes attack.

One defect of the book is its immense length, a defect which neutralises to a large extent the merits of a lucid and lively style. Probably it is correct to say of this work, as has been said of others, that long books are written by people who have not time to write short ones.

There is no need to dwell on some of the author's peculiar views, such as his dislike of metaphysicians, or his doctrine of the nature of truth (pp. 256-267), which should bring a blush to the cheek of the most hardened Pragmatist; for they do not seriously affect his argument. But his distrust of Mathematics leads to difficulties that must be considered.

Part I. deals with certain preliminary questions. The chief points are: a not very satisfactory treatment of the subject-matter of science, and the basis of agreement on matters of fact; an interesting treatment of the character and proof of natural laws, including a lively attack on the doctrine of Causation and on Mill's Inductive Canons, and incidentally a confession that there is no such thing as inductive proof, which appears to be forgotten later on; a discussion of the nature of Theories, using the term in a special sense; and an apparently heretical treatment of Chance and Probability (matters that are beyond me). In the final chapters there are some excellent remarks on the use of imagination in scientific discovery, and on the place of science in education (pp. 224-229). The treatment of laws and theories seems to call most for comment.

"Laws," he says (p. 38), "are propositions asserting relations which can be established by experiment or observation. The terms between which the relations are asserted consist largely or entirely of judgments of the material world, immediate or derivative, simple or complex. The relations asserted, if not always the same, have always a common nature which may be described as uniformity of association." Later (p. 45) he says that most of the laws of science, apart from the most primitive and implicit, state relations between "concepts," and that "concept is a word denoting an idea which depends for its meaning or significance on the truth of some law". Most of the technical terms of Physics stand for concepts in this sense. Thus, he takes as examples Hooke's Law, that the extension of a solid body is proportional to the force applied to it, and Ohm's Law, that electric current is proportional to potential. Here "solid body," "force," "current" and "potential" are all concepts. Dr. Campbell's analysis and statement of the case may not be very profound or exact, but it would not be easy to improve upon it. It would be quite acceptable but for the fact that he afterwards introduces a very far-reaching distinction between laws and theories and between concepts and hypothetical ideas. A theory, according to his special use of the term (pp. 122-123), is expressed as a system of propositions falling into two groups. The first group, which he calls the Hypothesis, consists of propositions about certain hypothetical

ideas : these propositions and ideas are sharply distinguished from laws and concepts as not being directly derived from experience. The other group of propositions he calls the Dictionary, and it serves to relate the hypothesis to laws. Apart from the dictionary, the propositions of the hypothesis appear as arbitrary assumptions. It would be absurd to deny that this is an excellent description of a certain type of theory, particularly of theories depending upon an analogy, such as the Kinetic Theory of Gases, used as an illustration by the author. But it seems extremely doubtful whether this rigid distinction between laws and theories is everywhere applicable. In fact, it is Dr. Campbell's strict regard for this distinction that leads him into his greatest difficulties.

When he comes to discuss Fourier's Theory of Heat Conduction as an example, the artificiality of the distinctions is apparent. The hypothesis here is a differential equation relating certain variables and constants. The dictionary consists of a number of propositions stating that these variables and constants "are" the co-ordinates of a point in a body, temperature, time, density, specific heat, and thermal conductivity, all of them measurable quantities. The only reason stated for considering the whole thing a theory and not a numerical law is that differential coefficients are involved, which are not directly measurable, and that though a differential equation and its integrated form may be logically equivalent their meaning is different. It is clear from later discussion that the crux of the matter is the author's view that mathematical propositions as such are all hypothetical, and that the numerical relations which are the immediate result of measurement are somehow not mathematical.

The treatment of measurement occupies Part II. of the book. Numerical measurement, he explains, arises out of the fact that certain properties of processes and things display transitive asymmetrical relations of the kind that generate "order," and that numerals can be assigned to stand for the terms related. In some cases the numerals are not mere arbitrary symbols like the numbers on the doors of houses, but are found to be amenable to arithmetical manipulation, so that the results of certain physical manipulations and of certain arithmetical ones correspond. Thus, if two things weigh a pound each it is found that the whole collection of two things weighs two pounds. At this point Dr. Campbell distinguishes what he calls physical number, with a small 'n,' which is a property of things, and mathematical Number, with a big 'N,' which is something different, to be found only in the pages of *Principia Mathematica* (see p. 304). The authors of that learned work, I am told, consider cardinal numbers to be classes of similar classes, and surely these similar classes are just the things of the physical world, cows and potatoes, and gram weights and bits of wire, and anything else that is numerable? Fifty years ago, if an inquiring stranger had asked a mathematician what numbers were, he might well have been told that this was a great mystery not to be revealed to the

uninitiated. It would have been reasonable for him to believe that what he came across in his humble way and called numbers were not the same as the supernatural entities dealt with by those enlightened ones. But nowadays things are different. When it has been shown by logical deduction that two and two make four, the result can be applied to the constituents of the physical world as soon as we have made one simple observation, namely, that there really are as many two things, and still another set of two things. When, therefore, Dr. Campbell supposes that the numbers we employ when we count things are not the Numbers of the mathematician some astonishment is pardonable. When we find him spending laborious chapters proving, by logic apparently, that physical numbers can be added and multiplied and otherwise manipulated, it becomes more astonishing still. The trouble all comes, it would seem, from his having read *Principia Mathematica*, and not believed it. He should have taken it on trust, unread, like the rest of us.

Consider the process of direct measurement. Two observations are necessary. First, we make a comparison between two sets of perceived things or processes, whereby they are judged to be equal in some respect. One of the sets is taken as a standard. The second operation is a process of counting, which is not strictly a measurement, but is prior to all measurement in numerical terms. For instance, we can measure a length with a scale of inches by juxtaposition of the scale divisions included. The standard here is an inch, and the linear scale is a device that repeats inches in the correct manner for our purpose. For convenience the standard is usually put equal to unity, but of course we could call the inch 22.4 (millimetres) or $1/12$ (feet), if we liked. The operation can be done in the reverse fashion. If our only standard was a yard, and the length to be measured was a few inches, we should have to find with a pair of dividers how many times it went into the yard. In any case what we are aiming at is to obtain a ratio, which we can do by dividing one number by another, but simplifying the operation by calling one of the numbers, arbitrarily, unity. It is well to notice that the result is a ratio and not a cardinal or ordinal number, and we can as a matter of fact utilise (*mutatis mutandis*) either the numeral or its reciprocal in calculation. This fact is not, I think, sufficiently emphasised by Dr. Campbell. He sometimes speaks, in fact, as though counting were itself a kind of measurement, and as if there was always one number which was the value of the magnitude measured. Normally there is an indefinitely large collection of numbers which all represent the value sought within any assigned limits. The true or right value is not a number, but a class of numbers. The only cases in which a single number truly represents the value of the measured quantity are where it is assigned by definition, as when we say there are twelve inches in a foot, and certain special cases where we are comparing discontinuous series.

That the limits within which lie the values of a quantity are always a finite distance apart, Dr. Campbell points out clearly. This depends, as he says, upon the fact that every instrument has a "step". We can always conceivably make the step smaller, but it is still always finite, because we can never judge that a thing is equal to q , but only that it is greater than p and less than r . We can for convenience take q , the arithmetic mean of p and r , and say that it equals $q \pm \delta$. This use of the arithmetic mean has certain other justifications, but it is still not *the* value except in so far as it symbolises by convention a class of ratios. Other kinds of average could be used instead.

Dr. Campbell points out (chap. x.) that those properties we can measure directly and in the full sense, such as lengths or weights, are additive, but that there are derived quantities which are not always additive, such as density. His statement here is unfortunate. He says (p. 282), "However we combine two bodies of equal density we always obtain a body of the same density". This is only true of solids and liquids. If we take two equal volumes of a gas of density 1, and pump all the gas from one vessel into the other, we shall have a gas of density 2, and density will be additive. What it means is that density is a specific property of solids and liquids that cannot be varied at will, but only between very narrow limits. Special cases can be found where magnitudes usually additive are specific properties, and so are not additive. Volume is usually additive, but in the case of an emulsion we cannot always combine the spheres of the emulsed liquid to make spheres of larger volume, because above a certain critical volume they will be unstable, and there will be no spheres of any volume.

Density, although it is a specific property and for the most part defies our powers of manipulation, can be measured because it is related by laws to properties that are not specific and can be added. Hardness cannot be measured except in a very limited and unsatisfactory way, by means of an arbitrary scale, because it is specific and not yet related by laws to measurable magnitudes. If we discovered a substance whose hardness could be varied at will, hardness would become measurable and additive.

Dr. Campbell gives an interesting treatment of the measurement of derived magnitudes by means of laws relating them to fundamental magnitudes, and of the theory of dimensions. One point, however, he has hardly proved. He shows (pp. 386-390) that the ordinary text-book statement that volume has the dimensions of length cubed is misleading and needs correction, and that volume can be treated as the ratio of mass and density, but he hardly establishes his case that the alteration is necessary or desirable on grounds of precision or simplicity. Doubtless many logical theories of dimensions are possible according to what kinds of quantity we choose as fundamental; the problem is, which is the best?

The treatment of the Theory of Errors is heterodox like that of Probability. Here again I should not venture to criticise. The

final chapter on the application of mathematics is valuable, if allowance be made for the author's peculiar views on mathematics. In an appendix there is an outline of the proposed continuation of the work.

To return to the question of theories and laws: the author rejects the view that simple numerical laws are theories on two chief grounds (pp. 336-337). They are (1) that they do not explain laws or predict laws as proper theories should; (2) that universal agreement is possible about them, but not about theories. As regards (2), it is true that the confidence that should be placed in generalisations varies, but there seems to be always some element of doubt, as his treatment of Induction shows. Moreover, it does not seem legitimate to distinguish sharply as Dr. Campbell does between experimental concepts, which are supposed to be given unequivocally in experience, and hypothetical ideas, which are not. Any general notion of scientific value is somewhere based on experience, and in some respects goes beyond experience. Dr. Campbell, in order to avoid the suspicion that numerical laws involve mathematical numbers, which are theoretical, explains how a law can be expressed graphically in such a way as to avoid the use of numbers (pp. 350-352). This very process of expressing a law as a graph shows that a numerical law can be legitimately regarded as a theory in his sense. We start with a number of experimentally determined relations, as, for instance, that at one atmosphere pressure a gas occupies 25 c.c. at half the pressure 50 c.c., and so on. These results are plotted as points, and, finally, a curve is drawn through them which represents the law, Boyle's Law in this case. Now the individual experimentally determined points are themselves laws according to any reasonable definition, and they certainly represent relations between concepts in Dr. Campbell's sense. Experiment can only give us a finite collection of points. The curve through them is theory. It has the characteristic properties of explaining the positions of the points and of predicting the positions of new points by interpolation. If it is possible to describe Fourier's Law as a theory according to Dr. Campbell's view of the nature of theories it is equally possible so to describe Boyle's Law.

Any ordinary generalisation that is important enough to have a name can be analysed into more special generalisations in relation to which it has the status of a theory. In order to get to laws that cannot be further analysed, we must burrow much deeper beneath the surface of explicitly recorded generalisations than the author does. Further, progress in generality, if also accompanied by increase in precision and refinement of statement, may involve a diminution in the arbitrary and fictitious element, so that it is not always the simple and primitive generalisation that is the least hypothetical. Several illustrations of this could be found from recent developments in Physics; in particular, one of the benefits conferred by the Principle of Relativity is an increase in generality of statement accompanied by an elimination of hypotheses.

In conclusion, it is to be hoped that Dr. Campbell's work will be read, not only by the philosophers, whom long training has inured to the study of long books, but also by the physicists. It would be a pity if they all put it aside, the experimentalist as mere theory, the mathematician as sheer blasphemy. The book may suffer from both these defects, and yet be a valuable contribution to their science.

A. D. RITCHIE.

Sulle Interpretazioni Immanentistiche della Filosofia di Platone.
ADOLFO LEVI. Turin [undated]. Pp. vi, 240.

Il Concetto del Tempo nei suoi Rapporti coi Problemi del Divenire e dell' Essere nella Filosofia di Platone. Saggio sulla Teoria delle Idee. ADOLFO LEVI. Turin [undated]. Pp. 111.

Two generally excellent works on the interpretation of Plato by a thoroughly competent scholar who seems familiar with nearly everything which has been published on the subject for the last hundred years, and is also an acute and eminently sane critic. I would heartily recommend both to the students of Platonism in our own country, who are perhaps too prone to undervalue the work of continental Platonists outside Germany. Of the two works, the longer, which I have named first, is in the main expository and critical of other interpreters (mostly German and English), and serves as prolegomena to the second, in which Mr. Levi develops his own views of the meaning of Plato. As appears from the title-page of the former essay, Mr. Levi is strongly opposed to all interpretations of what he calls the "immanent type," *i.e.*, to all which do not recognise, or try to explain away, the metaphysical or ontological significance of the Platonic "Ideas" and their "separateness" from sensible existents. His thesis is that the Platonic doctrine is from first to last an "ontology," and not a "philosophy of experience". Hence he is led to a careful exposition of a whole series of interpretations which are subjected to careful criticism with a view of showing their incompatibility with the Platonic text, as well as with the statements of Aristotle about the Platonic doctrine, on the supreme value of which the author rightly insists. The interpretations selected for special consideration are—to mention only the chief among them—those of Fouillée, Dr. Jackson, Teichmüller, all grouped together as of the "pantheistic type," the "logico-methodological" interpretation (Lotze, Cohen, Natorp, Hartmann, Marck, Prof. Stewart), and the "mathematical" (which means primarily that of Milhaud. Robin, though constantly cited, receives no full examination).

The exposition of these various interpretations of Plato strikes me as full, fair, and clear, and in respect of most of them, in my own opinion, Mr. Levi's criticism is finally annihilating. I am par-

ticularly glad to see that the importance of the Platonic doctrine of the soul as the "self-moving" is clearly recognised, and that it is shown that this one doctrine excludes all the "pantheistic" readings of Plato which require the identification of God, the soul of the world, and the supreme "Idea" with one another. As Mr. Levi rightly sees, it is precisely because "souls," including God, the *ἀρίστη ψυχή*, are neither "Ideas" nor *αἰσθητά*, but stand midway between the two realms that the conception of the soul enables Plato to offer a solution of the problem of the "cause of *γένεσις* and *φθορά*".

The long examination of the exegesis of the "Marburg school," and particularly of Natorp, leads up to a triumphant criticism which ought to give the *coup de grâce* to the whole attempt to read Neo-Kantianism into Plato on the strength of wilful mistranslations. (Or can it be, as Mr. Levi seems once at least to hint, that the mistranslations are not wilful, and that the real secret of the "school of Marburg" is simply ignorance of the Greek language?).

I am not sure that the case against Natorp and his followers might not be put even more forcibly than Mr. Levi himself has put it. He says quite truly that the Plato of Natorp is a Plato who has been taught Kantianism at Marburg. He might also have said that Natorp's Plato has unlearned at Marburg the most important doctrine in which the Plato of the Academy was at one with the Kant of Königsberg, the doctrine of the radical disparateness of sense and thought. It is just *because* sense and thought are disparate (or at least so both Plato and Kant thought), that in "ontology" we have to recognise a real difference between the "Forms" and the sensibles which "partake" of them. The figure which Cohen and Natorp have labelled "Plato" is not even a Plato converted to Kantianism.

The "mathematical" interpretation of Plato comes off better at Mr. Levi's hands, though he regards it as only doing justice to one side of Plato's thought, and classes it along with the "pantheistic" and "logico-methodological" interpretations as "immanent," *i.e.* as denying the Platonic *χωρισμός* of Form from sensible.

I do not feel sure that this estimate is wholly correct. I admit that in one or two of his comments on Milhaud Mr. Levi makes a real point, and I am not quite sure that I myself should now like to express myself wholly as I did years ago in a paragraph which is quoted on p. 238 as an illustration of the "mathematical" type of Plato-exegesis. But I do not see that this exegesis involves denying any kind of *χωρισμός* which can really be ascribed to Plato. To give an illustration. The number 2, we know, is a Platonic *εἶδος*. Now the number 2 is the number of all "pairs," and a "pair" is a class with individuals which are not classes as its members. My right hand and my left hand are the members of a certain pair, and this pair itself is a class which is a member of the "class of all classes which are pairs". The number 2 is this "class of classes which are pairs". My hands are the members of a class,

not the class itself, and that class again is an entity of a different order from the "class of all pairs". Thus there is a real χωρισμός between the number 2 and any pair, and between the pair which is the class of which my hands are members and my hands themselves. Is not this enough to explain why on Aristotle's showing the Platonic εἶδος is "separate" from the "mathematicals," and both from sensibles?

Mr. Levi's own exposition of Plato, in the second of his essays, has throughout the merit of being a careful attempt to explain Plato in a genuinely historical way, but I think he is still haunted by certain prejudices which are really due to the bad nineteenth-century habit of forgetting that the meaning of a great philosophy cannot be properly understood if it is studied out of relation to the actual scientific thought of the society in which it arose. In fact, the great merit of a work like that of Milhaud is precisely that it does take the actual scientific problems and methods of the age of Socrates and Plato as the point of departure for inquiry into the meaning of the Academic philosophy.

Milhaud may be open to a good deal of criticism in the details of his exegesis, but he has the imperishable merit of having seen, after a century and more of misconception, where the beginning must be made if Plato's thought is to be grasped. The two chief points which I should be inclined to criticise in Mr. Levi's essay are his assumption that the whole conception of εἶδη was a discovery of Plato, and his way of using the *Philebus*, the *Timaeus* and the testimony of Aristotle. As to the first point. It is, at any rate, a great gain in historic insight that Mr. Levi properly insists that the Platonic εἶδος is not an "hypostatized general notion". He accepts, however, from Zeller the view that Socrates was busied solely with the "general notion," and thus correctly infers from *those* premisses that the origin of the theory of Forms is not to be found in the teaching of Socrates. Plato must have reached his belief in the εἶδος by the route of "aesthetic intuition" *before* he came under the influence of Socrates at all. The original Platonic εἶδος and the "aesthetic intuition" by which it is apprehended are set before us in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, which are thus treated as much earlier works than, e.g., the *Phaedo*, in which we have further developments due to the influence of Socrates and his quest of the "universal". Now I grant that this is, at any rate, a more rational theory than that of the development of the εἶδος out of an "hypostatized concept" (which latter is, in fact, nonsense), and I congratulate Mr. Levi on the courage with which he has drawn the inference necessitated by his theory about the dates of the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. If they expound Platonism as yet un-Socraticised, they must be the youthful compositions that he holds them to be. But I should have said that it ought to be as clear that, on stylistic and other grounds, the *Phaedrus* cannot be an early dialogue, as it is that the *Theaetetus* cannot be, in spite of the assertions of the "Marburg school," an earlier work than the *Phaedo*. Any man who main-

tains either paradox seriously has really put himself out of court as a Greek scholar.

Now when we turn to the *Symposium* we are at once struck by the fact that Plato quite definitely connects the "aesthetic intuition," on which Mr. Levi properly lays stress, with certain critical incidents in the career of Socrates. According to his account a personal "vision" had a great deal to do, not indeed with the first formation of the theory of *μέβησις*, of which a very different history is given in the *Phaedo*, but with the doctrine of the ascent to the Form of Beauty. But this vision came not to Plato himself, but to Socrates, and it came before Plato's birth. It has been common in the nineteenth century to treat this representation of the matter as a mystification, but no one has ever given any tangible reasons for such a view, and it was evidently not the Academic tradition. It is quite clear that Aristotle, for example, only knew of one "Platonic theory," that which he has described in Bk. A of the *Metaphysics*, and that his statements about the thought of Socrates are mainly based on the *Phaedo*, which he, therefore, rightly or not, regarded as historical. In fact, I believe it would be safe to say that though Aristotle repeatedly alludes to the *Phaedo*, and in one famous passage directly describes its most important thesis as "what Socrates says in the *Phaedo*"; (*De Generatione*, 335 b 10), he never expressly speaks of any statement drawn from the dialogue as a tenet of Plato. Mr. Levi reminds us that in *Metaphysics M.* the theory of the "ideal numbers" is distinguished from that of those who "first had said that the Forms are". He interprets this phrase as a reference to the *Phaedo*, and it is possible that he may be right. But he should have observed that this passage does not attribute the doctrine of the *Phaedo*, if that is what is meant, to Plato at all. On the face of it, the writer of *M.* is *distinguishing* what Aristotle knew as "the doctrine of Plato" from something earlier and cruder. It is, therefore, at least well worth our while to try the hypothesis that Plato's accounts of the theories and the "rapt" of Socrates are the truthful narratives they purport to be. On that view we could do full justice to all Mr. Levi urges about the experiences in which the mystical strain of the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* has its origin without having to make the strange assumptions that these experiences are those of Plato in the days before he—the nephew of Charmides, remember!—had come under the influence of Socrates, and that the connexion of them with, e.g., Socrates' service at Potidaea is a simple fiction. (I think Mr. Levi would perhaps have been more willing to try this hypothesis had he known, as he clearly does not, that Proclus, who had the library of the Academy at his disposal, definitely identifies the "friends of Forms" mentioned in the *Sophistes* with Italian Pythagoreans, and repeatedly insists on the point that the representation of Socrates in the *Parmenides* and *Phaedo*, as holding the *μέβησις* theory from his early youth, is historically accurate. It is safe to say that this was the view taken in the continuous Academic tradition, as it appears to have been the view of Aristotle.)

As to the use of the *Timæus* and *Philebus*, Mr. Levi follows the common practice in assuming that these dialogues represent Plato's own most intimate thought at the time when they were written. I am afraid I cannot believe this, and I think it idle to try to discover in them either the "ideal numbers," or, as Mr. Levi even seems to suggest, still later developments of Platonic thought. We must remember that both dialogues are in form imaginary conversations, dated in the fifth century, and that, as it is quite easy to prove, the discourse of Timæus in particular is imagined to be delivered not many years after Plato's own birth. (This would follow from the way in which the famous Hermocrates is described as a young man whose friends are confident that he will yet do great things, and there are many other indications to the same effect.) We should naturally expect that this dramatic dating would set limits to the extent to which Socrates and Timæus can be used to express Platonic ideas. The existence of such limits is manifest in both dialogues. It is certain that Plato must have held the theory of the "ideal numbers" and their formation from the "one" and the "great-and-small" at least as early as 367 (since Aristotle simply identifies this theory with "the doctrine of Plato"), and equally certain that the *Philebus* must have been written long after that date. Yet in the *Philebus* Plato makes Socrates work not with the "one" and the "great-and-small," but with the antithesis of *ἄπειρον* and *πέρας*, which Aristotle expressly says was Pythagorean and not Platonic. So with the *Timæus*. I am prepared to urge—though I naturally cannot give the proof here—that one of the most famous features of the dialogue, its astronomical theory, is not the theory which Plato himself held when he wrote the dialogue, and I believe it can be proved that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. I regard it then as a mistake to look in either of these dialogues for any closer approximation to Plato's own views than could be plausibly ascribed to fifth-century precursors. In particular, I am sure that neither dialogue contains a single word about the "ideal numbers". We must remember that Plato did not depend on his writings as a means of teaching his ideas to his pupils in the Academy, and that it was his work in the Academy, not the composition of his dialogues, which must have appeared to him the main business of his life.

There are two other minor historical points on which I could wish that Mr. Levi would reconsider his position. I regret that he should countenance the quaint theories which have made Antisthenes of all men into an epistemologist and represented much of Plato's most important logical work as a refutation of him. So far as I know the only evidence for these speculations is the assumption that the allusion of the *Sophistes* to *ἀντιπαθεῖς γέροντες* who deny the possibility of contradiction must be meant for Antisthenes. As though there might not well be many persons answering to the description in an age which could produce Euthydemus and his brother! (And is it likely that Antisthenes would be called a

γέρον in 399, the year in which the Eleatic of the *Sophistes* is supposed to be speaking?)¹ I am sorry also that Mr. Levi should countenance the notion that Plato in his "later theory" replaced μέθεξις by μίμνσις as the relation between Form and Sensible. It is plain from Aristotle, who expressly says that μέθεξις was the Platonic, μίμνσις the Pythagorean, word that Plato to the last talked of μέθεξις and, in fact, it and its equivalents, μετοχή, μετουσία, remain the recognised terms of the whole Platonist succession down to the very last of the Neo-Platonists. The reason why the words μετέχειν, μέθεξις are avoided in the *Timaeus* is childishly simple. The chief speaker is a Pythagorean astronomer, and μίμνσις, as Aristotle says, was the Pythagorean formula. Also, as Aristotle sensibly adds, the difference is merely verbal. In fact, so far as statements about the nature of the εἶδη are concerned, there is no difference whatever between the *Phaedo* and the *Timaeus*, nor should we expect to find any when we remember that the *Phaedo* professes to describe views held by Socrates in the middle of the fifth century, and the *Timaeus* to report a discourse delivered about twenty-five years later. That Plato's own theory had undergone a development which makes it widely different from that of the *Phaedo*, we know, not from the *Timaeus*, but from the testimony of Aristotle and other members of the Academy.

With these reservations I strongly commend Mr. Levi's careful study to all lovers of Plato. In the main it impresses me both by its scholarship and by the soundness of the author's judgment. But I am not quite sure whether the writer has fully grasped the important point that the "ideal numbers" are, as is clear from Aristotle, just the integers, neither more nor less. I am half afraid that Mr. Levi supposes the integers to be what Aristotle calls the μαθηματικά.

The main purpose of the study of Plato's treatment of Time and Becoming is to show that even in the *Timaeus*, taken as representing Plato's maturest thought, there is an unsolved problem. The world of "becoming" is after all not explained in terms of the eternal εἶδη. The two still, after Plato has done his best, stand over against one another, and Plato's doctrine remains a "two-world" philosophy. "The problems stated by Parmenides (i.e., in Plato's dialogue) remain unsolved." In a sense, this is, no doubt, true. Plato has never shown why there *must* be a realm of temporality. He has merely shown us that the eternal and the temporal are compresent and interpenetrant. Why this should be so is, I imagine, more than any philosophy can say.

It may be doubted whether Plato's inability to go further justifies treating his doctrine as a "two-world" one. If all the

¹ Also it must not be forgotten that the conversation of the *Sophistes* is feigned to be held only a few weeks before the death of Socrates. Antisthenes was at this time one of the "inner circle" of Socrates, as we see from his presence in the *Phaedo*. This makes it unlikely that the *Sophistes* should contain a contemptuous attack on him.

phrase means is that Plato rightly refuses to identify the eternal with the temporal after the fashion of our "cheap and easy monism," that, no doubt, is true. But if it is meant that, after all, the *εἶδη* are supposed to be suprasensible "things," that seems to me a mistake. The root of the whole matter is the disparateness of thought and sense from which follows the distinction between the finality of mathematical demonstration and the provisional character of all empirical science. If sense could be sublimated into thought, or if thought really could "posit" its own data, as the Marburgians do vainly talk, temporality could be swallowed up in eternity. Because this cannot be, the sensible world exhibits everywhere the traces of what Timaeus calls *ἀνάγκη*, base or brute "conjunction" for which we can see no reason. However far back you may push your scientific hypotheses they always include the assertion of "conjunctions" which are not "connexions," as Hume rightly said. Yet the further back you push "explanation," the less prominent does "conjunction" become, and the more prominent "connexion". If we could see with God's eyes, presumably we should see "connexion" everywhere and "conjunction" nowhere. But it is only God Himself who can see with God's eyes, and thus for all our philosophy *ὁ*ν and *γένεσις* must remain distinct. Whether Plato would have put it exactly in this way no one can tell, but this seems to me to be the natural way for us to express what he was concerned to say. If the distinction of "two worlds" is taken to mean more than this, it cannot, I think, be found in Plato, though even to ascribe it to him in its extremest form is less of a misunderstanding than the attempts to make him into a Spinoza, or an amalgam of Spinoza and Berkeley.

Mr. Levi's essays are a valuable proof that in Italy, as elsewhere, Platonic exegesis is beginning to shake off its "dogmatic slumbers". It might move a little faster, but *eppur si muove*, and that is the main thing.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-1920. New Series, vol. xx. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.

THIS volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* presents an attractive table of contents, most of the papers dealing with topics of present-day interest and controversy. Prof. Ward's Presidential Address has for its subject the method of philosophy. The question of method, he thinks, is one which urgently demands discussion at the present time, because while it remains unsettled it bars the way to further progress. And no doubt a real difference as to method must have this effect, since it will prevent the exponents of the divergent methods from reaching any common ground. Whether the difference between Prof. Ward and the thinkers whom he has specially in view in the later part of the

address—Bradley and Bosanquet—depends essentially or predominantly on a difference of philosophic method is not perhaps so clear. But at all events Prof. Ward thinks so, and the question is one which it would certainly be well to have cleared up. Prof. Ward begins by pointing out that, in accordance with the Aristotelian distinction between *notiora nobis* and *notiora natura*, the problem of attaining philosophical first principles is an inverse one. He reminds us of the way in which philosophers were long misled by the ease with which an abstract science like mathematics was able to attain indubitable first principles and a demonstrative method; and, further, of the way in which Kant brought out the difference in this respect between the method of mathematics and that of philosophy. Yet, in spite of Kant, his idealistic successors seemed to take once more as their ideal of philosophical knowledge the development of the whole structure of reality out of a supreme principle, the Absolute. And in the philosophy too of our leading English "Neo-Hegelians" (if we are to call them by that name) it is the Absolute that figures as the standard or ideal by which all finite experiences are tested. How, then, do we arrive at this conception of the Absolute? Along one line of reflexion it seems to be equivalent simply to the universe or all-inclusive whole, along another to the ideal of a perfect being or God. In the philosophy of the Absolute these views seem to be fused: from the elementary logical demand for self-consistency in the real there somehow emerges the conception of an absolute "Experience, individual and perfect". "These seem giant strides to accomplish by a principle 'so absurdly simple,' to quote Mr. Bradley, 'as the law of contradiction'." Prof. Ward then comments more particularly upon the procedure by which finite things, as being only parts of a larger whole, are found to be involved in contradiction and seem to lose their reality even as parts, becoming only adjectives of the one reality, the Absolute. And he shows how this process of dissolution reaches its climax when the finite centres themselves in which the datum experiences of our whole philosophising take place yield in their turn to the same inevitable fate. "If only," says Prof. Ward later, "the so-called 'divisions' of Reality into finite centres of experience were recognised as themselves real—real in a sense quite different from appearance, in short, as real in the sense in which the Absolute itself is real; if, in other words, they were regarded as creatures who have their part in carrying on the work of creation, being endowed with the 'main miracle' of will . . . in that case, certainly, we should have less ground to dissent from their doctrine." I was rather struck by this sentence, because it suggests that the difference between Prof. Ward and the "Neo-Hegelians" is not so extreme as might at first sight appear. The appearance of extreme opposition is due in part certainly to the fact that the opponents on each side use expressions—the self an 'appearance,' 'real in the sense in which the Absolute itself is real'—which have an air of paradox or absurdity to those on the

other. Yet Dr. Bosanquet, for instance, speaks of self-consciousness as "the clue to the typical structure of reality," and Prof. Ward would surely admit that there is a sense in which the finite centre, simply because it is finite, is less real than the Absolute. Probably a still more serious cause of misunderstanding is that phrases like "an Absolute Experience" tend to suggest, and are no doubt taken by critics to mean, something far more positive and rigid than those who use the phrases really intend, or, at any rate, have any logical right to intend. In view of the ordinary usage and associations of a term like "experience," such phrases, it seems to me, simply invite misunderstanding.

There are no fewer than three 'Symposia' in the volume, the Oxford Congress of Philosophy accounting for two. A comparison of the three inclines one to think—if an outsider may venture the suggestion—that the Society might profitably devote some consideration to the best method of conducting a 'symposium'. The usual practice of the Society seems to be this: A writes the first paper, B with A's paper before him writes the second, C with A's and B's papers before him writes the third, and so on. This method has its drawbacks, as will presently appear. One of the Oxford Symposia, to which six writers, French and English, contribute—on the 'Problem of Nationality'—follows a different method: the contributors (apart from a single reference) appear to have written quite independently, with the advantageous result that each addresses himself directly to the subject and gives his own view of it. The contributions of MM. Halévy and Mauss, and Sir Frederick Pollock are specially pointed and useful inasmuch as they seek to limit and define the place of nationality as a political principle. M. Halévy argues that the principle if made simple or absolute becomes really a principle of revolution rather than of settled peace, and that to meet the real complexity of the facts we must also take account of the principles of natural frontier and balance of power. Sir F. Pollock, who is in general sympathy with this attitude, argues that there is no one simple way of determining nationality, and that the most important factor after all is that of common tradition and institutions, that is to say, the political factor broadly understood. M. Mauss prefers to consider the problem in a more concrete form—the place of nations in political development. Using the term nation in a somewhat restricted sense, he holds that the full development of national life, in existing nations as well as in peoples that are not yet nations, is still in large measure a task to be achieved. Recognising this, he looks beyond the nation, not to an empty cosmopolitanism which is only the counterpart of individualism, but to the development of a true internationalism which will establish right relations between the nations: in his view the beginnings of this development are already plainly visible. The remaining three contributors treat nationality rather as a single force, M. Ruyssen and Prof. Gilbert Murray speculating on the possibilities of keeping it within due

limits, while M. Johannet takes a rather gloomy view of its significance: "Pratiquement la vogue de l'idée nationalitaire en 1920 est le signe d'une recrudescence de rivalités impérialistes".

The other Oxford Symposium has for its subject: 'Is the Existence of the Platonic ΕΙΔΟΣ presupposed in the Analysis of Reality?' Mr. Joad leads off with the affirmative answer, which Miss Stebbing also maintains in a more qualified way, while Mr. Lindsay and Prof. Hoernlé act the part of critics. When we are told that Mr. Lindsay finds himself in "fundamental disagreement with almost everything in Mr. Joad's paper" we are prepared for criticism of a polemical kind. Mr. Lindsay's main criticism (in which Prof. Hoernlé concurs) appears to be that Mr. Joad ignores the fact that general notions are used in judgment, and thereby becomes unable to distinguish those which have no objective counterpart (*e.g.*, phlogiston) from those which have such a counterpart. But is error in judgment, we may ask, so much easier to explain than error in conception? Prof. Hoernlé's criticism does more, I think, to further the ends of discussion. He points out that there is no real dispute about the propositions on which the 'realists' lay so much stress, *viz.* that "the possibility of my being able to know a thing depends upon there being a thing for me to know, which is something other than my knowing it" or that "no conclusion as to the status of an entity follows from the fact that the given entity is the object of a mental act"; and he tries to clear up the confusions which make the assertion of these propositions seem important.

The remaining Symposium proposes the question: "Is the 'Concrete Universal' the true Type of Universality?" The natural text for the discussion would have been, as Prof. Dawes Hicks points out, the chapter in Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, but Prof. J. W. Scott puts a meaning of his own on the question, and practically identifies it with the question of the objectivity of knowledge. His general line of argument is that knowledge is objective only if the known object is the same for different minds, and this identity of the object throughout its several appearances is what he means by concrete universality. Mr. G. E. Moore tells us that this argument seems to him "to have hardly anything to do with the question," but, instead of dealing with it briefly and proceeding to discuss the question properly at issue, he devotes his own paper wholly to a detailed (and unsympathetic) criticism of Mr. Scott's. Prof. Wildon Carr, following this unfortunate example, finds Mr. Scott's thesis "of great interest" and proposes likewise to take his "lead entirely from it". Thus it is only in the final paper that we come to the question proper, as most students of philosophy would understand it, and even then Prof. Dawes Hicks is naturally hampered by the fact that his colleagues have been discussing something else. Comment upon this method of conducting a 'symposium' is needless. The perversity of it is the more to be regretted because the argument of the final paper shows very

plainly that a careful discussion of the subject proper is eminently desirable. After quoting from Hegel the following passage: "Caius, Titus, Sempronius . . . are all men. That they are so is not merely something which they have in common, but something without which these individuals would not be at all," Prof. Dawes Hicks comments as follows: "The passage illustrates with sufficient clearness the confusion which Hobhouse [has recently sought] to exhibit [between a universal and the concept of it]". Hegel himself explains his meaning by adding that "it would be nonsense to suppose that Caius, without being a man, would still be brave, learned, etc."—a statement which seems too obvious to be guilty of subtle confusions.

I will now remark briefly on some of the ordinary papers. Mr. Cator's paper on 'The Nature of Inference' is interesting because it shows a former disciple of Bosanquet in sharp revolt against his master's logical and metaphysical theory. Some of the theses which he would now maintain are as follows: "That there are for thought, no things which being given something else different from them necessarily follows. . . . That no logical connexion can be at once pure and synthetic. . . . That the Absolute taken as meaning the all-inclusive reality has no character." For logical necessity of connexion Mr. Cator would now substitute a psychological tendency to fuse together things which can barely be distinguished. "Thought's working principle is that a thing is what it is only just not." Thought is "an activity of which the characteristic *nisus* is to mediate between differents by the interposition of just-nots, separately imperceptible, cumulatively perceptible". The theoretical difficulty which he now finds in the ideal of logical system is well brought out in the following passage: "Given a jigsaw puzzle complete but for one piece, or an animal complete but for one bone, or a universe with but one gap in its completeness, could we say with certainty what the missing element must be? No; because the absence of the piece makes the ground of determination itself indeterminate precisely in the direction in which it is required to be determinate."

Mr. G. E. Moore's paper on "External and Internal Relations" is argued with his usual acuteness, and states very carefully what he takes to be the real issue and what his own view is. Unfortunately he seems to attribute to those who hold the doctrine that relations are 'internal' a view which one cannot believe that they do actually hold. According to Mr. Moore the doctrine implies "that any term which does in fact have a particular relational property, could not have existed without having that property," *e.g.*, if Edward was in fact the father of George he could not have existed without being the father of George. Why the doctrine that relations are 'internal' should commit us to a fatalism of this sort it is hard to see. At the end of his paper, in speaking about the formula that a relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms, Mr. Moore gives as one of its possible meanings this, that,

in the case of every relational property, "the term [which possesses it] has some quality without which it could not have had the property"; and he goes so far as to say that the formula taken in this sense "may quite well be true". One can only regret that he did not make this formula so interpreted the starting point of his discussion.

Prof. J. A. Smith's paper on "Giovanni Gentile" seeks by a sympathetic account of the main tendency of that philosopher's thinking to enlist our interest in him and in the general movement to which he belongs. It seems clear from the account that Gentile makes an advance upon Croce, but it is not so clear that either the one or the other improves upon the Hegelian original. When we read a sentence like the following: "This all-dissolving but also all-creating or re-creating thought is thought *a priori* and absolute, is the act or reality of thought at its highest," we seem to be back at the kind of language which Green felt to be so unconvincing.

In a paper on "Impulse, Emotion, and Instinct" Mr. Shand endeavours to clear up some of the confusions in which these controverted topics of psychology are involved. The primary aim of the paper is to show generally how emotion is distinguished from impulse, and more particularly how the primary emotions are distinguished from the elementary or instinctive impulses. As regards the questions at issue between McDougall and himself—questions as to how much the instincts, defined in view of their actual character and mode of operation, can be used to explain—Mr. Shand seems to me to have the great advantage of being more concerned to express the actual facts than to fit them into a simple theoretical scheme.

Mr. Ginsberg discusses the question "Is there a General Will?" mainly, though not exclusively, with reference to Bosanquet's teaching on the subject. He is evidently anxious to be accurate in statement and objective in criticism, but I am afraid that disciples of Bosanquet will find him wholly unconvincing. He expresses himself, for instance, upon the distinction between the real and the actual will as follows: "I should say that a thing is either real or not real, and that, therefore, the actual will is just as real as the 'real' will, if by the latter we mean the permanent or standing will, though the former is relatively to it transitory. If, on the other hand, as seems to be the case, by the real will is meant a completely rational will with a definitely articulate organic system of purposes, then such a will is not real at all, but ideal". But of course to bring against Bosanquet's doctrine such dilemmas as 'either simply real or simply not real,' 'either simply real or simply ideal' is merely to beg the question, and to beg it not only against the doctrine but against the facts.

Mr. C. C. J. Webb's paper on "Obligation, Autonomy, and the Common Good" deals in an interesting way, though too briefly, with the basis of obligation. Accepting the Kantian doctrine that "the essential feature of our moral consciousness" is "the sense

of obligation," he would base this authoritative character of morality, not upon a mere common good or general will, but rather upon an absolute factor "which may perhaps be best described as the sovereignty of God."

In a paper on "The Problem of Truth and Existence as treated by Anselm" Mr. A. E. Davies contends that Anselm's treatment of the problem has been generally misunderstood, in that his proof of the existence of God has been represented as purely *a priori*. The aim of the whole argument, it is here maintained, is to verify that experience of faith in which God is actually apprehended, and this is done by showing (1) that consistent thought about existence involves the thought of a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist—an argument in which, instead of trying to pass from thought to existence, Anselm throughout presupposes the distinction between them as ultimate—(2) that this Being is identical with the God in whom faith believes, since anything less would not be God.

Miss Beatrice Edgell's paper on "Memory and Conation" compares the views of Ward, Semon, and Freud, in regard to memory.

Mr. Geikie-Cobb's paper on mysticism seeks to distinguish between a false or inferior form of mysticism which finds a basis in unconscious vital and mental forces and the true mysticism which draws inspiration from a higher source. "The function of philosophy," he thinks, "when mysticism comes before it, is to accept the *data* of the latter as it does the *data* of the sensuous order, and then to find a place for them in its system of thought." In view of the incommunicable character of the mystical experience it would seem that the philosopher who is to undertake this task must himself be a mystic, but this is not expressly said.

Of the merits of a paper on "Buddhist Metaphysics in China and Japan" I am unable to judge.

H. BARKER.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Lectures on Modern Idealism. By JOSIAH ROYCE. Yale University Press.

It was a curious consequence of the preoccupation of the British Press with the War that the death of Royce was almost unnoticed in this country at the time when it occurred. Yet his was a name which might, one would have thought, have attracted the notice of journalists even then, in consequence of the very decided position taken up on the side of the Allies by the man who, since the death of William James, had been undoubtedly the foremost figure in the ranks of American philosophers. Indeed, as the editor of the volume before us tells us, Royce "was destined to articulate the American conscience at a time of moral perplexity". These posthumously published lectures, in which he gave, to quote his editor again, "an unbiassed and trustworthy study of German idealism" is "all the more notable" as coming from one who "showed no hesitancy in characterising Germany as 'the wilful and deliberate enemy of the human race' when she, in his opinion, assumed that rôle". "Germany was thus judged, not by one who disparaged and belittled, but by one who knew and cherished the ideals of her past." For Royce was in a very real sense a follower, though an independent follower, of the German idealism discussed in these pages.

It is indeed no very "modern Idealism" with which they deal: only that of the immediate successors of Kant, with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Of this they give an admirably clear and suggestive account.

The first and second lectures deal with the Kantian conception of knowledge and of the self, which lay behind this whole movement of thought. It is rightly emphasised here that while the self "to whose categories," according to Kant, "all natural facts conform" "one inevitably conceives as common to all those men whose intelligence we accept as essentially a guide to our own" (p. 23), yet it is never by Kant himself "viewed as any absolute or as any superhuman mind that views all the facts of nature at once". The difficulty of the whole Kantian position is well put on page 61 in the remark that "in order to reach his epistemology, as he usually states the latter, one has to accept his ontology, while after one has once accepted the epistemology, anything but a wholly problematic ontology is excluded". Is it, by the way, quite a correct representation of Kant's doctrine of freedom to say that "the practical reason in passing moral judgments, inevitably says 'I am, for I ought to be, the origin, the source of my own deeds'?" Should it not rather be "I am the source of my own deeds, for I ought to act thus and not otherwise"?

The account of Schelling and Hegel should be especially useful in calling attention to the importance assigned by these philosophers to facts which it is sometimes, as it would seem, thought that it has been reserved for others to emphasise; for example, the unconscious element in the self (p. 120) in Schelling, or the plurality of selves (p. 174) in Hegel. Throughout the lectures one meets with sayings which suggest interesting trains

of thought or associate with a striking phrase some important aspect of the philosophy under discussion. Some of these may be quoted. "Future historians will look back upon the history of idealism as being that of the dissolution of the classic Protestantism" (p. 3). "The philosopher is more frank than common sense with his antitheses. He does not invent the paradoxes; he confesses them" (p. 93). "The ideal hero of Hegel's *Phänomenologie*, name him *Weltgeist*, or call him by a more familiar word *Everyman*" (p. 188). "One may charge Hegel rather with having too hastily overlooked the possibility of discovering a deeper reasonableness in many things which now appear to us to be accidental than with having been a merely blind partisan of the reasonableness of whatever happens!" (p. 225). "I am very willing then to hear people condemn the *a priori*; for I notice that they do so on *a priori* grounds" (p. 254). Royce's own attitude in respect of contemporary controversies in philosophy is briefly described on page 258: "Personally I am both a pragmatist and an absolutist . . . I believe each of these doctrines involves the other, and . . . therefore I regard them not only as reconcilable but as in truth reconciled".

There are several misprints. On p. 7, l. 8 from the bottom, it seems that for 'metaphysical' we should read 'physical' and that 'metaphysical' should be inserted in the next line before 'researches'. On p. 63 the date of the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is given as 1871 (for 1781); on p. 172, l. 6 from the bottom, for 'as' read 'is'.

C. C. J. W.

Das Denken und die Phantasie. Psychologische Untersuchungen nebst Exkursen zur Psychopathologie, Aesthetik und Erkenntnistheorie. By R. MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1916. Pp. xii, 341.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. In the author's opinion the popular meanings of *Denken* and of *Phantasie* give a rough indication of the scope of his work; and that is enough for him. Indeed, he does not try to analyse the contrast between *Denken* and *Phantasie* until he reaches page 253, and even then he seems indifferent to the issue for he is content to leave it after five pages of somewhat perfunctory discussion in which he concludes that the difference between the two consists solely in the *Wirklichkeitswert* of the former. What is more, he is barely consistent in these pages; for he is prepared to call primitive folk-lore imaginative on the ground that it has no *Wirklichkeitswert* for us, while he also maintains that children are unimaginative because their so-called imagination proves only that they are lacking in the critical faculty which distinguishes reality from illusion.

His intention, in fact, is to show, on strictly psychological grounds, and ostensibly without prejudice to any theories which are but partially psychological, that our thinking processes are not affairs of *Vorstellungen* (in the sense of reproductions), but are phenomena of response, reactive processes with a strong feeling-tone. *Vorstellung*, when it occurs, is relatively unimportant. Thinking itself is *Einstellung*, or *Stellungnahme*.

This line of thought, of course, has many prophets to-day, and our author freely acknowledges his debt to James and Schiller among English-speaking philosophers, to Binet, Ribot, and others in France, and to many psychologists and philosophers in his own country. On the other hand, he claims (most justly, I think) that he has worked the problem out for himself according to a single fundamental principle. The nature of this principle

and of the author's introspective method appears very clearly indeed in his first main chapter (pp. 41-90), and this chapter, in many ways, is the most original, and the best, in the book. Here he undertakes a systematic description of all the primary *Vorstellungen*, beginning with the sense of smell and ending with the sense of sight; he describes his own experience with the most meticulous care, and with very great skill; and he succeeds throughout in seeing himself with his own eyes and without borrowed spectacles. In the result, while he admits that some *Vorstellungen* are reproductions, he denies that many are, and he endeavours to explain away many of the cases in which reproductive *Vorstellungen* are supposed to be obvious matter of fact. He insists, for example, that internal articulations in the way of sound must be sharply separated from auditory images, and he gives some interesting examples to show that many 'auditory images' are really *illusions* in which some sound in the neighbourhood is misinterpreted and taken to be a subjective memory-image. He applies this type of argument to all the senses, and even in the sense of sight he concludes with Ribot that '*les représentations visuelles sont toutes motrices*'. In a word, he substitutes affective-motor *Einstellung* for the *Vorstellungen* of classical theory in all the principal varieties of sensory knowledge.

The obvious reply to this analysis is that our author is a 'motile' who has generalised far too rashly and uncritically from his own experience. He lays himself open to this reproach, I think, but I am debarred from criticising him effectively in this regard since I also am a motile in so far as I am anything, and therefore I have to take the reproach on trust. I cannot help thinking, however, that the author makes his case far too easy by arguing, at a pinch, that a *Vorstellung* is not, properly speaking, reproductive unless it is an *exact* reproduction. I wonder what he would make of the case of Lieut. Jones, for example, who tells us, in *The Road to En-dor*, that he was able to visualise an ouija-board upside down (although he had never seen it in this position), and so was able to outwit his friends in the ingenious test they set him. Such visualising is not exact reproduction, but it is certainly not an affective-motor phenomenon.

Our author then proceeds to give us chapters on Analytic Attention, Reification and Typifying in Perception, Judgment and Idea in Perception, and The Abstraction of Ideas. These chapters are always careful and interesting, and he supplements the discussion of one of them in the penultimate chapter of his book by a more elaborate account of the relations between Language and Thought. His principal contentions, however, seem to be reached in his sixth chapter in which he criticises the theory of Associationism, and in the seventh, eighth, and ninth chapters in which he deals with purposive thinking in detail. This latter triad of chapters is perhaps rather discursive and diffuse. At any rate it does not add so much as it claims to the position he has already sketched in outline, but the chapter on Associationism is very closely argued, and very well worth reading. Let me quote some sentences from its conclusion (pp. 241-242).

"We must reject altogether the theory of well-rounded, deposited ideas which range themselves in series like dominoes. The elements of consciousness are phenomena with quite elusive boundaries. They are rather a general tendency and setting towards something-or-other, than anything clearly determined, and it is only occasionally that they assume determinate forms in words or images. . . . The contents of consciousness are waves in a river, and the element which is the bearer of ideas is *feeling* whose tendency towards fuller inclusiveness and whose propensity to spread is a manifest piece of fact. . . . The problem of advance in knowledge is therefore not that of linking together "pictures" already painted, but one of purposive dissociation."

This bald statement, to be sure, may seem very commonplace nowadays.

It should be noted, therefore, that Herr Müller-Freienfels tilts with living philosophers, and disdains a combat with shadows.

The digressions into psycho-pathology, æsthetics, and theory of knowledge which are promised in the sub-title of the book, do not occupy very much space or interfere with the argument. As the author of two works on æsthetics, Herr Müller-Freienfels is naturally at home in that field, and his examples are well chosen. His remarks on psycho-analysis are to be found principally in his eighth chapter, and do not pretend to probe very deep. And he is to be congratulated on the restraint which keeps his argument within the domain of psychology. He has no intention of developing his psychological results into a metaphysical theory, although he is aware, of course, that these results are bound to affect the philosophy of mind. Still, except for his short concluding chapter (modestly printed in small type), and for a rather apologetic section at the close of his fourth chapter, he sticks to his last. And his book is none the worse for that.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions. By CARVETH READ, M.A.
Cambridge University Press. Pp. xii, 350.

THIS very interesting book meets a long-felt want on the part of British psychologists, as well as of British students of folk-psychology in particular. It comprises in part material which now sees the light for the first time, and in part work which the author has already published, mainly in the *British Journal of Psychology*. The latter constitutes by no means the least important part, and most readers will be glad to have the various valuable papers from the *Journal* collected together and presented as parts of the whole to which they belong.

Starting from his hypothesis of the descent of Man from a branch of the larger anthropoids, which took to an animal diet—a 'wolf-ape,' *Lycopithecus*—and in so doing departed from the habits of the anthropoids by becoming dwellers on the ground and hunting in packs, Mr. Carveth Read traces first, in Chapters I. and II., the various physical and mental changes which were involved in this departure, arguing that the new life afforded an opportunity for, and demanded, precisely those modifications of body and of mind which differentiate Man from the other anthropoids. He passes on to a consideration of Belief and Superstition (Chapter III.), Magic (Chapter IV.), Animism (Chapter V.), the relation between Magic and Animism (Chapter VI.), Omens (Chapter VII.), the Mind of the Wizard (Chapter VIII.), Totemism (Chapter IX.), and Magic and Science (Chapter X.). The hypothesis of the 'wolf-ape' and the hunting pack may be regarded as representing a thread on which the various topics are strung, very loosely it must be confessed. The whole makes a very excellent book, not so comprehensive as Wundt's *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*, but in many respects much more satisfactory.

At several points the discussion is of great interest for general psychology. That being so, it seems almost ungrateful to suggest that in certain instances a fuller treatment than that given would perhaps have been desirable. In Chapter II., for example, we get a discussion of the psychology of the hunting pack. Now, if the hunting pack is to be taken as representing the first human society, its psychology should obviously be of high significance for social psychology in particular, as well as for psychology in general. Unfortunately—at least so it seems to us—the discussion is rather too general to be helpful. Various vexed questions of the instinct level might have been treated in a most illuminating way

from this point of view. That the author is awake to this particular line of argument is indicated by his references in the chapter to both Freud and McDougall. He appears to have missed a golden opportunity. Of course the exigencies of space necessarily imposed limitations, but a detailed consideration of the social nature and tendencies of man as he now is, in relation to the characteristics of the hunting pack, would have been exceedingly valuable. In Chapter III. the treatment of Belief is open to the same kind of criticism. One would have imagined that the psychological foundation of the chapter, and indeed of the whole book in one important aspect, must necessarily be laid in a systematic psychological treatment of Belief itself. Apparently it has not seemed so to the author, and one result is that the reader is to some extent left guessing as to the exact sense in which 'belief' is used, and the precise psychological phenomena covered, right through the chapter. It is true that a definition of 'Belief' is given on page 76, but the definition is obviously not meant to be a rigorous one, nor is the psychological analysis which it prefaces intended to be at all searching. We cannot help thinking that this is a pity. The distinction drawn between 'perception beliefs' and 'imagination beliefs' is an interesting one. Is there also a 'conception belief,' and, if so, how is it related to these? How is 'superstition' related to 'make-believe'? What are the conditions upon which differences in degree of conviction depend? Many such questions remain unanswered.

As we have said, it seems ungrateful to ask for more when we have got so much. The book as a whole is a very valuable contribution to psychology. It gathers together from many sources facts, observations, and theories, bearing upon magic, animism, totemism, and the like, which have not hitherto been easily accessible to the psychologist. It interprets these facts and observations in an illuminating, often in a convincing, way, and always with a fine sanity of judgment. The reader feels throughout that theories are made to wait on facts, not, as in some books that could be mentioned, facts sought and selected in order to support ready-made theories. Several of the chapters are of quite special interest, notably perhaps those on "Magic," and "The Mind of the Wizard," respectively. The last represents a fine piece of psychological analysis, and is in itself sufficient to give high value to the book. The first starts with a distinction between Magic and Animism drawn by Westermarck, and too often forgotten by the psychologist to the great detriment of some parts of his science. This distinction—between the mechanical and the volitional explanation of processes outside the natural or familiar—is accepted by the author. The two types of explanation are also different, he maintains, in their origin. Magic arises as belief in certain mysterious forces from the confusing of coincidence with causation, whereas Animism arises from a confusion between dreams and ordinary experience. The chapter goes on to trace the course of the evolution of Magic, the development of its main types, and its final dissolution. The chapter on Animism is not so striking as either of these chapters, and the same is true with regard to the chapter on Totemism. In both cases this inferiority should be set down to the difficulty, complexity, and obscurity of the subjects, rather than to the fault of the author.

Altogether, as may be gathered from what has been said, Mr. Carveth Read's book is a very welcome addition to the library of the psychologist, filling a place which no English work has hitherto filled, and filling it adequately.

JAMES DREVER.

The General Principle of Relativity in its Philosophical and Historical Aspect. By H. WILSON CARR. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. x, 165. 7s. 6d. net.

Zur Einstein'schen Relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen. Von ERNST CASSIRER. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1921. Pp. 134.

Both of these books aim at giving the philosophical background of Einstein's theory, but adopt somewhat different methods of doing so. The greater part of Prof. Carr's work is occupied with a historical account of some of the main speculations that have been put forward with regard to the nature of space, time, and matter. The Zenonian paradoxes, the atomic theory of Democritus, the vortex theory of Descartes, the Newtonian system of absolute space and absolute time, Leibniz's view of space as the order of coexistences,—all of these are briefly and interestingly presented. Students of philosophy will be particularly grateful to Prof. Carr for the account of Descartes' physical theories and of Newton's fundamental views, which are often not included in their knowledge of the history of thought. The anticipations of the theory of relativity in Descartes' conception of motion as purely relative, and in Leibniz's view of space as no objective entity, but a mere order of confused perceptions, are clearly pointed out. Prof. Carr's own leanings are, as is well known, towards a Leibnizian view of reality, but this does not prevent him from giving a sympathetic account of the other great systems of thought which he describes. This whole part of the book forms an interesting and useful introduction to the study of relativity. The section devoted to the theory itself covers ground which has recently become very familiar, and Prof. Carr's presentation of the theory is in some respects less clear than some others which have been published; it may be doubted whether it will remove any of the doubts which many people feel about the intelligibility of the theory. One must, for instance, be well advanced in the relativist frame of mind to be able to understand such a passage as the following. (Prof. Carr has supposed two persons to travel from London to Edinburgh by trains going respectively thirty and sixty miles an hour.) 'Let us go back to the two railway journeys. According to the classical mechanics, one is double the velocity of the other. According to the principle of relativity, the velocity of each is identical because in each train the observer is at rest. The difference is in the space and the time. These are elongated for the traveller in the slow train, shortened for the traveller in the express. To common-sense this appears contradictory, but reflection will show that it is a simple alternative to the common-sense view, and logically an exact equivalent. It is simply equal to saying, what is also fact, that in our two journeys neither I nor you moved at all, but our destination moved to us, and in doing so traversed double the space in double the time in coming to me that it did in coming to you' (p. 122). Or again, it is not obvious why Prof. Carr should say that 'gravitation is a phenomenon which is connected'—'essentially connected' is apparently meant—'with a rotational system' (p. 143).

In the last chapter Prof. Carr expresses his conviction that the relativity-theory finally cuts the knot of the Zenonian paradoxes and the Kantian antinomies by allowing us to think of the world as in reality non-spatial and non-temporal. The world is infinite, but 'infinity is not the affirmation of space, but its disappearance' (p. 152). The world is an infinite number of non-spatial, non-temporal monads. The general contention of the book may perhaps be said to be that the theory of relativity confirms the truth of Leibniz's scheme of the universe; and there can be no doubt that its affinities are with some such scheme.

Cassirer does not follow the historical order, but groups his reflections under such subjects as 'measure-concepts and thing-concepts,' 'the empirical and conceptual foundations of the theory of relativity,' 'the philosophical concept of truth and the relativity-theory,' 'Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry'. His discussion shows, however, as might be expected, a wide knowledge of the history of modern speculation on the subjects which interest both philosophers and men of science. The general point of view is Kantian, and though the machinery creaks occasionally in the process of fitting the new views into the Kantian system, the attempt is on the whole not unsuccessful. The book leaves on the present reviewer, however, rather the impression of a skilful use of the vocabulary of a particular system than of a mind really at close grips with the facts. The crudities of Einstein's philosophy appear on the whole preferable to this rather too smooth exhibition of a method which, one feels, could with equal facility prove anything to be reconcilable with anything else. One of Cassirer's main objects is to show that the theory of relativity in some respects only carries to a further point tendencies which have been at work throughout the history of modern science, *e.g.*, the tendency to be interested in measurements or in laws rather than in 'things' having the objectivity which common sense assigns to bodies; and he is able to show by well-chosen quotations from the works of leading scientists that this is so. But whether there is any sense in talking of measurements which are not the measurements of objective entities, or laws which are not the laws of their behaviour, is a question to which he gives no satisfactory answer. A point which is brought out well and with full and interesting documentation is the mutual influence exercised on one another by epistemological theory and physical theory, and it would be hard to find anywhere so good an account of the way of thinking which leads many physicists to suppose that on philosophical grounds, apart from experimental discovery, position and movement in space must be purely relative.

A conflict may be noted between Prof. Carr and Cassirer about the position of Lorenz's theory as against that of Einstein; the former says (p. 130) that experiments have disproved the truth of Lorenz's view, the latter says (p. 36) that an experimental decision between the two views is impossible, and that Einstein's is preferable solely on epistemological grounds, *i.e.*, in virtue of the Leibnizian 'principle of observability.' The latter seems to be the position of most physicists.

One of the points on which Cassirer most strongly insists is that the effect of the relativity-theory is not purely destructive of absolutes; in declaring space, time, and movement to be relative it leaves us something that is absolute—'those relations and those particular size-values which . . . maintain themselves not only for one system, but for all systems' (p. 41, *i.e.*, not only the velocity of light, but the entropy of a body, its electric charge, etc. (p. 34). 'The object is not reached and known by passing from empirical determinations to what is no longer empirical, the absolute and transcendent, but by uniting the totality of the observations and of the measure-determinations given in experience into a closed whole' (p. 41).

Like Prof. Carr, Cassirer emphasises the fact that the relativity-theory is in a sense a return to Descartes's abandonment of the dualism of space and matter (p. 61). An interesting passage is devoted to the difficulties in reconciling the supposed properties of ether (p. 70). One of the most interesting chapters is that on Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry; the author has nothing new to say, but he gives an interesting account of the various phases of thought on the subject. His work concludes with a useful bibliography.

W. D. ROSS.

La Filosofia di Giovanni Locke. By ARMANDO CARLINI. Vallecchi, Florence. Vol. I, pp. xciv, 287. Vol. II, pp. 379.

This monograph on our greatest English philosopher by an Italian author is significant of the force and direction of the present philosophical movement in Italy. The book is a critical and historical study of the first importance, original in its standpoint, profound and comprehensive in its treatment. The only work to which it is comparable is Prof. J. Gibson's *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations* (1917). Prof. Gibson's book is not included in the Bibliography which Signor Carlini has compiled in his Introduction although the omission of it is noticed as an Erratum at the end of the second volume. The reason no doubt is that Carlini had completed his study so far as its general design is concerned before he knew of it. The bibliography ends with the date 1912. It is proof, however, of the wideness of the author's reading that he refers to and quotes from an article by Prof. Gibson on Locke in this journal in 1896.

To present Locke's philosophy to Italian readers can be no easy task. Locke's terminology offers no difficulty to us for the simple reason that he has imposed it on our language to such an extent that we are inclined to regard his meanings as standardising our terms. In philosophy, in fact, we feel called on to explain whenever we use one of Locke's terms in any other sense than that which he gave to it. But when Locke is translated into a foreign language there is a peculiar difficulty, one which cannot be removed by a glossary, for it is continuous. We cannot but sympathise with our author therefore when he says: "*Mind* (il soggetto auto-cosciente) non corrisponde esattamente nè a *spirito* (come opposto a 'materia'), nè a *mente* (perchè *mind* è anche *volere*); *understanding* è piuttosto *intelligenza* che *intelletto*; *consciousness* (consapevolezza di sé, riflessione interna), in inglese, è diversa da *conscience* (che ha un significato piuttosto morale)," etc. These are difficulties, however, which, to some extent, apply to all authors in every age. The real difficulty in interpreting as distinct from translating Locke is of a different nature. A first and indispensable condition for a true valuation of Locke's philosophy is the historical reconstruction of his thought. It is to this task the author has primarily devoted himself and we can congratulate him on having achieved a notable success.

The most remarkable thing about Locke is his philosophical detachment. His method is original. He shows an almost complete lack of interest in the systems of philosophy and in the philosophical theories around which the main controversies of his age were raging. He is possessed with the feeling that the philosophical problem is not abstruse, that it is easy of solution if we only go straightforwardly and directly to the study of our ideas and of our mental processes, without obscuring everything in a smoke-cloud of logical, metaphysical or philological definitions. In fact he devoted himself exclusively to the study of his subject without regard to what others had done or were doing. It has sometimes seemed incredible that he should not have read the works of his great contemporary, Hobbes, whose theory of knowledge had such striking points of resemblance to his own, yet the way in which he refers on occasion to the writings of Hobbes, whom he joins with Spinoza, show not only that he was unsympathetic but that he must have been positively unacquainted with his philosophy. A characteristic story is told of Locke in regard to Newton, the authority for which for the moment escapes my memory. Newton he read and admired warmly but before committing himself to the consideration of the philosophical bearing of his discoveries he asked

a mathematician friend whether he could assure him that it was safe to assume the correctness of Newton's mathematical demonstrations.

Signor Carlini has had to aim, therefore, at revivifying the historical period in which Locke worked. He has striven to place us in, and make us breathe as it were, the philosophical atmosphere which Locke's predecessors and contemporaries created, rather than to set before us the definite doctrines they held. We are made to feel the life of the world in which Locke's thought found expression.

What is particularly admirable in the general treatment is the way in which the author manages to combine and weave into one fabric an exposition of the doctrines and their historical setting. Thus in his first part, entitled "The Formation of Locke's Philosophy," he begins with an exposition of the treatise on "The Conduct of the Understanding" and follows it immediately with a discussion of Locke's relation to Bacon, to Descartes, and to Hobbes. This leads to an illuminating chapter (one of the best in the book) on the philosophical influences and directions in seventeenth-century England. We are then shown how naturally the problem of the origin of ideas arises.

The second of the four parts into which the book is divided deals with the theory of knowledge. The third part deals with the polemical writings and the minor doctrines. It is in some respects the most important part, and it is certainly the most original and interesting. The famous polemic against innate principles in the first book of the *Essay*, is not, according to our author, mainly or directly concerned with the definite doctrine of innate ideas as we find it formulated by Descartes and his followers. It comprehends these philosophers no doubt, but if it be read as a simple criticism of anything Descartes, or any particular Cartesian, actually propounded, we must pronounce judgment against Locke for complete misapprehension. On the contrary, Carlini argues, what Locke has in mind is that widely accepted but generally vague and indefinite notion of a kind of light of natural reason, a voice of conscience, implanted in the human mind. It was implicit rather than actually expressed in current theories. It is the basal idea of the natural theology, very generally and uncritically accepted in the seventeenth century, which became definite and pronounced in the Deism of the eighteenth century. It was against this theory that Locke's polemic was directed. The only criticism of a direct nature which he engaged in was against the philosophy of Malebranche and his followers. The Vision in God and the occasional causes were doctrines in every sense repugnant to him.

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of the *suppressio veri* with the *suggestio falsi*, both, of course, practised in the absolute good faith which comes from propagandist enthusiasm uncheeked by any infusion of historical sense. This may seem a hard verdict, but I will proceed at once to submit evidence in justification.

The book, apart from the assault on Christianity in the irrelevant final chapter, purports to be an exposition of the *Republic*. Its main thesis is that the "philosopher" of the *Republic* is a non-social Yogi who has risen above the necessity of practising the civic virtues and is following the "higher path" of aiming at the spiritual suicide of absorption into "Brahm". Of course Prof. Urwick must know that neither in the *Republic* nor anywhere else in Plato is there one word about "absorption" of the philosopher's selfhood in the impersonal. Here, then, is the *suggestio falsi*. Also he must know that on his own showing the *Republic* demands that the philosopher should be trained in the whole of the highest science precisely that he may be fitted for his task of ruling with adequate knowledge and insight. Yet he asks us to believe that the philosophers of the central books of the *Republic* are intended to be self-centred adepts who have left the stage of social duty behind them and are going in for what Schopenhauer calls "will-less contemplation". Here is the *suppressio veri*.

After this it is not surprising to be told that Plato cared nothing for anything which we call science and was not even serious in his show of being concerned with questions of education and government. One naturally asks, why then did Plato make it the business of his life to found the Academy? We happen to be rather fully informed about the kind of science pursued in the Academy. Plato and his personal associates, Eudoxus, Theaetetus, and others whose names are all known worked at planetary theory, the geometry of irrationals, solid geometry, conic sections, and the foundation of what we now call the Infinitesimal Calculus, as well as at the problem of zoological classification. I submit that this is what we call "science," and though Mr. Urwick has a right to his opinion that interest in science prevents mankind from enjoying the vision of God, he has no right to foist the opinion on Plato. Even if Plato's works did not teach expressly that science reveals the divine, the absurdity of Mr. Urwick's thesis would be adequately demonstrated by what we know of the actual achievements of the Academy, just as the absurdity of the thesis that Plato was not really interested in 'politics' is sufficiently proved by the arduous and dangerous part he played at Syracuse. If Plato had been the kind of man Mr. Urwick supposes, why did he, at the age of sixty, attempt to direct the political education of Dionysius II? And why was the Academy so active, a few years later, in the "liberation" of Syracuse? Of course I need hardly dwell on the historical difficulties of the assertion that there is any connexion between Platonism and what Mr. Urwick calls "the Indian philosophy". (He does not seem, by the way, to know that there is any Indian philosophy other than Vedantism. Has he never heard of the Sankhya?) It is as certain as can be that before Alexander there was no way by which Indian philosophical speculations could have reached the West. The idea is really refuted by asking the simple question in what language we are to imagine the communication as taking place. Nor do the best authorities on Sanskrit literature seem to regard the Vedanta philosophy as having anything like the antiquity Mr. Urwick ascribes to it. It was really his duty to make out his case for the existence of the Vedanta in the Vth (or possibly the VIth) century B.C. He is content to dispose of the difficulty in a few lines by asserting in his *Preface* that some Sanskrit literature (he seems to assume without proof that Vedantism may be found in the oldest hymns of the Veda) is six thousand years old!

There is a great deal more that might be said, but I think I have said enough to show that, as an interpretation of the *Republic*, a book which exhibits so complete an ignorance of the historical background of Plato's life and thought and proceeds on such arbitrary exegetical principles is not worth the paper on which it is written. Mr. Urwick speaks very disrespectfully of a whole series of modern students, Grote, Jowett, D. G. Ritchie, Adam, Dr. Bosanquet, Prof. J. A. Stewart. I should not like to adopt all the opinions of any of these distinguished men, but at least they have all been scholars, and one of them, Grote, a scholar of the very highest eminence. Mr. Urwick has still to learn what scholarship means, and I will add, what proof of a statement means. You are not in the position to have a right to confident views of your own about Platonic exegesis unless you begin with an adequate knowledge of the Greek language and literature (such as would, e.g., prevent the making of the foolish remark that the name Pthagoras is Indian and means Pitta [Pitá] Guru, "Father Guru"), and a sound understanding of the social and intellectual life of the Greek communities in the period 450-350. To dogmatise without this knowledge is at bottom charlatanism. It is because Mr. Urwick's book is one long dogmatising without knowledge that I feel bound to put it on record that of all bad books on Plato his is the very worst. It is highly discreditable to the firm which publishes it that they should "push" such wares by the impudent "puff" which appears on the wrapper.

A. E. T.

The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism. By W. B. PILLSBURY. Appleton, N.Y. and London, 1919.

Prof. Pillsbury tells us in his preface that this book "was suggested by contact with the American Greeks returned to Greece to fight in the Balkan War". He points out very clearly that nationality is not a matter of race or of language. "If you are to know," he truly says, "to what national group an individual belongs, the simplest way is to ask him". In what is perhaps his best chapter, that on 'hate as a social force,' Prof. Pillsbury observes that "in the attitude of the native American to the war, one was struck by the vastly greater effect of hate and resentment against the cruelty of the German than of sympathy with the victims," from which he deduces the consequence that "the war as a whole constitutes a definite refutation of the German doctrine of frightfulness". The "influence of a common hate" not only makes for national unity but plays a not unimportant part in the development of the universal system of social levels. It is also seen in the socialistic opposition to war—less as a "source of suffering" than as "an instrument of the capitalistic class devised to keep labour in subjection". When a nation becomes the victim of a war of aggression "hate is still the most important factor in national defence," and "while it is not true that had there been no war or if wars were to cease there would be no nationality, it is certain that coherence is emphasised where there is opposition". While there is much truth in these remarks, it is perhaps worth observing that at the beginning of the late war, hate (even in the very general sense here used) of the Germans was not the prevalent sentiment among Englishmen nor was it among the principal motives which roused the nation to enter into the struggle.

The following chapter on 'Nationality in History' is weak. The history of the middle ages in particular is not well understood and the

influence of the universal claims of the Holy Roman Empire in delaying the accomplishment of national unity in Germany and Italy is not even mentioned.

Chapter v., on nationality in the process of naturalisation, is interesting; an American writer has here special opportunities of observing relevant facts. Prof. Pillsbury laments the prevalence among Americans of an ignorant conceit of superiority which makes them unfair to foreigners, but remarks that by this attitude "the process of naturalisation is hastened". He notes the readiness with which the German immigrant, "usually better trained in languages" than the Englishman, and "keen to acquire a new one," soon "adopts the speech of the new home and gradually loses his own".

A chapter on 'the Nation and the Mob Consciousness' is sensible. The author clearly distinguishes the nation from the mob, and wisely points out that, even as regards the mob, "one is justified in the statement that a man in a crowd is somewhat similar in his acts to the man hypnotised, not that he is hypnotised". We should remember, he adds, that "in one sense all that we do is done through suggestion". But it is very questionable whether suggestion is really "nothing more than habit on the one hand and association of ideas on the other".

In dealing with "the national mind" Prof. Pillsbury does well to remind us that "to explain the consciousness of the social whole in terms of the relation of the individual consciousness to separate elements is to attempt an explanation by means of something that is itself far from fully known". If he does not himself throw much light on the problem of a "national mind" he is careful to avoid the extremes of denying the existence of any such thing on the one hand and making it a mind additional to those of the citizens on the other. His attitude to the project of a League of Nations is marked by a similar sobriety. He is wholeheartedly in favour of the formation of such a society and holds that no reasonable objection to it can be based on the psychology of nationality. But he also thinks that it is not likely that "the sentiment of loyalty to separate nations would ever be greatly reduced" and that, if it happened, the reduction "would be a much to be deplored result".

Prof. Pillsbury's remarks on the emphasis laid on different aspects of freedom in different countries, and especially in this country and in the United States (pp. 42, 229), are worthy of note and throw light on some recent developments of American legislation which are apt to astonish Britons. He has a just comprehension of England's difficulties in respect of the Irish problem, and many of us perhaps will be inclined to agree to his pessimistic conclusion that "no solution proposed holds any great promise of success".

One may doubt whether it is generally true that the Englishman of a quarter of a century ago "gloried in being Teuton"—whatever may have been the case with a certain group of historical scholars; and may wonder whether indeed the Germans were not disastrously misled by mistaking in this instance an academic fashion for a national sentiment.

The absurd use of the phrase 'Platonic love' on page 120 is unworthy of a cultivated writer. I have noticed slips or misprints of 'cleanliness' for 'uncleanliness' (p. 44), 'prosecution' for 'persecution' (p. 75), 'nation' for 'state' (p. 273); and wish that Prof. Pillsbury had enlightened my insular ignorance by explaining his allusion to 'the devotee of Peruna' on page 201.

C. C. J. W.

Knowledge, Life and Reality. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. Yale University Press, pp. xxiv, 549. 15s. net.

Before the publication of this book Prof. Ladd's philosophical opinions were expressed in a series of monographs dealing with particular questions. The present work represents his attempt to express in "semi-popular" form the philosophical system to which he is led by considering together the conclusions of these inquiries. This system seems to be largely determined by certain presuppositions which he elaborates, the first of which is his view of the nature of the functions of philosophy. These are, Prof. Ladd thinks, to examine the categories of the positive sciences and to synthesise their conclusions; we are told, however, that this synthesis must be of such a nature that it is "in accord with humanity's most important and persistent ideals" (i. 8), that is, man's moral, æsthetic and religious ideals; and later Prof. Ladd asserts that no system which is other than monistic will achieve this, since he thinks that to attempt to explain the world as the product of two independent principles—whether they be matter and mind or good and evil—is to deny the possibility of an explanation. Philosophy must discover "a supreme Reality which may serve to explain and interpret both kinds of existence," (i.e., the existence of matter and mind) "in their reciprocal relations and forms of behaviour" (p. 58).

The second group of presuppositions are those connected with the nature of knowledge. Prof. Ladd thinks that the only knowledge which may be regarded as certain is knowledge of ourselves; and this knowledge reveals the capacity to will as our dominant characteristic, the characteristic indeed which serves as a criterion of whether or not an entity is to be regarded as a self. The volitional aspect of our self enters into the state of knowing; for Prof. Ladd thinks that there is no such mental state as a pure act of cognition: there is always also a volitional element present in addition to feeling. Indeed he believes that "only beings that have wills of their own can know. And the beings which these wilful beings know as other than themselves, are known only as they are recognised in terms of opposing wills" (p. 67). That is to say, they are known only as they are selves. And here we come upon a tenet which Prof. Ladd repeatedly enforces as to the nature of our knowledge, which would seem to introduce a scepticism at least as great, if not greater, than that of Kant which he so much deplors. Starting from the premiss that all our knowledge must be human knowledge—a proposition harmless in itself since it is a tautology—he interprets this to mean that the objects of our knowledge in order to be known by us must behave more or less as we know ourselves to behave: that is they must be more or less self-like.

At this point we make the transition from his presuppositions to the results of his system. That objects of all kinds are more or less self-like is being progressively established by science, in as much as the causal laws according to which they behave are becoming more and more definite. Now to be a cause is, according to Prof. Ladd, to will in accordance with an idea; indeed we only come at the conception of cause through the knowledge of this process as it occurs in ourselves. It is easy now for him to pursue his unifying ideal, and the stages by which he proceeds are familiar, for they are more or less common to those philosophies which envisage the universe in terms of ethical Idealism. Scientists, he thinks, have a faith in the unity of the physical universe, in the sense that there is some one Force or Will which will account for all the conclusions reached by the different positive sciences. He believes that this ideal is being gradually approached although its attainment is still very distant.

He believes that there is a Being of the World whose spirit is immanent in the physical universe (it is on this account that physical entities appear self-like) and which is realising a plan therein the nature of which it is for the scientist to discover, that is to say in so far as he is a metaphysical scientist; and all scientists are bound to be more or less so—preferably more than less, thinks Prof. Ladd—if they do anything more than observe phenomena. He then considers the ethical, æsthetic and religious ideals of man. In each case he gives an extremely interesting account of their psychological development, and proceeds to discover what "ground" (to use his own term) they have in reality. These psychological discussions lead him to the conclusions that ethical, æsthetic and religious states of consciousness have always been present in the constitution of the human mind in a less or greater degree of development, and further that their history shows them to be evolving steadily towards certain ideals, which may be characterised. The ethical ideal, he thinks, is that of ideally good people (by which he means those who possess the virtues to the greatest extent compatible with their harmony) living together in a society. The æsthetic ideal is the recognition and appreciation to the greatest extent of the æsthetic qualities (such as sublimity, proportion, grace, prettiness) in the physical universe and in man. The religious ideal is that of monotheism, *i.e.*, the belief in the existence of a personal God, combining within himself the ideals of ethics and æsthetics, and worthy of our worship, whose spirit is immanent in the universe, in the sense that he is progressively realising himself therein. Such are man's ideals, and since they are part of his experience they demand an explanation by philosophy. Is the universe of such a kind that they may be realised; and is there any reason to believe that they are not merely man's ideals, but ideals of the universe apart from man? Yes, thinks Prof. Ladd. The physical universe from which man is evolved must itself possess in some degree those qualities which constitute man a moral being, since it would otherwise have been impossible for it to produce them in man. Also, he thinks there is empirical support for the belief that the physical universe shares man's moral characteristics; for, he argues, biologists speak of the improvement of species as a result of what would *prima facie* appear to be nature's wasteful and painful methods, and sociologists have no doubt that nature favours right conduct. Similarly he thinks we observe more and more the beauty of nature's processes; how what would appear to be ugly is only a necessary condition of something beautiful, and how nature is succeeding in producing in itself more and more those qualities which give rise to æsthetic appreciation. Finally our belief in God is justified because such a Being must exist in order to explain our experience. The universe appears to us as a planful, moral and æsthetic unity of such a kind that it must be the work of a mind which is itself characterised in this way, which is manifesting itself in the universe. God must exist in order to unify our experience.

M. LEBUS.

Université de Louvain. Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.
Tome IV. Louvain, 1920. Pp. 623.

The reappearance of this handsome Year-Book is welcome evidence of the courage and vigour with which all classes in Belgium are addressing themselves to the work of relieving the injury done to national life by the infamous German invasion and occupation. To the sentimentalists of Oxford who are so eager to resume public relations with the *Herren*

Professoren who applauded this villainy I recommend the prefatory note in which it is explained that the absence of all contributions to experimental psychology, a leading feature of former Year-Books, is due to the thoroughness with which the invaders destroyed the Louvain laboratory and all its contents.

Space permits of no more than a brief summary of the contents of the volume.

M. DEFOURNY. *Aristote et l'éducation*. [A full account of the educational theories of Aristotle marred by strange historical misconceptions. It is absurd to suppose that aliens at Athens, like Aristotle and his pupils, were interested in propounding a scheme for the reform of Athenian education. The whole course described in the *Politics* is patently meant not for any existing community but for the little aristocracy of Aristotle's dreams in which the "goodness of a man" and the "goodness of a citizen" are the same. Nor was there any such educational "crisis" at Athens in Aristotle's lifetime as the author imagines. It is quite false to say that Athenian education had ever been regulated by the State, and the legend of the demoralisation of society by the "sophists" has long been known for the idle tale it is. M. Defourny actually carries back the supervision of the *ephebi*, as fixed just before Aristotle's death by Lycurgus, to the age of Solon! Aristotle's relation to Plato is also quite misconceived. Plato was not an enthusiast for Spartan "education". In the *Republic* itself Sparta is given by name as an instance of a community where things are already going wrong from "neglect of education". In the *Laws* we are told that the Spartan system, though professing to teach "virtue," only teaches one subordinate virtue, and not the whole of that. Again it is ludicrous to accuse Plato of making "conquest" or "military process" the end of the State. It is from the *Laws* that Aristotle has borrowed the saying that it is peace which is the real serious business of life. And it shows either lack of knowledge or want of candour to dwell on the "secondary school" system of Hellenistic times without mentioning that the very idea of the "secondary school" was introduced into Greek thought in the *Laws*.]

G. COLLE. *Les quatre premiers livres de la Morale à Nicomaque*. [A poor summary of *Ethics* I-IV with unfavourable criticisms, mostly due to misunderstanding. The article is not worthy of its author.]

R. KREMER. *Remarques métaphysiques sur la causalité*. [A good explanation of the Thomist doctrine. The author might have pointed out that its sources are Plotinus and Proclus rather than Aristotle.]

E. JANSSENS. *La morale Kantienne et l'eudémonisme*. [Criticises Kant's hostile attitude to all forms of Eudæmonism. The author rightly says that Kant's account would be very unfair if taken as a description of the doctrine of Aristotle or St. Thomas. He forgets that Kant had probably never studied either of these philosophers and that the "eudæmonism" he attacks is that of the eighteenth-century British "moral sense writers". As against Hutcheson or Hume I think it would be easy to show that Kant's complaints are justified.]

F. DE HOVRE. *Pestalozzi et Herbart*. [Perhaps the best essay in the volume. A careful study of the educational theories of both thinkers and of the influence of Pestalozzi on Herbart. The writer's conclusion is that neither can be safely neglected by the modern "pedagogue".]

P. NÈVE. *La philosophie française à la veille de la guerre*. M. D. WULF. *L'œuvre d'art et la beauté*. [Extract from a forthcoming volume on *Æsthetics*. A good defence of the objectivity of beauty against Lipps, Vernon Lee, Croce and others. But why is "pragmatism" called an "Anglo-Saxon" way of thinking? It came from America, to be sure, but the United States is not, and probably does not consider itself,

"Anglo-Saxon". And it must be by a slip that Lotze is described as an "Hegelian".]

YVES DE LA BRIÈRE. *Le droit international chrétien*. [That war should be, as far as possible, prevented, or, if that cannot be, limited to cases where one party has a *iusta causa*, by a "League of Nations," is fully in accord with the teaching of Christianity. But, in the writer's opinion, a League of Nations *must* have the Pope as its head. I am afraid the British Empire could show a *iusta causa* for declining to enter the League so constituted.]

E. DUTHOIT. *Un sociologue catholique: Henri Lorin*. A. D. SERTILANGES. *L'idée de création*. [Very brief but admirably lucid.] J.

MARITAIN. *De quelques conditions de la renaissance scolastique*. [The condition chiefly insisted on is that every "philosophical principle" of Thomism, whether primary or subordinate, shall be insisted on. In philosophy, as distinct from science, there must be no concessions to the "moderns". The consequence of this will be that the rigid Thomist will come to understand the "moderns" better than they understand themselves and so to extract truth from their errors. I own I should have been more impressed if the writer had spoken of Descartes with decent courtesy and had abstained from lamenting that the peace of Westphalia secured political rights to French Protestants.]

A. E. T.

An Introduction to Sociology for Social Workers and General Readers.

By J. J. FINDLAY. Manchester and London, 1920. Pp. viii, 304.

Prof. Findlay has written an excellent introduction to Sociology. It is well balanced, lucidly written and shows throughout a philosophical detachment in face of the many burning questions that are touched upon with fine judgment. The book is especially interesting by reason of the fact that it has been written in the midst of the present great upheavals of social organisations, with all their possibilities of disaster and hopes of progress, and the author has not neglected the opportunities offered by them to the philosophical sociologist. He bases his sociology frankly upon psychology, and is content to pass skilfully over the difficult question of the boundary between these sciences. Perhaps the most severe criticism that could be made is that he has not used his psychological groundwork sufficiently; and this defect is due to his not having attained a sufficiently definite psychological position, and is perhaps attributable to the state of psychology rather than to any deficiency on the part of the author. It is illustrated by his discussion of the gregarious instinct, which leaves the reader uncertain whether he accepts or repudiates it as a constituent of human nature. His polemic against the gregarious instinct seems to have been prompted by Mr. Trotter's riotous application of the conception as the key to all sociological problems, which naturally enough tends to provoke a reaction against all such speculative application of psychological conceptions. The author's general attitude may be described as sanely and optimistically democratic. It is well illustrated by the following passage—"Every day it becomes more clear that one of the chief tasks of statesmanship will hereafter be concerned not so much in governing the people by superior authority as by organising in harmonious schemes the manifold groups devoted to occupation, to locality, to culture; and by using these, in friendly rivalry with each other, for the highest purposes of national and international advancement".

W. McD.

The Psychology of Persuasion. By WILLIAM MACPHERSON, M.A.
London, 1920. Pp. 256.

This is a brightly written popular exposition of the methods and rôle of 'persuasion' as a factor in social life. The word 'persuasion' is used in a wide sense to include all that is more technically called 'suggestion,' as well as appeals to reason and sentiment. The author does not aim at psychological precision or subtlety, but there is little or no serious fault to be found from the psychological standpoint. He has brought together many interesting illustrations of the principles he expounds.

W. McD.

I Primi Scritti di Kant (1746-1760). By AUGUSTO GUZZO. Naples, 1920. Pp. vii, 126.

The author reviews successively the early 'pre-critical' writings of Kant from the essay on the *True Measure of Vis Viva* to the *Reflections on Optimism* called forth by the famous earthquake of Lisbon. There is a conditional promise of a continuation in which Kant's work from 1760 to 1781 will receive similar treatment. The criticisms are made from the general standpoint of a non-theistic spiritualistic pluralism. One may doubt whether the whole point of view is not too far removed from that adopted by Kant at any period of his thought to make such criticism specially valuable. But much of Kant's 'pre-critical' work is excellent reading, and most of it is much less generally known than it deserves to be.

A. E. T.

The Psychology of the Future. By EMILE BOIRAC. Translated and edited with an Introduction by W. DE KERLOR. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. N.D. [1918]. Pp. x, 322.

In his *Psychologie Inconnue*, of which a second edition appeared in 1912, and his *Avenir des Sciences Psychiques* (1917), which also Dr. de Kerlor has now translated, M. Boirac showed himself to be one of the most philosophically competent, level-headed, and scientifically-minded of the writers on psychical subjects, and his books richly deserved to be translated. He tends indeed a little too much to classification, and the invention of technical terms, as if he thought that they were very important and really contributed to rendering a subject more scientific, and what is more serious, though he has evidently experimented and claims to have had considerable success, he nowhere gives an account of his experiments full enough to enable his reader really to appraise their value. This would appear to be an error of tactics, for however great the confidence a writer may inspire by his sobriety and candour, the subject is not yet in such a condition that writers on it can rely entirely on the impression of good faith and competence which they may produce. The translator has equipped the book with some illustrations of M. Boirac's methods, though they are not expressly stated to be his; he has also taken some liberties with the text, mostly by way of omission. The translation cannot be pronounced good; errors like *ignorer* 'ignore' (p. 57), *assistants* 'assistants' (pp. 150, 206), *être parti de*, 'to be a partisan of' (p. 94) are inexcusable.

F. C. S. S.

Le Néo-Réalisme Américain. By RENÉ KREMER, C.S.S.R., Louvain, Institut de Philosophie, 1920. Pp. x, 310.

It was no slight task Father Kremer of Louvain set himself when he undertook to give to the world a complete account of the doctrines, antecedents, and affiliations of American 'Neo-Realism'. For not only is the literature extensive, scattered, controversial and not easily rendered coherent, but, as he himself notices in quoting the complaints of James and Santayana (pp. 21, 106), it is too often couched in a repulsive and illiterate style. Nevertheless he has read, collated and considered everything, and so produced an exhaustive work which will be found a good and trustworthy guide through the labyrinth. The more so that his attitude towards his subject is one of neutral interest; he interprets and combines neither in a hostile nor in an apologetic spirit, and even the conviction he is bound to hold, *viz.*, that all this new realism, in so far as it is true, is only a re-discovery of the old truth delivered to S. Thomas Aquinas, is not obtruded. The book is a credit to the philosophic school of Louvain.

F. C. S. S.

The Field of Philosophy: an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. Second, revised and enlarged, edition. Columbus, O.: R. G. Adams & Co., 1919. Pp. viii, 485.

So long as philosophers attempt to teach philosophy by narrating its history, there will probably be a continuous flow of 'Introductions' to philosophy. For as such histories must be necessarily highly selective, each professor will want to make his own, and they will all grow antiquated, because, when new points arise and new issues become important, the old selections will always be found to have omitted the anticipations of them in the earlier philosophising. The present work, which attempts to include too much, and so is rather too crowded and compressed, follows in the main the path of safety along conventional lines. But it has the merit of being clearly and simply written, from a moderate rationalist standpoint; which, being interpreted, means, without too pedantic a regard for consistency. Prof. Leighton is anxious to exhibit the religious 'God' on good terms with the philosophic 'Absolute,' and hedges judiciously on the burning questions, new and old.

F. C. S. S.

An Examination of William James's Philosophy: a Critical Essay for the General Reader. By J. E. TURNER. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. vi, 76.

Mr. Turner's attitude towards William James's philosophy is neither very profound nor very consistent. His interest in philosophy has apparently a religious motive, and in the last chapter ("Religion and the Sub-conscious") he applauds James's fundamental contentions.

"Certainly it is in the sphere of religion, if anywhere, that Pragmatism comes into its own; for here at least we can never exclude for a moment the practical results of our principles; here it is eternally true that 'By their fruits ye shall know them'" (p. 65).

Nevertheless, Mr. Turner is "sincerely of the opinion that James is not 'on the side of the angels'" (Preface, p. vi.). The only ground for this opinion seems to be Mr. Turner's personal affection for the absolutist conception of truth. He makes the curious assertion that the coherence-

theory of truth "is one which James does not appear to have dealt with at all" (p. 26); presumably because James himself prefers to deal with it in the more concrete form of monism. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Turner fails to understand the pragmatic alternative to that strangely incoherent theory; and has not realised the sceptical implications of his own assertion that "it is an almost obvious commonplace that no system of pure principles, and no high ideal, will 'work' in our actual world; what 'works' there is never truth, but compromise" (p. 14). In Mr. Turner's view, if theories do not fit facts, so much the worse for the facts—even if they *really are* facts. But surely there is *some* point at which neglect of facts ceases to be an adequate expression of our devotion to the truth?

H. V. KNOX.

Space and Time in Contemporary Physics: an Introduction to the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation. By MORITZ SCHLICK. Translated by H. L. BROSE. Introduction by F. A. LINDEMANN. Clarendon Press. Pp. x, 88.

This little book, by the professor of philosophy in the University of Rostock, may be confidently recommended to all those who want an accurate and non-technical account of the concepts of Einstein's theory of relativity, and the reasons that have rendered some such overhauling of traditional physics indispensable. One very great merit of the book is that it really is consistently relativistic from beginning to end. After reading many expositions of the theory one has an uneasy feeling that a view which recommended itself at the outset by its success in laying the ghosts of absolute space, time, and motion, has ended by becoming obsessed with them in its cosmological speculations. This *may* be due simply to verbal carelessness in the writers; but it is liable to produce great bewilderment in the reader. Prof. Schlick does devote a chapter to Einstein's later cosmological theories about the finitude of the world, but he manages to express himself in such a way that they appear to be—as, I believe, they really are—quite compatible with the most complete relativity of space, time, and motion. The book ends with a chapter on the connexion of the new theories with epistemology and the psychology of sense-perception. The author regards the extreme phenomenalism of Mach as possible; but he holds that it is not necessitated by the facts, and that it is unduly restrictive of the possible contents of the physical world.

The translator is to be congratulated on presenting the British public with a valuable introduction to this vitally important subject in an agreeable and accurate form.

C. D. BROAD.

Hauptlinien der Entwicklung der Philosophie von Mitte des 19. Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart. HARALD K. SCHJELDERUP. Kristiania: Jacob Dyswad, 1920. Pp. viii, 278.

This work in its original form was awarded the Monrad gold medal by the University of Christiania; the translation into German has been accomplished by the author himself, and it certainly inspires confidence in his ability to interpret the numerous philosophers of that race who are dealt with in his sketch of the modern developments of thought.

He recognises that his task has both an artistic and a scientific side—artistic, because every philosophy is the expression of a distinctive

personality, an individual achievement—and scientific, because the movement from one system to another is co-determined by the general tendencies of the environment, economic, scientific, cultural and religious, as well as by the previous history of philosophy itself. He takes the function of the historian, here as elsewhere, to be that of the observer and reporter—not of the critic or the judge. His treatment is, as far as it can be so, purely objective, although here and there one may get a glimpse of his personal sympathies. There is an over-emphasis, perhaps, of materialism, positivism, pragmatism; English philosophy in general hardly receives sufficient justice; Green, Bradley, Sidgwick, Bosanquet, Bertrand Russell are all out of the picture; in pragmatism, Schiller has the barest mention. On the other hand, the psychological tendencies in modern thought and their influence on both science and philosophy are clearly recognised; admirable outlines are given, for example, of the work of Fechner, Wundt, Guyau, Münsterberg and James. The purely scientific aspects and influences are also skilfully handled;—atomism and energetics, the relativity theory (the earlier "special" relativity of Einstein, not the later "general" relativity), the evolution-theories, vitalism, etc.

The Introduction describes "the collapse of speculative idealism," and the remarkable upward movement in science in the earlier part of the nineteenth century; the main work is divided into four sections of varying length, (1) the development of natural philosophy from Materialism to Energetics; (2) Inductive Idealism; (3) Positivism; (4) Neo-Idealism and Neo-Romanticism. In the second section, the chief figures are Fechner, Lotze, von Hartmann and Wundt; in the third, on positivism, there are various subdivisions,—the foundations of positivism in Comte and Mill; the correlativism of Laas and Schuppe; the biological and pragmatist development in Spencer, Mach, Avenarius, and James; the idealistic trend in Lange and Vaihinger; and finally the "transformation of values" in Nietzsche. The last section refers mainly to Münsterberg's metaphysic of values, to Bergson, and to James' mysticism.

The more recent movements are treated sympathetically, especially the main trend back to a more direct and immediate appreciation of reality, to the "fresh, bright morning-world of our childhood and of the young races"; it is shown in pragmatism, "an uncritical, popular philosophy," yet a movement of great interest to the historian as a "very typical sign of the times"; in the anti-rationalism of Vaihinger's philosophy of the "as if," with its reduction of thought to fiction; in Windelband and Münsterberg's definition of the sphere of philosophy as the world of values, treated "not as facts, but as norms"; and in Bergson's treatment of thought as "an annex of the world of action".

The counter-movements are not given the space or even the mention that they may be thought to deserve; but—with that reservation—the volume should prove a most useful guide through the maze of modern philosophy.

J. L. M.

La Psychologie Française Contemporaine. By GEORGES DWELSHAUVERS.
Paris: Alcan. Pp. xi, 256.

At the suggestion of the late Th. Ribot the author of this book has striven to do for French psychology what Ribot himself had done for the German and English psychology of the last generation. He has obviously spared no pains to carry out his task and has produced a survey of French psychology well calculated to support the claim, "que le sceptre de la psychologie, réservé à la France depuis le xvii^e siècle, n'a pu lui être

enlevé et qu'il appartient sans conteste, aujourd'hui comme à l'époque classique, au pays de Montaigne et de Pascal, de Descartes et de Malebranche, de La Rochefoucauld et de Vauvenargues". The survey starts with the work of Maine de Biran and ends with that of Bergson. The several chapters trace the main currents of psychological thought: the inspiration of Maine de Biran, the contributions of Jouffroy and the eclectic school; the opposition thereto expressed in the positivism of Comte, in the sociological psychology of Durkheim, Lévy Bruhl and Le Bon, in the rational psychology of Cournot and Renouvier and in the neo-Aristotelianism of Ravaisson; the development on the one hand of a scientific psychology by Taine, Ribot, Binet, Janet, Paulhan and Tarde, and on the other of a philosophical psychology by such representatives of idealism as Fouillée, Lachelier, Hannequin and Lagneau, and of a psychology of religion by Boutroux. In the final chapter the author gives not only a summary of Bergson's philosophy and psychology but also an interesting criticism of his leading psychological ideas.

The stream of thought is thus shown to have had many and varied currents, but from the survey certain features emerge for the reader as characteristic of contemporary French psychology: (a) the influence of vitalism which manifests itself again and again in the dynamic treatment of consciousness, in the repudiation of the attempt to view mental phenomena as elements and compounds, and in the rejection of mechanism; (b) the faith in the method of self-observation, whether it be simply as a source of psychological data, as in Maine de Biran, Taine, Binet, or as a source of philosophic truth, reflexion, "the thought of thought," as in Lachelier and Ravaisson; (c) the interest in the concrete psychology of human beings as persons, witness the "Essais" of Taine, the character study of Fouillée and Paulhan, the use of pathology and experiment by Ribot, Binet and Janet as methods subserving this interest rather than as methods for studying detached psychological processes; (d) the close connexion between psychology and speculative philosophy and religion and again between psychology and art.

M. Dwelshauvers appears to have no knowledge of present day English psychology. It is always alluded to in terms which can only fitly refer to the psychology of James Mill or to that of Spencer. Similarly his references to German psychology are restricted to physiological and experimental work. To expect such knowledge is perhaps to expect too much from one who has made such a detailed study of the writings of his own countrymen, but its absence entails the loss of interesting parallels in the development of psychological thought.

A greater consistency in the practice of inserting dates and lists of principal works would increase the value of the book, which is one to be heartily recommended to all students of contemporary psychology.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Spiritualism and the New Psychology. An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge. By MILLAIS CULPIN, with an Introduction by Prof. LEONARD HILL. London: Edward Arnold, 1920. Pp. xvi, 159.

Dr. Culpin's book is intended as a counterblast to modern credulity and the willingness to ascribe any puzzling psychical phenomenon to the agency of 'spirits'. It attacks these tendencies by an 'explanation' constructed out of the theory of dissociation and the theory of the 'unconscious' (after the fashion of Freud) and fused together by an ingenious suggestion of his own that the malingerer may grow into an

hysteric by a 'repression' of the knowledge of his own deceit, so that "a man believing firmly in his own honesty may yet practice elaborate trickery and deceit" (p. iii). With this explanation he traverses the whole field of the 'occult,' in a simple and attractive, though rather elementary, style, and finds no difficulty he cannot surmount. It is clear throughout that his practical experience of the subject has been derived from the study of 'shell-shock' cases, while his theoretic convictions are those of a very advanced irrationalism, which comes out well in the conclusion that "the ideal human mind would be perfectly integrated, there would be no logic-tight compartments, all its complexes would be apparent to the consciousness, all memories available when needed, all emotions assigned to their proper cause and all instincts recognised and well directed; and the owner of it would find life in our world intolerable" (p. 157). But if so, what is the use of argument? And if "it is useless to attack rationalisations in an effort to penetrate a logic-tight compartment; as soon as one defence is broken down, another is built up" (p. 131), does it not occur to Dr. Culpin that beliefs which are necessary to the carrying on of life cannot in the long run be declared 'false'? Prof. Hill's Introduction, though it hardly strengthens the argument of the book, provides an excellent and typical specimen of 'medical materialism'.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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- The Letters of William James*, edited by his son, H. James, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920, Vol. I., pp. xx, 348; Vol. II., pp. xii, 382.
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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (the title is shortened as from 1921). xvii. (1920), 16. **H. W. Wright.** 'The Basis of Human Association.' ["Is personal communication carried on through discussion, co-operation and emotional concord."] **L. J. Henderson.** 'The Locus of Teleology in a Mechanistic Universe.' [Reply to Holt in xvii., 14.] **K. S. Miller.** 'The Logical Necessity of a Constant in the Concept of Space.' [Argues against Relativity from the assumption that absolute change is inconceivable.] xvii., 17. **H. T. Costello.** 'Professor Dewey's "Judgments of Practice".' [Distinguishes truth-claim, truth, use and verification, but urges against Dewey considerations he would himself insist on.] **F. C. S. Schiller.** 'The Place of Metaphysics.' [Shows historically that the notion has always been ambiguous, and that three conceptions of the relation of metaphysics to the sciences had been in vogue according as metaphysics had (a) claimed to determine the principles of science, (b) to be independent of the sciences, or (c) to systematise scientific principles. The first alternative having been confuted by the history of the sciences, and the second demanding for metaphysics a distinctive subject-matter and method, which it failed to establish, it is open to the third to raise the question of *value* both about the real and the known, and to introduce an allowance for the *valuer*; with the result that metaphysics actually achieves what it desired, by undoing the abstraction from values and personality which was assumed in the sciences.] **J. E. Turner.** 'The Bases of Croce's Logic; A Criticism.' [Concludes that since "science 'is composed of pseudo-concepts,' it must falsify the pure concept, falsify 'the universal that is truly universal,'" which, nevertheless, it establishes!] xvii., 18. **R. S. Lillie.** 'The Place of Life in Nature.' [A plea for recognising alongside of the mechanical and calculable "in nature an element making for the production of novelty," while admitting that "to call this novelty-producing or creative element in reality 'volitional,' or to ascribe to it consciousness, purpose and ethical intention, is in a sense to anthropomorphise nature".] **L. E. Hicks.** 'Shall we Exclude Elementary Judgments from Logic?' [Versus R. C. Lodge.] xvii., 19. **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'Ends and Means in Ethical Theory.' [Admits the great value of pragmatism, but thinks that it "has failed to emphasise the importance of intrinsic goods".] **A. W. Moore.** 'Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism.' [In W. Fite and G. P. Adams.] **R. H. Dotterer.** 'The Distribution of the Predicate.' [Defends it against Toohey.] xvii., 20. **E. S. Brightman.** 'Modern Idealism.' [Is hopeful about the outlook for 'personalist' idealism as opposed to 'speculative'.] **T. de Laguna.** 'The Lesser Hippias.' [Defends its authenticity.] xvii., 21. **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'The Need for a Pluralistic Emphasis in Ethics.' [There is "neither one unified *summum bonum* nor one single course of right conduct," because "the goods of life are utterly incommensurable" and "we must recognise an ultimate pluralism of goods which no pious wishes can synthesise into a simple monism" by any formal principle. There

results "a pluralism of obligation or duty, such that it is impossible to maintain that one and only one, among several possible choices, is alone morally right".] **S. Cody.** 'Enlarging the Scope of Mental Measurement.' [Sensible comment, from a practical point of view, showing up the composite character of the 'general intelligence' tests.] **H. W. Carr.** 'Dr. Wildon Carr's Theory of the Relation of Mind and Body.' [Reply to J. E. Turner in xvii., 10.] xvii., 22. **A. O. Lovejoy.** 'Pragmatism as Interactionism,' I. [Apropos of *Creative Intelligence*: discovers a 'shift of emphasis' in pragmatism to the efficacy of intelligence which makes mechanistic naturalism its chief enemy. However it also repudiates dualism and denies the existence of any specifically 'psychical' element in experience or behaviour, so that it seems to come out finally as "an anti-mechanistic materialism".] **H. H. Parkhurst.** 'The Obscurescence of Consciousness.' [Man dotes upon consciousness as something "cherished for its own sake" and desires it "in maximum intensity and duration entirely irrespective of any end to be accomplished". Yet it is always slipping from him into the unconscious as habits and traditions grow up. This conduces to efficiency, but is none the less deplorable.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Relativity, Nature and Matter.' [Criticises Eddington's article in *MIND*, No. 114.] xvii., 23. **H. B. Alexander.** 'Philosophy in Deliquescence.' [A tirade against academic professionalism which has 'abdicated the inheritance of Plato' and shinks from intervention in live issues.] **A. O. Lovejoy.** 'Pragmatism as Interactionism,' II. [Shows that pragmatism cannot dispense with the 'psychical' side in behaviour, because intelligent action, 'practical judgments' and 'plans of action' all imply the presence of the future (and of the past) in thought. Consequently psycho-physical dualism is *not* avoided, and the 'efficacy of intelligence' involves a form of interactionism which should be developed further.] **A. R. Chandler.** 'The Nature of Aesthetic Objectivity.' [It is an aspiration towards which actual aesthetic judgments may converge, and is to be found by looking "forward into the richest and most harmonious forms of possible experience".] xvii., 24. **D. S. Robinson.** 'Reality as a Transient Now.' [Dialectical criticism, objecting that it cuts off the past and the future, makes progress impossible, reduces to solipsism, and concluding that "the attempt to find a standing-place of certainty on the rock of the now in the stream of time is utterly futile".] **A. A. Roback.** 'The Scope and Genesis of Comparative Psychology.' [The term should neither be equated with *animal* psychology nor dropped from the *Psychological Index*, but kept for comprehensive surveys of the psychological field.] **P. H. Weber.** 'Behaviourism and Indirect Responses.' [Contents against J. B. Watson that in his notion of the *substitution* of one reaction for another there still lurks a reference to consciousness, purpose and value.] xvii., 25. **L. Buermeyer.** 'Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought.' [Criticism of *How We Think* as not being sufficiently detailed in its analysis, though Dewey's view of the nature and function of thought is accepted.] **M. W. Calkins.** 'The Metaphysical Monist as a Sociological Pluralist.' [Contents that these two persons may be one.] **H. Alexander.** *A Lover of the Chair.* [Review of a book by S. B. Gass.] xvii., 26. **E. E. Sabin.** 'Giving up the Ghost.' ['Mind' is a 'ghost', "like gravity, sickness, or vital principle, simply an abstract name for certain concrete desirable relationships," but now "this most stubborn of ghosts must make room for what is valuable—a description of consciousness as a unique relationship which may maintain on occasion between a living organism and its world".] **L. P. Boggs.** 'A Glimpse into Mysticism and the Faith State.' [Regards as the essence of mysticism a pleasurable emotional state of relaxation in which antagonistic ideas have dropped away.] xviii. (1921), 1. **G. P. Conger.** 'Santayana and

Modern Liberal Protestantism.' [Even this need not swallow Santayana's reduction of religion to 'myth'.] **B. H. Bode.** 'Intelligence and Behaviour.' [Reply to Lovejoy in xvii., 22, 23. Contends that "the road of progress does not lead through the psycho-physical problem at all but around it," and that "unless we abandon the category of interactionism we are back on the level of mechanistic naturalism, from which the position of instrumentalism is intended to provide a means of escape". By taking the 'psychic' as "a distinguishable aspect, but not a separate link, in the chain of causation," the efficacy of intelligence and the denial of interaction can be combined.] xviii., 2. **S. Unna.** 'A Conception of Philosophy.' ["The final test of a philosophy is its power to satisfy an aesthetic demand, a passion for order and harmony and lucidity."] **R. C. Lodge.** 'Modern Logic and the Elementary Judgment.' [Reply to Hicks, xvii., 18.] **E. E. Slosson.** 'Eddington on Einstein.' [Review of *Space, Time and Gravitation*.]

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Louvain. xxii^e Année. No. 88. November, 1920. **M. de Wulf.** *L'Individu et le Groupe dans la Scolastique du xiii^e Siècle.* [Social theory was the last part of philosophy to be developed by the scholastics. Their serious study of it begins with William of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Politics*, c. A.D., 1250, This is followed by Guibert of Tournai's *Eruditio regum*, the *de regimine principum* of St. Thomas, etc. The fundamental thesis of all scholastic social philosophy is that the state exists for the good of the citizen, not the citizen for the good of the state. The ethical foundation of this theory is the conception of the infinite worth of "personal happiness," a conception naturally enforced by the theological doctrine of the redemption of the soul by Christ. Society is necessary simply because the individual cannot attain the supreme personal felicity of knowledge and love in a solitary state. (This, though the author does not say so, is of course a reversion to the Platonic standpoint; cf. *Republic*, 369 b.) Unlike Aristotle, St. Thomas or Dante does not regard the "city" as the supreme social organism, but rather the *provincia* (St. Thomas) or the *regnum* (Dante). This is, of course, due to the actual political developments of the thirteenth century. Since the "community" exists for the service of the individual, its good = the personal good of each and all of its members. *Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e converso* (Dante). From this non-Aristotelian individualism follows the belief of the schoolmen in in-prescriptible 'natural rights' independent of the 'state'. The sacrosanctity of these rights depends in the end on the metaphysical position that the single person, unlike the collective 'personality' of the state, is a substance. (Possibly M. de Wulf exaggerates a little in what he says about the non-Aristotelian character of these ideas. The emphasis on the claims of the individual is new, but, as M. de Wulf of course knows, it would be easy to cite texts from the *Politics* which contain the germs of the theory of 'natural rights'.) This line of thought is worked out by the jurists and canonists who brought the state or the church under the principles of the Roman law of corporation, since the Roman view of the corporation is that it is neither more nor less than an association of individuals. This refusal to ascribe real personality to a corporation shows the eminent sanity of the political thought of the schoolmen. Metaphysically the unity they ascribe to a social group is simply a *unitas ordinis*, i.e., unity of the members in functioning together for certain specific ends. The view that the middle ages knew nothing of the worth of the 'individual as such' rests on a misunderstanding of the whole doctrine. The comparison of the church or the state with a human body,

common from the time of John of Salisbury onwards, is meant for no more than an analogical illustration, like Tennyson's comparison of the "mob" with a milliped. The metaphysical doctrine of the individual person as a substance is thus the very foundation of the ethics and social theory which protect 'personal' rights against the encroachments of the 'leviathan'.] **E. Gilson.** *Météores Cartésiens et Météores Scolastiques*. [A learned and interesting examination of the degree to which the *Météores* of Descartes is influenced by scholastic Meteorology and the points in which Descartes departs from the tradition. The article, of which the present issue contains only the first part, is too technical for summary here, but should not be overlooked by any student specially interested in Cartesian Natural Science.] **W. Jacobs.** *Quelques Observations sur la Synthèse Asymétrique*. [Deals with the light thrown by recent experiment on the reticular structure of crystals.] Note on the Oxford Philosophical Congress. Obituary of the well-known Austrian philosopher, Otto Willmann (d. July, 1920). Reviews (one of *A History of Mediæval Political Theory in the West*, by **R. W. and A. J. Carlyle**). List of recent publications.

VIII.—NOTES.

"COMMON SENSE AND THE RUDIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY."

IN the October number of *MIND* (under "New Books") Mr. L. J. Russell makes some appreciative references to my book on "Common Sense and the Rudiments of Philosophy," while indicating—what I fully admit—that its discussion of philosophy is rudimentary and needs developing. (Page 14 contains reference to problems "reserved for a future treatise". On this I have been for long, and am still, at work.)

Unfortunately two of Mr. Russell's criticisms are based upon (doubtless unintentional) misquotations. The worst case is the first, where he quotes me as saying that the mental image "begins to exist when something handled or seen is recognised, not merely as similar to what we have handled or seen before, but as the very same thing which we previously recognised," and adds the query, "On what, then, is the recognition based?" The words actually contained in my book (on p. 17) are "previously perceived," not "previously recognised," so that my critic has here sub-consciously created the fallacy which he indirectly charges me with!

In the other case it is said that "sense-data" (the critic quotes) are described by me as giving us our fundamental knowledge of the physical world. The sentence referred to (on p. 79) does not mention "sense-data," but reads, "It is, however, in referring to material objects of visible and tangible dimensions that touch and sight give us our fundamental knowledge of the physical world". In a subsequent sentence, I say, "We at least believe that we perceive, not merely sense-data as such, but things themselves through the immediate sense-data".

Now I certainly should not say that touch and sight *are* sense-data. In the first place, these terms mean something more than actual touching and seeing. In the second place, actual touching and seeing mean something more than the immediate sense-data of the respective senses. "Touch" and "sight" signify permanent aptitudes, or capacities, on the part of the individual, for touching and seeing, and cover all his successive personal experiences of these orders. Some of these experiences are evoked by stimuli, such as being pushed or struck, or seeing an infuriated bull approaching, which enforce attention independently of our own wills. Others—the more important sort for scientific observation—proceed from a deliberately inquisitive or explorative attitude; from touching with intent to ascertain the nature of the thing touched, or focussing the eyes on something with a similar purpose. In the latter case we solicit fresh and clear sense-data from something already vaguely sensed and consciously referred to as outside ourselves, with the object of knowing it better. In both cases, however, the conscious reference to externality accompanies the sense-data felt, and it is only because it does so that touch and sight can be said to "give us our fundamental knowledge of the external world".

While sense-data (or particular passing sensations of specific sorts) are, for psychology, exactly what they appear to be to the person who has them, for epistemology they *mean* much more than they *are*. They are taken as signs of real relationship between the percipient and the per-

ceived. The relation is, on one side, essentially cognitive, but it indicates the circumstantial spatial relations of actual contact with, or direction of the eyes towards, the object. These relations may be observed to subsist when two persons shake hands or take hold of the same rope, or when one person sees another looking at the same object which has attracted his own attention.

CHARLES E. HOOPER.

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1st February, 1921.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

In connexion with the above Library, we are endeavouring to supply the various university libraries on the Continent with the scientific journals they urgently need.

Among the periodicals for which we have received a pressing demand *MIND* is frequently mentioned, and I very much hope that you will be good enough to publish this letter in your columns, so that any of your readers having copies of your journal from 1914 onwards may hear of our appeal. Any numbers of the periodical which readers may feel they can dispense with, will be most gratefully welcomed.

The Library is entirely non-political and non-sectarian, its sole object being to enable humanity at large to benefit in the future, as it has done in the past, from the research of European scholars. Such research has been brought almost to a standstill from the fact that European centres of learning have been cut off since 1914, first of all by the blockade and more recently by the exceedingly unfavourable position of the foreign exchanges, from English and American thought.

I fervently hope that some of your readers may be able to help in supplying the literary needs of Central Europe. A copy of the prospectus of the Library will gladly be sent to anyone desiring a fuller account of its work and objects.

I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,

B. M. HEADICAR.
Hon. Secretary.

INVITATION FROM THE SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE
PHILOSOPHIE.

Monsieur Xavier Léon, President of the Société Française de Philosophie, has sent the following letter to Professor Wildon Carr, Honorary Secretary of the Aristotelian Society (107 Church Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3), as representing the English Societies which took part in the Congress of Philosophy at Oxford in September, 1920.

Paris, le 28 Février, 1921.

CHER MONSIEUR WILDON CARR,

J'ai le plaisir de vous informer que, dans sa réunion du 24 Février, la Société française de philosophie a décidé adresser aux Sociétés anglaises de

philosophie qui l'ont invitée à participer au meeting d'Oxford l'offre de venir à Paris assister à une session extraordinaire de la Société française de philosophie qui sera donnée en leur honneur.

Elle a attendu, pour pouvoir leur faire cette offre, d'avoir l'assurance qu'elle pourrait publier les mémoires présentés : elle avait fait, à cet égard, une demande de crédit au ministère compétent. Elle a eu tout dernièrement la satisfaction de voir cette demande accueillie et elle s'est aussitôt réunie pour prendre la décision que je m'empresse de vous communiquer.

La date proposée serait la semaine qui sépare le Noël du premier jour de l'an, époque à laquelle nos collègues sont en vacances et n'ont pas d'examens à faire passer comme au mois de Juillet. J'espère qu'elle vous conviendra.

Notre ami E. Halévy qui doit venir bientôt à Londres s'entendra avec vous sur les modalités de la participation. Dès maintenant je puis vous dire que nous comptons organiser quatre sections distinctes : Logique et philosophie des Sciences ; Psychologie et Métaphysique ; Morale et Sociologie ; Histoire de la Philosophie. Les mémoires présentés ne devraient pas dépasser quinze pages d'impression.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre l'offre de la Société française de philosophie aux Sociétés qui l'ont si gracieusement reçue l'an passé et auxquelles elle adresse son souvenir reconnaissant.

Croyez, cher Monsieur Wildon Carr, à mes sentiments cordialement dévoués.

XAVIER LÉON.

MIND ASSOCIATION.

The Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Cambridge on Saturday, 9th July. The hour and place of meeting will be announced in the July number of MIND.

